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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the role played by public opinion in the regulation of genomics, and 
conversely the role that regulation plays in shaping public opinion.  It is argued that 
there has been an over-emphasis on the use of public opinion by regulators, and that this 
is a rhetorical strategy.  There are strong normative drivers behind the regulation of 
genomics, which include the argument that regulation has the capacity to imbue public 
confidence in novel technologies and that enhanced deliberation will help to placate 
public concerns.  While not dismissing these arguments, the thesis shows that in 
practice the interaction between regulation and public opinion is not so clear.  It is 
argued that both regulation per se and the very existence and visible presence of 
independent regulatory agencies overseeing genomics can help to alleviate public 
concern. A key finding is that although regulators refer to public opinion, in practice 
they actually respond to stakeholder opinion.  The thesis analyses the classic 
interpretation of public opinion, survey data, and contrasts it with regulators’ 
understandings of public opinion and with public opinion data collected by independent 
regulatory agencies.  The regulators interviewed agree that the public opinion data used 
in the regulatory process is not representative of public opinion.  However, public 
opinion is still used as a way of legitimating policy.  It is for this reason that I suggest 
‘public opinion’ should, for reasons of transparency, be called ‘public opinion data’. 
Such a move would reflect its value in the regulatory process, but equally indicate that 
such data has inherent limitations.  The argument is supported by evidence from two 
case-studies from genomics, both of which are significant areas of scientific and public 
concern.  The first is prenatal testing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and 
the second is Genetically Modified foods.  The thesis questions whether the sui generis 
features of genomics merit its special regulatory handling and the enhanced role given 
to public opinion in this area. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
What is this thing called public opinion? Can such a fluid concept be ring-fenced? If not 
then how can we measure the role it plays in the regulatory process and conversely, the 
role that regulation plays in shaping public views?  In this thesis I analyse the 
relationship between public opinion and regulation in the case of genomics.  I show that 
public opinion has multiple definitions and understandings and it is these 
understandings that I attempt to isolate as the public opinion input is incorporated into 
the regulatory process.  From the outset it is apparent that while there is an enormous 
business in the collection and collation of survey data pertaining to our daily lives and 
attitudes, it is not clear where and how this data is being interpreted and digested by the 
regulatory-policy process.  More specifically, there is a huge amount of data relating to 
the public opinion of genomics. Sturgis and Allum, for example, identify 298 
publications, 236 studies, 140 knowledge questions, 85 interests questions and 817 
attitude questions in relation to biomedical science in the meta-review they conducted 
covering 1980-2006.1 This illustrates an enormous push for data collection which is 
driven by the narratives relating to the potential risks and concerns seen as emerging 
from novel technological developments.  This thesis is concerned with the paucity of 
discussion relating to how this data is being used, and to issues of consistency.  While 
survey data per se is referred to in the regulation and policy documents, it is more often 
the results of consultation exercises which are discussed.  This raises the question as to 
why and for what purpose the survey data is being collected.  Further, there is, I argue, 
an enormous gap between these two gauges of public opinion (survey data versus 
consultation exercises) in terms of the way the resulting data is utilised.  It is both this 
gap, and the utilisation and response to the public opinion data, which I am studying in 
order to shed light on the function of public opinion as an input into the regulatory 
process.  It is not simply a one-way process however, and the interaction between 
regulation and public opinion is additionally viewed from the perspective of how 
regulation per se can alleviate public concerns.  The idea that regulation has the capacity 
                                                          
1
 Sturgis, Patrick and Allum, Nick, ‘A Literature Review of Research Conducted on Public Interest, 
Knowledge and Attitudes to Biomedical Science’, prepared for the Wellcome Trust, August 2006, at p.2. 
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to bring resolution to the public over the use of genomic technologies is examined and 
interrogated in the thesis. 
The thesis focuses on two case-studies from the regulation of genomics: Genetically 
Modified (GM) foods and prenatal testing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).  
The original reason why two areas of biotechnology were chosen was to generate data 
which might shed light on the role of public opinion in this area of regulation.  This area 
of regulation has been selected because it is important to determine whether these two 
areas of genomics have a sui generis regulatory style.  The thesis argues that the 
idiosyncratic features of genomics as a regulatory object has led to an increased resort to 
public opinion data by the regulators.  Indeed, public opinion has been viewed precisely 
as a means to advance the credibility and legitimacy of the regulatory bodies in this 
field.  The unique nature of the regulatory and institutional design in the regulation of 
genetics is supported by Black who describes it as ‘a morass of regulation’ made up of 
‘an enormously complex set of advisory bodies, regulatory bodies, committees, 
professional bodies and industrial associations’.2 
In the next section of the chapter an overview of the thesis research questions is given. 
This is followed by the central justifications for the research topic and the contribution 
of this thesis to the current literature.  The thesis is situated in the socio-legal literature 
and this is discussed in terms of the interdisciplinary nature of the work.  The chapter 
then describes the methodology and the decision to adopt a mixed methods approach 
involving a combination of diverse sources of data.  The principal data sources, survey 
and interview data, are then discussed in terms of the strengths and limitations of each.  
A section is included on researching observable and non-observable interactions as this 
is considered particularly pertinent in terms of analysing the relationship between public 
opinion and regulation where many interactions are not explicit.  For instance, 
significant decisions may be made in committees and not added to the meeting minutes.  
Finally a chapter-by-chapter overview of the thesis is given. 
                                                          
2
 Black, Julia, ‘Regulation as Facilitation: Negotiating the Genetic Revolution’, p.29 in Brownsword, 
Roger, Cornish, W.R., Llewelyn, Margaret, ‘Law and Human Genetics: Regulating a Revolution’, Hart 
1998. 
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1.1  Analytical Framing and the Research Questions 
The central research question of this thesis is ‘how does public opinion interact with 
regulation in the case of genomics?’ This question is complicated by the fact that the 
relationship between public opinion and regulation is two-directional and possibly even 
three-directional. Thus the research considers two correlate questions: what is the 
impact of public opinion on the regulation of genomics? And what impact does 
regulation have on public opinion in the case of genomics?  Below, these two questions 
have been further broken down in order to illustrate how the thesis has gone about 
answering them. 
1. What is the impact of public opinion on the regulation in the case of genomics? 
(i) How is public opinion understood? 
(ii) What is the difference between the rhetoric surrounding the use of public 
opinion in the regulatory process and its role in practice? 
(iii) Has public opinion been given a privileged role in the regulation of genomics? 
2. How does regulation impact on public opinion in the case of genomics? 
(i) Can the regulation of genomics be deemed a discrete area or is it better regulated 
in terms of product? 
(ii) What is the capacity of regulation to alleviate public concerns over GM foods, 
prenatal testing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)? 
(iii) Does the structure of the regulatory bodies, the Independent Regulatory 
Agencies (IRAs), have the capacity to reassure the public in terms of novel 
genetic technologies? 
(iv) Does the knowledge that public consultation processes are inherent in the 
regulation of genomics lead to a symbolic role for the consultation processes 
which helps to reassure the public? 
Evidently these questions are fairly wide-ranging and equally very ambitious in terms of 
the expectations of a PhD thesis.  However, these issues will be addressed to the 
greatest extent possible given the inevitable limitations in a study of this nature.  I 
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contend that the argument given that public opinion enhances regulatory output has 
little or no empirical basis, and while it is democratically laudable it does not lead to 
more effective regulatory output in this field.  However, if one measure of effective 
regulation is the impact upon the public, which in the case of genomics may be to 
reassure them that safety standards are devised to alleviate concern, then it is critical 
that a reliable gauge of public opinion is devised.   
 
In relation to the issue of the impact of regulation on public opinion, the question of 
whether genomics can be classed as a discrete area of regulation will be discussed in 
chapter 3.  It is argued here that the products, techniques and devices which have 
resulted from the techno-science of genomics are regulated more stringently than 
comparable products which result from different arenas of techno-science.  This 
argument posits that this is ineffective regulatory practice, and while it is often 
supported on the grounds of a risk-based approach, there is no evidence for the inflated 
risk arguments.  The thesis explores the role played by the consultation process, asking: 
how does one measure in practice the symbolic role that regulation fulfils?  The 
research undertaken here shows that instances of enhanced deliberative practice in the 
regulatory process lead to greater public acceptance of the technologies regardless of the 
level of responsiveness of the regulatory agency to the public opinion data findings.  
This is something which is intimated in policy formulation in genomics.  Levels of 
responsiveness to public opinion by the regulators are examined in the thesis, but the 
central thread is concerned with analysing what is understood by public opinion and 
how representative are the sources of public opinion data used.  Within the thesis it will 
be asked whether enhanced responsiveness to public opinion leads to an increased 
public acceptance of the regulatory object in question.   
 
1.2 The Contribution of the Study to the Field 
The choice of the regulation of genomics as a case-study for an examination of the 
interaction between regulation and public opinion was made primarily as a response to 
the argument that there are high levels of regulatory responsiveness to public opinion in 
this area.  Indeed, Lezaun and Soneryd talk of ‘the new centrality of the public to 
science and technology policy’ and argue that the vox populi has become a ‘new 
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orthodoxy’.3 In the following chapters this argument will be examined in relation to the 
case-studies.  In the course of reading the literature relating to regulation of genomics 
and attending conferences on genomics in society, I have collated the principal reasons 
given for the enhanced role of public opinion in this field and they are: 
 
1. The regulatory arena 
Regulation in this area is characterised by Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) and 
advisory bodies who operate at arms-length from government and use public opinion 
data gathering as a means to gain credibility and legitimacy in their decision-making.  In 
this thesis I will address the weighting that public opinion is given in the regulation of 
genomics, both rhetorically and in practice, to determine whether a privileged position 
has been attributed to it.  In each of the case-study chapters the regulatory field is 
mapped out and I investigate the hypothesis that the regulatory set-up per se has an 
impact on how public opinion data is utilised in the regulatory process. 
2. The ‘risk’ factor 
An additional feature is that the increased perceived or actual risk from genetic 
technologies leads to an enhanced rationale for increased responsiveness to public 
opinion by the regulatory agencies over and above the cabinet Code of Practice on 
Consultation in such situations.  This Code has been in place since 2000, and sets out 
guidelines on when to consult, the duration of consultation exercises and the 
responsiveness of regulators to the findings of consultation exercises.4  
 
3. The absence of categorical precedence 
At the heart of any discussion about the regulation of genomics is the argument that this 
is an area where there is an absence of categorical precedence.  To put succinctly, if 
there is an absence of categorical precedence then policy makers are unable to draw 
upon policy learning and to manage it as they have done in the past or in relation to a 
                                                          
3
 Lezaun, Javier & Soneryd, Linda, ‘Government by Elicitation:  Engaging Stakeholders or Listening to the 
Idiots?’  CARR Discussion Paper No:34, May 2006 at p.1&2. 
4
 HM Government, Code of Practice on Consultation (3
rd
 Version) 2008. 
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similar issue.5  The argument that there is no categorical precedence is critical as a 
major justification for the high levels of political attention given to genomics.  The idea 
is that the issues raised in the regulation of genomics are singularly unique and pose 
problems which regulators have not encountered before in other fields of regulation.  As 
such the regulators cannot draw upon the rule learning of their past experience.  
Combined with the lack of rule learning is the fact that the technology is creating very 
critical social and ethical dilemmas and there are no frames of reference that can be 
drawn upon.  It is thus concluded and argued by the regulators that genomics needs 
novel and special regulatory handling as it is testing the cognitive limits of the existing 
structures.  One response advocated by regulators has been to give a heightened or 
enhanced role to the public in policy deliberation relating to genomics.  This policy 
position has been accepted as a fait accompli, yet I believe this assumption should be 
open to debate and this is the central justification for this thesis.   
Thus this thesis shows that the regulation of genomics is already endowed with a strong 
rhetorical push which arises from the nature of the issues, the moral and ethical 
implications, and the contested science.  On these grounds it is argued by policy makers 
that there is a need to both educate the public through deliberation and to engage with 
the public in order to obtain their views.   
 
I do however wish to stress that while the reasons above are arguments for the increased 
centrality of public opinion, we should not conclude that an increased responsiveness to 
public opinion data by the regulator is the result.  It is critical that a distinction is made 
between the collection of the data on public opinion and its utilisation within the 
regulatory process.  It is also important that any gap between the rhetoric in the policy 
documents, that public opinion is central to decision-making, and the attention that is 
actually devoted to the public opinion input is examined.  This examination is on two 
levels, in that it needs to address both whether public opinion data is used in the 
regulatory process and subsequently to measure the level of responsiveness of the 
regulatory agencies to this data.  This issue is critical in order to assess whether a more 
responsive regulator leads to more effective regulation.  While discussion of effective 
regulation will be introduced in this thesis it is not a central concern, and more pertinent 
                                                          
5
 Felstiner, Abel & Sarat refer to the concept of the absence of categorical precedence as a generic term 
and not in connection with genomics.  They are cited in Cobb & Ross 1997: TR doc 
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to the current discussion is whether regulation per se has an impact on public opinion 
and whether the public are more complacent, placated, or less hostile towards a 
technology as a consequence of the regulation.  Perhaps this type of thinking equates to 
the traditional idea of public engagement; one where it is viewed as a mechanism to 
educate the public which in turn can lead to public acceptance of the issue debated. 
Thus as stated above, the significant role given to the views of the public in the 
deliberation of regulatory decisions has been accepted as a fait accompli, yet I believe 
this assumption should be open to debate, and this is the central justification for this 
thesis.  The role of public opinion in relation to regulation has not previously been 
examined in this way by mapping different gauges of public opinion data, including the 
views of regulators themselves.  Also, in response to the cries for the increased 
centrality of the public in the regulation of genomics it is necessary to analyse what is 
exactly taking place in order to establish whether it is a justifiable procedural 
development.  Thus, if there is evidence that a greater role is being given to the public, 
then what is the effect of this in terms of regulatory output and public opinion?  These 
last few questions have not been asked or addressed in the existing literature. 
A contradiction arises in that such a fluid concept as public opinion often has different 
meanings, understandings and applications, and yet references made to public opinion 
in the regulatory discourses give the impression that this is not the case.  The 
methodological approach taken here has been to use survey data as one indicator of 
public opinion and to examine it in contrast with other measures of public opinion 
which principally have been the results of consultation exercises carried out by 
regulatory agencies but have also included analysis of the influence of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs).  Such a method has been chosen with the aim of 
providing insights into the role played by public opinion data in the regulatory process.  
In addition to the quantitative element of the thesis, nine elite interviews were 
conducted with regulators.  The interview data gives insights into the regulators’ 
attitudes surrounding the significance and representativeness of public opinion data.  
What emerged from the interview data is that there is a consensus from the interviewees 
that public opinion data is an important input into the regulatory process, but the 
interviewees held that this data equally cannot be taken as truly representative of the 
views of the public, suggesting a rather paradoxical view of public opinion within 
regulatory organisations.  In spite of the strong arguments made about the importance of 
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public opinion in the regulatory process by social scientists, scientists and regulators 
alike, I argue that in practice the regulator, and regulatory agencies, are using 
inconsistent measures of public opinion.  This does not negate the significant role of 
such data in the process.  While regulators accept that the public opinion data used is 
partial, they continue to portray it as representative of public opinion, and such data 
retains a significant influence, both rhetorically and in practice, within regulatory 
decision-making. 
1.3 Situating the Research in the Socio-legal Literature 
This study is situated within the literature on socio-legal studies or law-and-society 
scholarship because this literature and approach illuminates the interactions which take 
place between regulation and public opinion.  Socio-legal studies centres on the analysis 
of the gap between the black letter of the law, the legal text, and the impact of the law in 
practice by looking at ‘law in context’ or ‘law in action’.6  While socio-legal studies 
offers wider angles than taken in this thesis, what is gained from it here is one of its 
central motifs which concerns the ‘theoretical and empirical analysis of law’s social 
consequences and origins’.7  Socio-legal studies crosses disciplinary divides, and this 
thesis also encompasses literature from political science, law and sociology.   
1.4 Methodological Approach 
In responding to the research questions the thesis has become very data-rich in that it 
maps out different sources of public opinion data across time in order to establish the 
representativeness of the data and the role specific sources of public opinion play in the 
regulatory process.  Within this context a greater depth of analysis has been devoted to 
survey data and specifically the British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey as this data has 
been used as a comparator against which the public opinion data collected by the 
Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) has been analysed.  This methodological 
approach is not intended to suggest that the BSA survey is deemed more representative 
or robust than the public consultation exercises, which is a claim made by Sturgis et al.  
                                                          
6
 Selznick, Philip, ‘’Law in Context’ Revisited’, Journal of Law and Society, Volume 30, Number 2, June 
2003, pp.177-186 at p.177. 
7
 Cotterrell, Roger, ‘Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central:  A View of Sociolegal Studies’, Journal of 
Law and Society, Volume 29, No.4, December 2002, pp,632-644 at p.632. 
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Sturgis et al state the following in relation to the cache of genomics questions contained 
in the BSA survey: 
‘While we make no claims to having fostered a public dialogue by administering the 
questions in this survey, we believe that our findings are a good deal more robust and 
representative of public preferences on these issues than can ever be produced by such 
exercises in public ‘consultation’’.8   
This claim is examined in the course of the thesis, although it is difficult to directly 
contradict because the questions posed by the survey do not directly correspond to 
public consultations.   
A mixed methods approach has therefore been adopted as a means to address the 
research questions. This method is defined as ‘integrating quantitative and qualitative 
data collection and analysis in a single study or programme of inquiry’.9  A large range 
of data sources are drawn upon and these are: 
1. Secondary analysis of British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey data and the 
Eurobarometer.  Additional survey data will be discussed and referred to but this 
will be primarily from published findings.  The latter includes a survey 
conducted by the Food Standards Agency which includes attitudes to GM food 
(The Consumer Attitude Survey). 
2. Nine elite interviews conducted with senior regulators.  The interviewees were 
officials from the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection (DG 
SANCO) at the European Commission, the European Food Standards Authority 
(EFSA), a member of the GM Policy and Regulation team at The Department of 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), a member of the Novel Foods, Additives and 
Supplements Team at the Food Standards Agency (FSA), Members of The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), The Human Genetic 
Commission, The Genetics Interest Group (GiG), a member of The National 
Consumer Council who additionally chaired the FSA’s Advisory Committee on 
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 Cresswell, J.W., Plano Clark, V.L., Guttman, M., Hanson, W. ‘Advanced Mixed Methods Research 
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Consultation and Engagement (ACCE) and an academic who had extensive 
involvement in consultation on GM including sitting on the FSA steering group 
on UK GM dialogue in 2010. 
3. Mapping of Regulatory Organisations.  In order to contrast product and process 
regulation and to assess whether the regulation of genomics should be viewed as 
discrete area or whether it is better viewed as application relevant. 
4. The regulation pertaining to the two case-studies 
5. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) Consultation 
Documents relating to PGD.   
6. The Cabinet Office regulations on consultation which outline the duties placed 
upon IRAs to incorporate public opinion into regulation.   
7. Media counts relating to numbers of stories in the press about GM foods which 
were undertaken on Lexis. 
Brannan argues that mixed methods research may lead to new perspectives and 
innovative insights on the subject of study.10  It is hoped that this the case in this thesis 
and that the choice of methods is a good fit with the research questions posed.  The use 
of each data set can be justified on the basis of the need to investigate the different 
understandings of public opinion. For example, the interview data shows the regulator’s 
perception of public opinion and how s/he uses survey data.   
Triangulation is often purported to be the purpose of using mixed methods, based on the 
idea that different methods corroborate or validate each other.  There are however a 
number of possible outcomes in addition to this view of ‘triangulation’ as corroboration.  
It is hoped that the methods used for this research will achieve the outcome which 
Brannan describes as complementarity, that is, the qualitative and quantitative data sets 
are treated as ‘different beasts’ and each enhances the other: ‘the data analyses from the 
two methods are juxtaposed and generate complementary insights that together create a 
bigger picture.’11  It is an unusual approach to analyse and refer to such a wide range of 
data sources but it allows original insights into the research questions in terms of added 
depth to the study and greater subtlety to the findings.   
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 Brannen, Julia, ‘Mixed Methods Research: A Discussion Paper’, ESRC National Centre for Research 
Methods, NCRM/005 at p.9 
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 Brannan, 2005 op cit. at p.12. 
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The thesis thus analyses an array of survey data, public opinion data collected by IRAs, 
and regulation, and additionally draws on a number of elite interviews conducted with 
senior regulators.  A thematic analysis was undertaken of the interview data which 
allowed themes to emerge from the data without being predetermined. This lent itself 
well to the study since the mapping of public opinion data through the regulatory 
process demanded a fluid and flexible approach.  In addition, an in-depth document 
analysis of the regulations relating to GM food and prenatal testing and PGD was 
conducted. A further area of analysis is the secondary data which includes the survey 
data and the reports on the public consultation exercises.  The overall aim was to map 
out the regulation for each case-study and to map the public opinion inputs into this 
while also gauging public opinion measures across the time-frame.  The time-frame 
extends from the first BSA survey data which included the cache of questions relating 
to genomics in 1999 until 2010 when an extensive Eurobarometer survey was 
conducted covering this area. 
The method adopted of mapping the sources of public opinion data and examining the 
inputs of this data into the regulatory process is original in methodological approach. 
Originality is additionally derived from the subsequent data findings. The 
methodological approach has led to interesting findings in relation to the influence of 
public opinion on the regulatory process.  One such finding is the significant impact on 
public opinion of the moratorium on GM products which is discussed in Chapter 5.  The 
findings of this thesis are not intended to be ‘grande generalisations’ but ‘petite 
generalisations’12; they are significant, but the aim is to offer a nuanced account of the 
interplay between public opinion and regulation.  One very significant problem in this 
study is that of when and where causal inference between the variables (public opinion 
and regulation) is appropriate.  As Steel opines:  
‘Given the general impossibility of performing experiments and the difficulty of 
knowing whether all possible causes have been taken into account, one is faced with a 
serious challenge to the possibility of making reliable inferences about the causes of 
social phenomena’.13 
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 Stake, Robert E. (1995) ‘The Art of Case Study Research’.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
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 Steel, Daniel, ‘Social Mechanisms and Causal Inference’, Philosophy of Social Sciences, Vol. 34, No.1, 
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While the problematic nature of causal inferences is acknowledged here, this thesis does 
make knowledge claims and in doing so it contributes to the field of study.   
As already acknowledged, the public opinion data is analysed in this thesis in order to 
identify points of convergence and points of data divergence across the sources and 
additionally to examine changes in public mood over time.  A longitudinal study was 
not possible due to the data limitations: the data points of the BSA data were 
sporadically and not annually conducted in relation to specific techniques.  The 
mapping of public opinion and regulation over time was necessary in order to show the 
interchange of public opinion data and how it has been both used and viewed from 
within the regulatory process.  The large number of sources of empirical data analysed 
here is justified on the grounds that it is the best means by which to gain an overview of 
the public opinion data collected.  The overview was a necessity in order to gauge the 
understandings of public opinion utilised in the regulation relating to the case-studies, 
and for the cross-analysis of the data to assess representativeness.    
As already noted, the study undertakes a comparison of the regulation in two fields of 
genomics: genetically modified (GM) foods and prenatal testing and preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD).  There are a number of benefits from this comparative 
approach which include the applicability of the findings.  The reason for using two case-
studies in the study has been that the data findings may have significance or resonance 
for other areas of genomics, although the findings should not be deemed representative 
across the board for the regulation of genomics.  The latter argument would lead us to 
conclude that genomics regulation is best viewed in terms of product rather than process 
regulation.  I will return to this point in Chapter 4. A discussion of the survey data 
follows, after which the interview procedure is outlined. 
1.4.1 The Survey Data 
The survey data utilised in the thesis, the BSA and the Eurobarometer in particular, 
benefit in terms of force and enhanced robustness from the large sample sizes.  A 
number of on-line databases were used in the course of this research and these include: 
EurLex (Europa), BAILII, Butterworths Legislation Direct, and LexisNexis.  ENDS 
Europe Daily proved very useful in terms of highlighting legal and policy developments 
at both national and EU level.  The data discussed here is drawn from three principal 
sources: the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA), the Eurobarometer and the Food 
22 
 
Standards Agency Consumer Attitude Survey (CAS).  The first of these, the BSA 
survey, is designed to produce annual measures of public attitude and is intended as a 
means to measure attitudinal change across time on a very wide range of subjects from 
opinions of marriage to views on smoking.  A cache of questions relating to genetic 
technologies was included from 1996-2003. However, the areas of genetic technologies 
covered were included in a random fashion, which poses difficulties in terms of any 
kind of longitudinal study.  For instance, survey questions on GM foods were only 
included in the years 1999 and 2003 and for prenatal testing and PGD in the years 1998, 
2000 and 2003.   
I analysed the BSA data-sets in SPSS and the findings have been presented in the form 
of pie-charts, tables and graphs.  The BSA data imposed limitations in a second way 
because for GM foods, six questions requiring a likert response were asked in the two 
years they were included in the survey.  Fortunately, five of those statements remained 
the same across the years and a similar pattern emerged for prenatal testing, where the 
same questions were posed in both 1998 and 2000 (see appendix 4).  I also examined 
the reports on the BSA surveys produced by Sturgis, Cooper, Fife-Shaw and Shepherd 
in relation to this data and GM foods.14  These reports are produced by the academics 
responsible for the design and collection of the data relating to attitudes to genetics in 
the BSA surveys.  The sample sizes varied in relation to the questions; for the 1999 
attitude statements it was small at only 833.  For the 2003 attitude statements the sample 
was 2,649.  The BSA survey of 2003 additionally contained a quiz related to genetics 
(base =2,649) and a set of public trust statements which demanded a likert scale 
response (base =3,272).   
The Eurobarometer have conducted seven surveys specifically of public perceptions of 
the Life Sciences and Biotechnology.  The surveys were conducted in 1991, 1993, 1996, 
1999, 2002, 2005 and 2010.  While the surveys reflect a wider European public they 
additionally contain data specific to the UK.  I refer mostly to Eurobarometer Reports 
58.0, 63.1 and 73.1 covering the years 2002, 2005 and 2010 respectively, but which 
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included analyses of previous Eurobarometer data from the years since 1991.15  The 
sample size of the Eurobarometer survey is approximately 25,000 respondents, taken to 
be representative of the 27 EU Member States plus Croatia, Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland and Turkey.  The survey examines, inter alia, trends in optimism and 
pessimism towards biotechnology, familiarity with specific technologies including GM 
foods, and support for and opposition to biotechnologies including GM foods.  The 
Eurobarometer survey also includes data relating to public trust in the biotechnology 
system and specifically trust in scientists and regulators.  The data is analysed as one 
source of ‘public opinion’. It is data which, while it is very robust as survey data, has all 
the inherent limitations of survey data.  Survey data is an artefact of the survey design 
and this must be borne in mind when drawing conclusions from the findings.16   
1.4.2 The Elite Interviews 
‘The term ‘qualitative interview’ refers to interview techniques that provide qualitative 
(textually rich) data.17  Kelly argues that due to the reflexivity and textual qualities of 
qualitative interviews, they are ‘appropriate to research questions regarding the meaning 
of events or phenomena to research participants’.18  This is a great fit therefore for a 
discussion of the relationships between public opinion and regulation.  Following the 
advice of a colleague, Kelly, it was the hope that the interviews would give an insight 
into the regulators’ ‘knowledge, experience and perspectives’ on the role of public 
opinion in regulation.  The semi-structured nature of the interview allowed this to take 
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place rather than restricting or delimiting the discussion with preset categories.19  Nine 
interviews with senior regulators of GM foods, prenatal testing and PGD were 
undertaken.  The interviewees were senior regulators from the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA), the European Commission’s Directorate General for 
Health and Consumer Affairs (SANCO), the European Food Standards Authority 
(EFSA), the Food Standards Agency (FSA), the Human Genetics Commission (HGC), 
the GM Team in the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), 
an academic with a background in GM regulation as a scientist and the Genetic Interest 
Group (GiG).  GiG is a national alliance of over 120 charities which represent the 
interests of people with genetic disorders.  The interviews were semi-structured and 
ranged in length from 45 minutes to an hour and a half.  The semi-structured approach 
enabled a flexibility to allow the interviewee to speak at length while specific questions 
remained at the core of the interview. The interview schedule included open-ended 
questions.  The majority of the interviews were conducted face-to-face but 3 were 
telephone interviews.  The preference was for face-to-face but the travel costs and time 
meant that phone interviews were easier when the interviewee was based for example in 
Brussels or Edinburgh.   
The contribution of the interview data to the thesis is that it brings a level of nuance and 
depth to the study.  It is very difficult to find regulators who agree to devote their time 
to being interviewed by a PhD student.  While such a small sample of interviews is not, 
of course, representative of regulators, the value of this interview data should not be 
underestimated as those interviewed are very senior officials and as such are central to 
regulatory decision-making.20 
Incorporation of the realist approach tells us that the data obtained from the interviews 
should not necessarily be viewed as a candid account of the regulator’s view of public 
opinion processes, but rather as a particular account of events or views.  It can perhaps 
be best understood as the voice the regulator wishes to portray, which is nevertheless a 
rich source of data and gives us an insight into a somewhat idealistic view of how 
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public opinion would work in the regulatory process.  Additionally, there are other 
factors at play which may elude capture in the process of data collection: some 
observable and others which are not observable. 
1.4.3 Observable and Non-Observable Interactions 
There is an almost all pervading normative driver, both in the literature relating to the 
role of public opinion in regulation and from the regulators themselves, which argues 
that public opinion input into policy and regulatory decision-making is critical.  This 
normative driver is discussed throughout the thesis, however as pertains to the 
methodology it is important to recognise the role that such normative arguments lend to 
the interpretation and analysis of the role of public opinion at the outset.  There are very 
strong democratic arguments for the inclusion of public opinion as have been outlined 
yet the question has to be does the incorporation of public opinion in regulation better 
the regulatory output. 
Cultural theorist Pierre Bourdieu talks of the ‘imposition of a problematic’ which he 
argues is ‘just what opinion polls do with all the appearance of ‘neutrality’’, a notion 
that is instructive in informing our awareness of the status of opinion data.  Bourdieu 
widens this argument to include a similar process occurring in the research interview, 
where a choice is made by the researcher to attempt to act in a neutral manner or to 
engage with the interviewee.21  In the interviews I carried out for the thesis, I found that 
it was at times exceedingly difficult not to lead the interviewee by either the way the 
questions were framed or feeling that it was necessary for the interviewer to nod or 
make a small sound of agreement with the interviewee as a means to encourage them to 
continue talking.  The latter point relates to the discomfort an interviewee can feel in the 
process of being interviewed and also to the unusual position where one does not 
generally produce a monologue on a subject but interacts with another person.  It is 
necessary to acknowledge that the interview data is a product of this interaction between 
the researcher and the interviewee.     
University ethical approval was obtained to conduct the research for this thesis.  
Additionally, an informed consent form was drafted (see Appendix 1) and sent to each 
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interviewee prior to the interview.  This form outlined the nature of the study and 
anonymity and confidentiality measures to be undertaken.  Subsequently, before the 
interview began, the details of this form were reiterated and the interviewee was asked 
whether they were happy with specific elements which included the confidentiality 
issue, and recording the interview. 
The redaction of data is a necessity in the conduct of a finite research project, however 
this does not negate the point that it is a redaction and the findings should not be given a 
greater significance than reflects this.  For instance in the transcribing of a recorded 
interview, the researcher is interpreting the data and Bourdieu argues creating a 
‘translation’ of the interview.22  The interviewee is often viewed as someone giving an 
‘account’ and as such it needs to be viewed as an ‘account’.  It is important that the 
researcher retains a reflexive approach in the course of the data collection and data 
analysis.   
1.5 Thesis Overview 
Following this Chapter, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 provide a theoretical background to the 
themes of the thesis on which the analysis of the case-studies is based.  In order to 
discuss the role that public opinion plays in the regulation of genomics, the principal 
interpretations of ‘public opinion’ are reviewed in the next chapter.  Five 
understandings of public opinion are given and these provide an overview for the 
discussion of how public opinion is captured and subsequently represented by the 
regulatory-policy process in relation to genomics.  These five definitions form a frame 
for discussion throughout the thesis, but most importantly in the chapters which analyse 
the case-studies.   
In Chapter 3 I set out the rationale for the use of a more expansive definition of 
regulation, including both hard and soft law, thus running from primary legislation 
through to guidance notes.  The different understandings and definitions of genomics, 
regulation and the regulation of genomics are discussed in Chapter 3.  The principal 
focus of the regulation here relates to the rules which emanate from Government, i.e., 
the rules which are produced by the Independent Regulatory Agencies and Government 
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Departments relating to the case studies chosen in the thesis.  In addition, the primary 
legislation is drawn on as necessary to elucidate the role played by public opinion in the 
regulatory process.  For the case of GM foods, the principal forms of regulation I will 
be looking at are: primary legislation which is predominantly the relevant European 
Directives, and secondary rules such as product approval processes relating to the 
authorisation, risk assessment and labelling regulations.  In the cases of prenatal testing 
and preimplantaion genetic diagnosis I examine the primary legislation & case-law, 
principally the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.  In addition, I analyse 
the secondary rules, principally the Codes of Conduct for PGD and the large range of 
general guidance which exists to oversee prenatal testing.   
Additionally in Chapter 3 I outline the rationale for my choice of reference to the 
regulation of genomics as opposed to the regulation of genetics or biotechnology.  The 
movement from genetics to genomics is outlined and it is argued that genomics is more 
appropriate for this study as both a nod to the increased complexity of the technological 
and scientific developments in the field and as a recognition of a shift from a ‘thing’ to 
an ‘activity’.  Genomics embraces so much more than genetics in this respect and I 
argue that it is more representative of the study conducted here.  For the purpose of this 
thesis, genomics is defined as ‘the place where things happen which involve the genetic 
complement of an organism’.23  The regulation of genomics is viewed in the thesis as 
the study of the regulation relating to the development of products from the laboratory 
to the consumer and as such is a fairly expansive understanding.  Included in this 
chapter is a section outlining both the rhetorical arguments commonly given for why 
genomics should receive special regulatory handling and additionally an examination of 
whether there is any evidence that in practice genomics is being given special treatment.  
As such the normative arguments and justification for the regulation per se and the 
regulatory approach are outlined.  What arises from this discussion is that public 
opinion collection and deliberation have been utilised as a response to the idiosyncratic 
features of genomics such as novelty, ethical issues, and the controversy over safety and 
risk of harm.  The idea is raised that in certain cases it is not the regulation which 
appeases the public but the fact that deliberation has taken place: are the public aware of 
the state of the regulation in any case? Do the public feel more secure if they feel that a 
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fair system and process has been followed to ascertain their views?  If the latter is the 
case then it is a sharp move away from much of the existing literature which generally 
examines how responsive the regulation is to the public and does not address the idea 
that the regulation, the IRAs or the public consultation exercises may themselves imbue 
reassurance and public trust. 
Chapter four discusses the literature surrounding the interaction between public opinion 
and regulation and sets the scene for the issues to be analysed in the subsequent case-
study chapters.  This chapter questions the rationale for public opinion as an input into 
the regulatory process; it asks whether regulation can influence public opinion, and 
whether public opinion has the capacity to influence regulation.  In this chapter the role 
played by the regulator is introduced, which leads in nicely to the data from the 
interviews with the regulators which is analysed in chapters six and seven.   
Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with the project’s case-studies.  Both Chapter 5 on GM 
foods and Chapter 6 on prenatal testing and PGD follow a similar structure allowing 
comparisons in the regulatory developments and relevant public opinion data to be 
outlined.  For each case-study the primary areas of focus are identified and analysed.  
The case studies in many ways reflect a lack of unanimity over the benefits or risks 
posed by the technologies: for instance, the controversial nature of the risks posed by 
GM foods has meant that regulators are attempting to offer consumers a choice in the 
purchase of the products in the form of a label.  With regards to prenatal testing and 
more specifically PGD, it is a case of contested benefits, in that the majority of the 
survey respondents agree that the technologies should be made available, yet there is 
some hesitancy relating to the ethical issues.  The prenatal testing and PGD chapter 
examines the difference between what people say in response to survey questions and 
what they do through a comparison between attitude data from the BSA and statistics 
for the levels of terminations of pregnancies following a prenatal genetic test. 
 
The final chapter draws conclusions from the thesis findings in seven areas and these 
are: the understandings of public opinion in the regulation of genomics; the question of 
successful policy resolution and role of regulation in the alleviation of public concerns 
over genomics; issues of representativeness of public opinion data in the regulatory 
process; the use of public opinion as a means to boost IRA credibility and increase 
regulatory share; the privileged role given to public opinion in the regulation of 
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genomics and levels of responsiveness to public opinion;  the use of public opinion by 
the regulator: the representativeness of public opinion paradox and the inter-
changeability between understandings of public opinion; and the special regulatory 
handling and idiosyncrasies of the regulation of genomics.  In addition a review is given 
of the merits and limitations of the thesis both in relation to the methodology and the 
choice of the regulation of genomics as an object of study.  The thesis concludes with a 
look at future research possibilities which emerge from the thesis research, including 
recommendations for regulators on the utilisation of public opinion data in regulatory 
decision-making. 
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Chapter 2 
The Capture and Representation of Public Opinion in Theory and 
Practice: The Case of Genomics 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the often competing and conflated definitions of 
‘public opinion’. Public opinion is a slippery, fluid concept and its meaning can change 
in accordance with the context in which the term is used.24  This can give the concept of 
public opinion a strong utilitarian value to regulators because it has the power to act as a 
‘coat hanger’ in that different interpretations can hang on it.  The purpose of this chapter 
is to outline the most common interpretations of the term ‘public opinion’.  Once these 
definitions have been drawn out I will examine in the remainder of the thesis the value 
of ‘public opinion’ as it is used by regulators and within the regulatory and policy 
documents.  In order to understand how the term is utilised in regulation it is important 
to step back and examine the principal methods of data collection used to establish a 
gauge of public opinion and these are outlined in this chapter. 
While some understandings of public opinion are underpinned by normative motives 
inherent in the regulatory process there is also an operationalist perspective which posits 
that public opinion equates simply to the thing that surveys measure.  I develop this 
position by arguing that the normative argument concerning what public opinion should 
be can rest with the operationalist view that public opinion is what a survey measures.  
Indeed, the normative element is critical if the measurement techniques of public 
opinion are to be continually reviewed and improved upon in line with reflexive policy 
making.  In this chapter I make the case that although there are evident and widely 
acknowledged limitations to any measurement of public opinion, there remains a role 
for the findings of such data collection exercises.  Why should this be if the object of 
study eludes capture so effectively?  It is, I argue, because the ‘object’ or ‘entity’ which 
policymakers and regulators call public opinion is both purposive and leads regulators 
to use it in a self-referential manner.  Regulators use the concept of ‘public opinion’ to 
support a policy position and the act of collecting data and calling it ‘public opinion’ is 
                                                          
24
 Glynn et al 1999 op cit. at p.33. 
31 
 
taken as a given.  A difficulty arises in that regulators agree that public opinion is an 
important input into the regulatory process, yet they admit it is also partial.  It is argued 
in this thesis that regulators persist in using public opinion data in a way that does not 
belie their feelings that the data may not accurately represent the actual public opinion.  
If then there is a general consensus that public opinion is an artefact, it raises the 
question whether it should be renamed ‘public opinion data’ when referred in regulatory 
policy documents, and whether more circumspection should be used in discussion of 
public opinion data.  However, this is a moot point as the thesis shows that public 
opinion carries agency and has an impact upon the regulatory system regardless of its 
potential lack of accurate reflection of the public’s views.  Is it more realistic to accept 
that regulators attempt to collate the most robust data on public opinion that they are 
able and that the data gathered retains a value in the regulatory process?  Added to these 
thoughts, in relation to surveys per se, is that in this thesis the British Social Attitudes 
(BSA) Survey is analysed and the role of the survey is given a greater emphasis than, 
for example, the role of the focus group as a means to produce an indicator of public 
opinion.  To reiterate, the survey data is being given a prominence in the thesis because 
it is being used as a comparator against which the data on public opinion which has 
been collected by the Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) is compared. 
This chapter consists of three sections: the first offers an overview of the theoretical 
understandings of what constitutes public opinion, the second examines how public 
opinion is measured, and the third explores whether there is a public opinion of 
genomics.  In the first part there is recognition of the fact that the concept of public 
opinion is fluid and inherently dependant upon context.  Additionally, it is important to 
delimit my line of study, because an analysis of public opinion could include references 
across disciplines and draw from inter alia, sociology, psychology and political science.  
Discussions of public opinion are found in many disciplines and it is unfortunate that 
intellectual travel between the disciplines is limited as there is much to be gained by the 
cross-over.  I refer primarily to the socio-legal and political science literature to 
maintain the focus of the chapter. 
As stated in Chapter 1, it is argued that, when faced with novel regulatory objects, there 
is an absence of categorical precedence which leaves regulators unable to draw upon 
policy learning as they do not have any experience in managing these technologies as 
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they have done in the past or in relation to a similar issue.25  This argument is found in 
the policy rhetoric, and the concept of regulatory novelty and lack of categorical 
precedence is often cited as a major justification for the high levels of political attention 
devoted to genomics, and is often used as a reason for turning to the public opinion 
data.  The idea is that the technological developments pose unique problems about 
which regulators cannot draw upon the rule learning of earlier decisions.  Combined 
with the lack of rule learning is the fact that the technology is creating very critical 
social and ethical dilemmas and there are no frames of reference to be drawn upon.  It is 
thus argued by regulators and policy makers that genomics needs novel and special 
regulatory handling as it is testing the cognitive limits of the existing regulatory 
structures.  The powerful and emotive push for enhanced reference to public opinion in 
the regulation of genomics necessitates a study of the understandings of public opinion 
being utilised in the regulatory process.   
In this thesis I contend that enhanced reference is given to the public opinion of 
genomics relative to other regulatory spheres, and that one of the driving forces for this 
is as a response to the absence of categorical precedence in this sphere.  Lezaun and 
Soneryd discuss a ‘new centrality of the public to science and technology policy’ and 
argue that it has almost become a ‘new orthodoxy’.26  Indeed Lezaun et al extend this 
point by arguing that it is in the areas of science and technology policy in which 
innovative instruments of consultation are being developed while in other policy 
domains ‘citizen engagement is waning’.  In fact it is almost as if the call for increased 
public participation and recourse to public opinion data in genomics has taken on its 
own momentum.   
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2.1 Understandings & Definitions of Public Opinion 
This first section offers an overview of the most commonly held understandings of 
public opinion.  The five definitions of public opinion outlined by Glynn, Herbst, 
O’Keefe and Shapiro27  are utilised here as reference points in the mapping of the many 
interwoven and overlapping concepts of ‘public opinion’.  The five understandings of 
public opinion are: 
(i) Public opinion is the aggregation of individual opinions 
(ii) Public opinion is the majority view 
(iii) Public opinion is the result of the channelling of the public voice by interest 
groups 
(iv) Public opinion is a construction created by elite groups and the media 
(v) Public opinion is a fiction as it is simply a construct. 
 
The first definition is the classic and most commonly held view of public opinion: that it 
is the aggregation of individual opinions.  It is due to such a view of public opinion that 
specific forms of public opinion apparatus, such as the survey, have arisen.  Related and 
in many ways overlapping with this is the second view of public opinion which is that it 
is the reflection of majority beliefs.  This interpretation is perhaps more a consequence 
of what occurs in the policy process as opposed to the result of an effort to delimit what 
public opinion is normatively.  An additional element to understandings of majority 
opinion equating with public opinion stems from the argument that individuals do tend 
to conform and adhere to the majority opinion.  Noelle-Neumann’s research has been 
influential in this area. Her thesis is that as individuals we will generally keep quiet if 
we hold a view that is widely divergent from our peers.  An individual with an 
unpopular opinion has the choice to voice their own view with the risk that it will be 
tempered by the majority opinion or to fall into what Noelle-Neumann calls a ‘spiral of 
silence’.  Noelle-Neumann contests that people do in general temper their views as a 
means of conformity. 
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Noelle-Neumann researched elections and noted the phenomenon in which voters move 
to back the ‘winning team’ as the election draws closer.  The critical factor at the heart 
of her theory of the ‘spiral of silence’ is individuals’ perceptions of the distribution of 
public opinion.  Noelle-Neumann contends that: 
‘…..people sense a climate of opinion without public opinion research, that they 
virtually have an ‘opinion organ’, capable of registering the most minute changes.’28 
This idea of the opinion organ may indeed be relevant to the regulators themselves in 
that they may refer to their own opinion organ and assume that this will filter any other 
public opinion data which crosses their path.  There is limited research on the ways that 
people can sense the public mood, and importantly, what sources they use as a gauge of 
the majority opinion, whether derived predominantly from the media, peer groups or 
elite sources.  What is evident is that people generally do wish to align their own views 
with those of their peers and do not wish to isolate themselves with an unpopular or 
unfashionable view.29  This effect evidently plays a role in reinforcing the adherence of 
regulators to this understanding of public opinion.  Whether this understanding of public 
opinion has a greater role than the other understandings of public opinion is examined 
in relation to the case-studies in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The third definition of public opinion examines the cultivation of public opinion and the 
channelling and communication of the public voice by interest groups.  It is the political 
parties, the trade organizations, the consumer groups and the single issue NGOs who 
lobby for regulatory change and have spokespeople who offer an articulation of the 
public voice.  This articulation is often formulated so that a simplistic view of the issues 
is portrayed which aids the idea that one can take a particular side on an issue – the 
battle grounds are clearly defined.  From this perspective, public opinion is understood 
to be more of a procedural issue as a force to be shaped, manipulated and directed with 
the view to a specific policy outcome which may or may not involve the mobilization of 
the public.  Glynn et al highlight that underlying such a construction of public opinion is 
the assumption that interest groups are constantly engaged in the struggle to define 
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social problems and to provide solutions to them.30  Tilly argues that evidence of 
collective action is best viewed as a complement to survey data in order to gain an 
understanding of the public’s views and attitudes.31  This understanding of public 
opinion will be particularly pertinent with reference to the discussion of GM Foods in 
Chapter 5.   
The fourth understanding is that public opinion is not an entity in its own right.  It is not 
distinct from the media and elite projections of what public opinion is. Thus public 
opinion is viewed as a construct or simply a projection of the views held by journalists, 
politicians and other elites.  Indeed the Liberal Democrat MP, Evan Harris subscribes to 
this view arguing that 'public consultation is essentially delegation to the views of the 
Daily Mail'.32 While this comment was made with tongue in cheek, readers of the 
populist press do make up a large sector of the public and it could be argued that many 
people make a decision on an issue as a result of something they read in the paper.  The 
extent to which the media lead and define the issue is critical.  Lippmann adheres to this 
idea that public opinion evolves from what we are told is the public opinion and as such 
may be driven by the media.  Lippmann supports this argument by pointing out that it is 
not feasible for the average citizen to be au courant in relation to every issue in the 
public domain.  Public opinion is thus viewed as a mechanism instituted by policy 
makers, regulators and politicians to overcome this, it is a ‘symbolic phrase used by 
orators to make their own arguments’.  Lippmann does not adhere to the deficit model; 
the reason he gives for the public’s lack of knowledge and information is that they are 
time-poor.33  The knowledge deficit model can be understood in terms of the strapline 
‘to know science is to love science’ as it was traditionally believed by many policy 
makers that a greater knowledge of science and technology correlated with greater 
public acceptance of a novel technology.  There is a difference to be drawn between the 
discussion pertaining to the factions constructing public opinion to serve their own 
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purposes and Lippmann’s argument that decision-making by elites will lead to more 
effective regulatory output.  Lippmann strongly held that it was impracticable to place 
the private citizen in the role of the ‘omnicompetent citizen’ and he argues that the 
informing of decisions on social policy should come from specialists and not private 
citizens. 34   
The fifth definition of public opinion offered by Glynn et al is that the whole notion of 
public opinion is a fiction.  Advocates of such a view argue that the term ‘public 
opinion’ is nothing more than a rhetorical construct which is over-used by journalists 
and politicians without there being any substantive evidence to support their claims.  
Advocates of this view purport that political decisions will often be based upon weak 
survey data.  An additional line of argument is that there is little correlation between 
survey respondents’ opinions and their actual behaviour.35  It is held that public opinion 
can be manufactured through rhetoric, and certainly surveys and polls can be designed 
in such a way as to draw out a certain response.  A further issue is the epistemic divide 
which exists between politicians, regulators and the lay public.  This is greater than 
differences in terminology and impacts upon the ways in which policy and regulatory 
processes function.  These five understandings of public opinion act as a heuristic tool 
for analysis of the role of public opinion in relation to the case-studies in Chapters 5 and 
6 where it will be seen that there is a great deal of movement between the 
understandings by the politicians and regulators.   
2.2 Public Consultation Mechanisms & Representations of Public Opinion 
We move now from theoretical understandings and definitions of public opinion which 
may offer the most commonly utilised or the most normatively desirable understanding 
of the term to the methods adopted by government agencies to extract this elusive 
entity.  This section of the chapter provides an overview of the various engagement 
mechanisms utilised and highlights the specific mechanisms which have been used to 
gauge public opinion in the case-studies.  The majority of data collected on public 
opinion is collected in accordance with the understanding of public opinion that views it 
                                                          
34
 Lippmann, Walter, 1925 ibid.   
35
 On this point and the manipulation of survey design more generally, see further: Bertrand, Marianne 
& Mullainathan, Sendhil, ‘Do People Mean What They Say?  Implications for Subjective Survey Data.’  
Mimeo, University of Chicago, 2000. 
37 
 
as the aggregation of individuals’ opinions.  As such, it is predominantly survey data 
and attitude polls which are conducted. As already discussed above, while this thesis 
examines a number of methods used to collect data on public opinion, survey data is 
reviewed in greater depth because of the way the BSA survey data is being used here as 
a benchmark against which the data collected by the IRAs is reviewed.  This is not to 
say that the BSA data is without limitations but that discrepancies which arise are of 
interest because they enable a review of the means of collecting data per se and of the 
inconsistencies of the whole premise that public opinion data can be collected by any of 
the mechanisms discussed here.   
The positioning of the public, or rather data purporting to represent the public, in 
regulatory decision-making is central to this thesis.  There are two principal stances in 
respect to the role of the public voice in regulatory decision making: firstly, there is the 
idea that increasing a public’s familiarity with a technology or the ensuing product will 
make them more positive towards it; the second view is that since the public will be 
affected by the introduction of novel technologies then it should be the public who 
decide whether or not they should be readily available.  In conjunction with these two 
standpoints is the continuum across which the amount of weight the public voice should 
or does have in regulatory process varies, with decisions being made by the elite at one 
end of the spectrum and regulation by referenda at the other.36   
There are limitations with all areas of data collection and public opinion data is no 
different.  For instance, Zaller argues that ‘attitudes’ simply do not exist but that people 
make attitude reports or give ‘survey responses’.  This view rests upon the premise that 
individuals present a temporary attitude for the purposes of surveys and participatory 
processes.37  Connecting Zaller’s comments and the view of Lippmann that individuals 
do not have enough time to hold an informed view on every policy issue are the 
thoughts of Key.  Key states that: 
‘The voice of the people is but an echo.  The output of an echo chamber bears an 
inevitable and invariable relation to the input.  As candidates and parties clamour for 
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attention and vie for popular support, the people’s verdict can be no more than a 
selective reflection from the alternatives and outlooks presented to them’.38 
Such a view does not negate the value of such data but its value must reflect an accurate 
understanding of what the data represents.  Survey responses do function as indicators 
of current patterns, predicting trends and attitude changes.  The central problem with 
survey data is the gap which exists between what it actually is and represents and the 
elevation of its status by policy makers.  The argument put forward in this thesis is that 
rigorously collected survey data does indeed have a value as an input into the 
regulatory-policy arena, however, it loses its potency when it is held up as being truly 
representative of public opinion.   
2.2.1 The mechanisms used to measure public opinion 
Rowe and Frewer conducted a review of public engagement mechanisms and came up 
with no less than one hundred processes, techniques and tools used to elicit the public 
voice.  The purpose of Rowe and Frewer’s review was not to provide an exhaustive list 
of public engagement mechanisms but to highlight both the volume and the variety of 
the mechanisms available and as such they comment on the confusion created by the 
large array of options available.39  This ‘confusing plethora’ of engagement mechanisms 
has arisen as a consequence of not only the uncertainty about how best to involve the 
public but additionally the increased drive for public involvement in the policy process 
per se.40  Lezaun and Soneryd argue that the increased engagement of the public has 
become ‘a veritable extractive industry’ which attempts to increase the productivity of 
government.41 
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Rowe and Frewer introduce a typology of public engagement mechanisms by splitting 
public engagement into the three sub-groups: public communication; public 
consultation and public participation.  An understanding of the varied public 
engagement mechanisms is useful here in order to understand the remit of the thesis and 
to ring-fence the field of study.  Rowe and Frewer refer to an expansive definition of 
public participation which states that it is:  
‘…the practice of involving members of the public in the agenda-setting, decision-
making, and policy-forming activities of organisations/ institutions responsible for 
policy development.’42   
However, Rowe and Frewer criticise this definition as being too broad and therefore 
open to different interpretations because the public may be involved in various ways 
and at various levels.  This is thus the motivation for Rowe and Frewer’s division of the 
mechanisms into three subgroups where the mechanisms are viewed in terms of the 
flows of information between the sponsor and the public participants.  The sponsor is 
the initiator of the engagement initiative which is in most cases a governmental or 
regulatory agency.  To turn to the three groups in turn:  public communication refers to 
initiatives where information flows in a one-way direction from the sponsors of the 
exercise to the public representatives, and where there is no requirement for information 
to be fed back to the public.  The second classification is public consultation where 
information flows in the opposite direction in that it is from the public representatives to 
the sponsor as a consequence of an initiative being set up by the sponsor.  In these 
instances, ‘[t]he information elicited from the public is believed to represent currently 
held opinions on the topic in question’.43  Thirdly, there is public participation where 
information flows both ways between the public representatives and the sponsor.  Rowe 
and Frewer state that in such circumstances, ‘rather than simple, raw opinions being 
conveyed to the sponsors, the act of dialogue and negotiation serves to transform 
opinions in the member of both parties (sponsor and public participants).’44  The 
classification system offered by Rowe and Frewer highlights the level of passivity or 
activity of the public representatives in the process of engagement.   
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Rowe and Frewer stress that the choice of public engagement mechanism necessitates a 
balance between the aims of the mechanism and the criteria for effectiveness. 45  A 
salient point is that despite the vast range of engagement mechanisms, there is no clear 
theory as to which would be the best mechanism to choose in any given circumstance.   
Different mechanisms inevitably lead to different types of data findings with varying 
strengths and limitations.  It seems lacking that no substantive study has been 
undertaken of the application of such mechanisms in order to enhance functionality and 
simultaneously aid policy makers in their selection.   
For the purposes of this thesis, of the three groupings of public engagement 
mechanisms, the focus will be public consultation as these types reflect the relevant data 
sources in the case-studies.  Rowe and Frewer provide a further breakdown of the 
engagement types and the relevant sections relating to public consultation can be 
viewed in figure 1.  Against the consultation type I have added the data sources being 
studied in the thesis case-studies in Chapters 5 and 6.    
Figure1: Types of public consultation mechanism and corresponding data sources 
analysed in the thesis46 
Example of 
Consultation 
type 
Characteristic Description Specific Data Source 
relating to the Thesis 
Case-Studies 
Opinion poll 
Referendum 
Survey 
Telepolling/ 
voting 
Controlled 
selection 
No facilitated 
elicitation 
Closed response 
mode 
Non-face-to-face 
Structured 
aggregation 
 
These mechanisms are 
essentially highly controlled 
ways of acquiring answers to 
specific questions from large 
samples.  Quantity is more 
important than quality (there is 
no facilitation of the elicitation 
process, responses are 
closed/limited and there is no 
FTF interaction).   
Eurobarometer 
 
Food Standard Agency 
Consumer Attitude Survey 
(CAS) 
 
British Social Attitude 
Survey (BSA)  
Consultation 
document 
Controlled 
selection 
Aims to attain open responses 
on a significant issue.  The 
typical mechanism is the 
Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority and 
Human Genetics 
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No facilitated 
elicitation 
Open response 
mode 
Non-face-to-face 
Unstructured 
aggregation 
consultation – in which a 
document is sent to a list of 
potentially interested people 
(often representatives of 
interest groups and other 
organisations) with limited 
time available for open 
commentary.  Potentially, non-
selected others may contribute 
but may find it difficult to do 
so if they are outside of the 
information loop. 
 
Commission  consultations 
Electronic 
consultation 
(interactive 
web site) 
Uncontrolled 
selection 
No facilitated 
elicitation 
Open response 
mode 
Non-face-to-face 
Unstructured 
aggregation 
 
As type 2, but with 
uncontrolled selection.  Some 
local authorities in the UK 
have internet sites inviting e-
mail messages form citizens on 
particular local issues or 
service matters. 
Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority  and 
Human Genetics 
Commission  consultations  
 
GM Nation? Debate 
Focus Group Controlled 
selection 
Facilitated 
elicitation 
Open response 
mode 
Face-to-face 
Unstructured 
aggregation 
This type of consultation 
emphasises quality of 
information over quantity, with 
effort expended to facilitate the 
information elicited with FTF 
interaction.  It is typified by the 
focus group, which may 
involve as many as a dozen 
people facilitated in discussion 
of a general issue.  Because 
there is no significant sponsor 
information, this may be seen 
as a consultation rather than 
participation mechanism. 
 
GM Nation? Debate 
British Social Attitudes 
Survey (BSA) 
 
 
The data sources being analysed as gauges of public opinion in the regulatory system in 
this thesis are: British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA), Eurobarometer, HFEA and HGC 
consultation exercises, the Food Standards Agency Consumer Attitude Survey  (CAS), 
and the GM Nation? debate.  The HFEA and HGC consultations are examined in terms 
of both the submissions themselves to the consultation, the reported findings and the 
outcome documents. The stages of the analysis shed light on the empirical bases given 
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for the statements made in the final document and subsequently its use in the regulation 
of PGD.  For the remaining sources: Eurobarometer, the GM Nation? debate and the 
FSA’s CAS survey, these are analysed from their published results.  As such, the British 
Social Attitude survey data is being used as a type of gauge by which to assess the other 
sources.  It is not claimed that the BSA survey is more representative, rather that 
discrepancies and alignment of sources will illustrate the role public opinion data has in 
the regulatory process.  Although it should be remembered that Sturgis et al have made 
the claim that the BSA survey data is more robust than any data collected by an IRA on 
the same subject area of genomics. 47 
While the GM nation? debate included open meetings, an interactive website and focus 
groups which by virtue of the open meetings extends beyond public consultation to 
include an element of public communication, I am focussing on the public consultation 
relating to GM foods.  For the purposes of this study, despite the fact that some of the 
BSA survey collection is carried out face to face, I have placed it in consultation type 1 
as it does not in any other way meet the criteria for participation.   
2.2.2  Surveys & Consultation Exercises as Measurements of Public Opinion 
‘One should carefully distinguish between public opinion and published opinion.  The 
two can be very different from each other’.  (Noelle-Neumann 1979) 48 
As the principal source of public opinion data referred to in the thesis, it is pertinent to 
discuss some of the criticisms and limitations of survey data as a representation of 
public opinion.  Bourdieu highlights a number of the problems with survey data and one 
of the points he stresses is the ways in which data findings are simplified as absolute 
statements and then fed into the policy process.  This process gives the output of survey 
data a very black and white feel in reports which state that ‘the public like x’ or ‘the 
public are anxious about x’.  An example of this would be the use of the 1996 
Eurobarometer finding that one third of the UK public believe that non-genetically 
modified tomatoes do not contain genes, a statement which can be found in a report 
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commissioned by the Human Genetics Commission.  The summary of the data which 
includes the infamous tomato statistic states that there has been: 
‘Improved knowledge of DNA and genes over the past 10 years, but this is still 
minimal.  The GM food debate seems only to have confused the issue (i.e. possession of 
genes), although publicity surrounding the Human Genome Project should hopefully 
have corrected misunderstandings about this.  Genes are still seen more as vague 
inheritable concept than solid physical entities.’49 
Bourdieu contests that reducing survey data to such a level removes the validity of the 
findings.  He states that: 
‘A rigorous interpretation of opinion polls would require an epistemological 
examination of each of the questions asked, plus, concerning the system of the 
questions, an analysis of the whole system of answers which together would be the only 
way to know what questions the people thought they were answering’.50 
Further, Bourdieu argues that even in cases where enormous care is taken to design and 
undertake meaningful surveys, the complexity of the results almost negates the effort 
and that no clear public opinion is discernable from them.  I contend in this thesis that 
while the findings of surveys are not a true representation of public opinion, it remains a 
representation of something and it retains a level of significance in the regulatory policy 
process.  It is a case of establishing what this is and what value it has in the policy 
process.  This view does not negate my opinion that regulatory bodies should continue 
to strive to improve their engagement processes.  While an alethic representation of 
public opinion is unrealistic, significant procedural improvements can be achieved.   
Blumer stated in 1948 in his seminal paper that public opinion polling does not succeed 
in isolating public opinion as a generic object of study.51  Blumer criticises what he 
describes as the very narrow operationalist view that public opinion consists of what 
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public opinion polls measure.52  I am in agreement with Blumer on this point and would 
like to argue that in response there are two options: to delineate what public opinion is 
and to establish a means of measuring it, or to reclassify this thing that is captured by 
the subjectifying technologies.  ‘Subjectifying technologies’ is a term employed by 
Rose to mean the devices which function to enfranchise the public and are the measures 
of the understandings and opinions of the public.53  Interestingly Rose views 
deliberative processes such as surveys as providing a reciprocal link between authorities 
and subjects.54  The technologies are certainly, in Blumer’s view, part of the cause of 
the conflation problem, that is, that people infer that the outcome of the collection 
process constitutes public opinion.  Arguably this is the reason why the most commonly 
used definition of public opinion is the aggregation of individual opinions because it 
stems from the popularity of election polls.  Blumer argues that researchers should start 
by characterising the object of study and that devices such as surveys and opinion polls 
can serve a purpose when used as part of the study of public opinion. 
Blumer rails strongly against the commonly held view that the aggregation of individual 
opinions equates to public opinion.  He contests that the formation of public opinion 
occurs in large measure as a consequence of interactions in groups and not through the 
interaction of disparate individuals. Blumer criticises the representational value of 
opinion polls in which all responses are recorded equally because, as he highlights, in 
society citizens are not equal.55  It is on the grounds of equality that Blumer thus states 
that polls do offer a representation of the vox populi.  How do we tease out the value of 
survey data from this?  In terms of equality and seeking to gauge what individuals think 
about genomics, there is a measure of  validity only if we disagree with Zaller’s 
thoughts that individuals are not giving their honest opinion but providing ’survey 
responses on the basis of momentarily salient considerations’.56   
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To clarify, this is a two stage process: there are the limitations surrounding what is 
actually being recorded, collected and collated by the survey and secondly, there is the 
manipulation of this data by the regulatory or policy agencies in order for it to become 
‘functional’.  With regards to the manipulation of the data, all the regulators interviewed 
for this thesis were very keen to improve the robust nature of the data they use. Thus 
this process is not one where overt or conscious distortion is taking place by regulators, 
it is rather that the data has a purpose which requires that it is digested into a policy 
document or part of a regulatory decision-making process, and since data is often 
contradictory and untidy in its outcomes, it is not always easy for this to be achieved.  It 
should be stressed here that the business of survey data analysis has a long history and 
this thesis is not an attempt to unduly criticise regulatory agencies who do employ the 
most sophisticated techniques available, however I contest that something is going 
wrong in the conveyance of this data both within the regulatory process and back to the 
public per se.  The question of whether the publication of opinion data has an impact on 
the public is disputed by Noelle-Neumann who instead argues that individuals are 
perceptive and sensitive to the climate of opinion.57   
The process of analysis of survey data involves looking at four variables: the direction, 
intensity, stability and the information content of the opinion. 58  The resulting findings 
of these four measures are critical factors in the robustness of the findings and output.  
To take the first of these, the direction of the opinion, whether people are for or against 
or indeed ambivalent about something produces many of the statements that Bourdieu 
would have decried.  To make a claim more substantive one needs to entwine these four 
measures so, for example, a measure of the intensity of feeling for or against an issue 
will make a statistic more reliable.  The power inherent in this is sometimes quite 
startling, for it is argued that when there is no particularly intense public mood on an 
issue this can be taken as permissive of the regulators’ or policy-makers’ actions. 59  
This idea is explored in relation to the two case-studies.  Intensity of opinion is very 
interesting in cases where a very vocal minority has greater political weight than an 
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apathetic or ambivalent majority. It is difficult to see how this would be reflected or 
indeed picked up in a survey as the minority view may be identified but the level of 
influence would require a different method to track.  While random selection may 
appear a better means to achieve an overview it may be that the sample of respondents 
fall into one or two overriding social classes or age-groups.  Systematic selection may 
be more appropriate, but this can be hampered by a lack of response from certain 
sections of society and is no guarantee that people will participate.  Blumer calls for a 
model which could ‘allow the development of a realistic method of sampling in place of 
what seems….to be the highly artificial method of sampling used in current public 
opinion polling’.60  
In the case-study chapters cases will be shown where the public are invited to respond 
electronically. These initiatives are not generally successful either due to a lack of 
interest from the general public in responding or because it appears that it is only the 
views of stakeholders which are being sought.  More generally, such sampling issues 
relate to representative democratic principles and to the balancing of interests within a 
democracy.  This raises the question as to whether much effort is made by policy 
makers and regulators in the identification of a silent, passive majority.  Indeed it seems 
likely that, as has already been established, this silence causes regulators no problems 
and thus they are left to interpret it as meets their own political ends.  In contrast to this 
Lezaun and Soneryd argue that in some instances the reticent publics and ‘hard to hear’ 
constituencies are the very ones who are being targeted for their opinions in an attempt 
to broaden participation.61  Indeed Lezaun and Soneryd ascertain that another way to 
refer to the general public is as the silent majority and they present an image of a much 
divided terrain where on the one hand there are the stakeholders and on the other are the 
general public.62  A quick aside here relates to the application of problems such as silent 
majorities and stakeholder hijack and asks whether their existence is less likely in 
relation to survey data collection. These issues will be addressed in the case-study 
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chapters because it is clear that what is portrayed as the ‘public opinion’ in regulatory-
policy documents is in many cases a reflection of stakeholder views. 
The third variable is stability which relates to the consistency of measures of public 
opinion over time.  Evidently, one must classify the time period considered appropriate 
in order to argue that a mood is stable or consistent.  Stability is deemed important to 
policy making as it is widely held that a stable mood is more representative of public 
feeling on the grounds that it is a reflection of a more measured attitude and not of a  
‘capricious’ survey response.  However, Glynn et al highlight that just because a mood 
is fickle or dynamic does not mean that policy makers do not respond to it.  The 
example Glynn et al raise relates to the death penalty in the USA where over a period of 
time corresponding to public opinion, the death penalty was abolished and then 
reinstated.63   
The final variable of public opinion is information content, which refers to how well 
informed members of the public are, and this is a thorny issue for regulators.  It is an 
area which has been neglected and it is generally the case that the very spare results of 
surveys are published with no mention of the underlying knowledge or understanding of 
the survey respondents.  Furthermore the level of informed response is extremely 
pertinent in relation to public attitude to genomics because it raises the question of how 
realistic is it to expect the public to keep up with the rapidly moving technological 
developments in genomics.  A number of studies have attempted to link knowledge 
levels and attitudes to genomics and these are discussed further in the second section of 
this chapter. This issue will be examined in relation to the case-studies in Chapters 5 
and 6.   
Normatively one would assume that survey responses from an informed public would 
be more valuable than those from individuals who do not grasp the issues at question.  
However if there are high levels of non responses or ‘don’t knows’ then these should be 
valued as important indicators of public opinion.  As already highlighted, it is my belief 
that there are cases where the data shows that the public is uniformed, yet the findings 
have persisted in shaping regulatory output.  Glynn et al conclude, however, that an 
informed public opinion is likely to have a greater influence over policy than an 
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uninformed one.64   Does this however simply reflect the involvement of the concerned 
public or stakeholders, those with a vested interest in the policy direction of a particular 
issue, who ensure that their views are heard?  Information content is an issue which has 
been explored in the interviews with the regulators and their comments are discussed in 
subsequent chapters. 
In summary then this thesis has to wrestle with two issues: the definition of public 
opinion and the value of the various measurement devices or subjectifying technologies 
available, principally in the case of survey data.  The operationalist definition that 
public opinion is simply whatever public opinion surveys measure has been discussed.  
This seems to be coming at the problem the wrong way in that we should perhaps 
rename the findings of the subjectifying technologies and attempt to draw some 
analyses about the perceived gap that exists between the results from these mechanisms 
and what can be delimited as public opinion.   
Glynn et al conclude critically that ‘the meaning of public opinion is always in flux, 
depending upon the context in which the term is used’.65  This is in line with Habermas 
who contends that the meaning of public opinion shifts over time.  The evolutionary and 
fluid nature of public opinion is due to it being tied to broader political and social arena 
that Habermas terms the ‘public sphere’.  To give an illustration of this, the idea of 
public opinion in nineteenth century Britain would be that of a group of men, since 
women were entirely excluded from such.  With the changing public sphere, the voices 
of women were added to the mix. 
In terms of adopting a single understanding of ‘public opinion’, not only are there 
different views on what constitutes public opinion, but also the understandings change 
according to context.  The question raised is whether it is possible to weave a way 
through the tangle of these overlapping and competing conceptions of what public 
opinion means.  While it is difficult to ring-fence and unpick the public opinion data 
pertaining to the case-studies here, it is evidently a useful exercise if it can enlighten us 
as to the representativeness of such data.  Further to this, whatever the level of 
representativeness of public opinion, the analysis of the role the data has played in the 
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regulatory process is paramount.  Gaskell et al point out that ‘Survey results do not have 
a single, obvious and unequivocal meaning.  Whether the glass is half full or half empty 
is a matter of personal preference.’66  This is a salient point in terms of the 
interpretation, potential for bias and presentation of public opinion data by regulators. 
2.3 Public Opinion of Genomics 
The first part of this chapter outlined the definitions of public opinion, ranging from the 
most commonly utilised understanding to discussion of the normative parameters of 
such a concept.  The chapter subsequently explored the variety of ways that public 
opinion data is gathered, with a focus on the role of the survey.  In this final section of 
the chapter an examination is undertaken of whether there is a measurable public 
opinion of genomics.  The response to this question is not straightforward because 
although it is argued that public opinion data is not representative, public opinion data 
collection continues in spite of this.  This position leads us to ask: what does this mean 
in terms of the data and its processing in the context of genomics?  Underlying the 
debate will be a study of whether there are idiosyncrasies in the measurement of 
opinions of genomics, either resulting from the inherent nature of the subject of 
genomics per se or as a consequence of special measurement techniques being applied 
to this case (techniques which are looked at in the next section).  Following this, some 
of the principal sources of public opinion data on genomics are examined, giving an 
insight into the machinations of the data collection process.  It is also necessary to 
examine the motivations behind the collection of such a vast quantity of data and to 
critique the lack of coherence in the collection.  Running through this chapter and the 
thesis as a whole are thoughts relating to the different publics referred to in the data 
collection process and how these are married to the concept of public opinion.   
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2.3.1 Different Publics 
‘From the public’s perspective, scientific research might make products available that 
could have important impacts on society.  It is not surprising, therefore, that all parties 
involved – including scientists, legislators, physicians and ethicists – are quick to make 
assertions of what the public believes about genetics.’(Condit 200167) 
Condit’s comment highlights the problem of multiple parties wishing to use public 
opinion data in ways which suit their own personal needs and wants.  There is clearly a 
strong motivation for some parties to hail public opinion as supportive of the 
introduction of new products; be it a genetically modified tomato or a new prenatal test 
for a genetic condition.  Evidently this use of public opinion is one of the drivers for the 
collection of data on public views in the first instance. However, this then raises the 
question of whether the commissioners of this process are expecting the results they 
need.  It would be inaccurate to argue that regulators are uniformly dismissive of the 
public and, as will be shown in the interviews I carried out and equally in the 
investment of resources in data collection, there is clear evidence of the pursuit of 
robust data.  This does not, however, negate the point that regulatory agencies have a 
remit and in genomics, their remit is generally permissive or supportive of the novel 
products and not prohibitive.  IRAs need to retain and sometimes work to enlarge their 
remit of mandate in order to remain viable.  Consequently they will want public opinion 
data which shows support of or at least reduced anxiety surrounding a product.  There is 
an added procedural element to this in that IRAs are requested to act in conjunction with 
the Government’s guidelines set out in the code of practice on consultation.68  While 
this is not a legally binding document a number of government agencies have signed up 
to the code; these include the Food Standards Agency (FSA), the Department of Health 
and the Department of Food and Rural Affairs (Defra).  In addition to the code of 
practice on consultation there are requirements under some laws for the Government to 
consult certain groups on particular issues. 
Hill and Michael contend that ‘the tacit recognition of the public entails a slippage 
between two facets of the public (qua consumer or qua citizen) which enables a 
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particular, relatively positive, vision of biotechnology’.69  Hill and Michael argue 
further that data on attitudes to biotechnology from Eurobarometer highlights a 
particular construction of the public by EU regulators which conflates the ‘citizen’ with 
the ‘consumer’. The construction of the public as a consumer by regulators runs through 
both case-studies in this paper and its role in setting and closing issue attention cycles is 
critical.  Hill and Michael advocate that the specific construction of the public through 
data manipulation by the EU produces a measure of public attitude which is very pro-
biotechnology.  When examining surveys, Hill and Michael have looked at the ‘target’ 
of the survey with an eye on the manipulation of survey questions to engender a specific 
response in the participant.  Thus Hill and Michael argue the survey participant will be 
encouraged by the survey design to think as either a consumer or a citizen and each self-
representation will bring about a different response.70 
Over the course of the thesis the idea of a public opinion will be opened up and in doing 
so the various roles an individual plays as a member of the public are explored, from 
consumer to patient to service-user, to the ‘man on the street’.  These are seen as 
separate to the idea that an individual who is a scientist or clinician is equally a member 
of the public.  The relationship between and value given to the expert and layperson is 
looked at in more detail later in the chapter and throughout the thesis as I attempt to 
identify which party holds more sway in regulatory-policy decision making.   
2.3.2 An overview of the features of public opinion in relation to genomics 
This part of the chapter opens with a further look at the four variables commonly used 
in the analysis public opinion data: direction, intensity, stability and information 
content.71  These four factors will be discussed in relation to the measurement of public 
opinion of genomics to help draw out the specific features and limitations of the 
gauging of a public opinion of genomics.    
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Sturgis and Allum’s review of the surveys carried out between 1980 and 2006 on the 
public opinion of biomedical science provides a very clear impression of the huge 
volume of survey data being collected.  Within the parameters of their meta-analysis 
which dictated that only national or international sample surveys that included measures 
of knowledge, interest and attitudes about biomedical science were considered, they 
managed to amass a cache of 136 surveys.72  It would be impossible to accurately 
measure the number of additional surveys that have proliferated over the past few 
decades in this field as the number has been astronomical.  Linked to this has been the 
rise in the commercial side of data collection, and it is common for regulatory agencies 
to outsource and to commission a survey from specialist public opinion data collection 
companies.   
(i) Direction 
As regards the direction of public opinion towards genomics it is first important to ask 
whether the public hold a uniform opinion of all applications of genomics.  Most people 
respond differently to the different applications of genomic science and technology.  
There is a divergence between the public’s opinion of the biomedical and the 
agricultural applications of genomics.  In simplistic and generalised terms, there is 
cautious support for the medical applications of genetics such as genetic testing of 
adults; by contrast there is very strong opposition to human cloning, gene therapy and 
xenotransplantation.  As regards public opinion towards GM foods, it will be shown in 
Chapter 5 that while there have been times of extreme opposition, public opinion is less 
polarised in recent times.  This distinction runs deeper, meaning that people will be 
more favourable, for example, towards prenatal testing and a selective abortion in the 
case of a serious genetic condition such as Tay-Sachs disease but disapprove of this for 
sex selection.73 
It is necessary to break down the data findings and a fascinating result can be found in 
the Eurobarometer 2010.  In this survey questions were introduced relating to cisgenic 
and transgenic apples.  These techniques were introduced to the respondent in the 
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survey as a similar process to that of genetic modification.  The following introductions 
were used, the first for GM and the second for the transgenic, cisgenic questions: 
‘Let’s speak now about genetically modified (GM) food made from plants or micro-
organisms that have been changed by altering their genes.  For example a plant might 
have its genes modified to make it resistant to a particular plant disease, to improve its 
food quality or to help it grow faster’. 
‘Some European researchers think there are new ways of controlling common diseases 
in apples - things like scab and mildew.  There are two new ways of doing this.  Both 
mean that the apples could be grown with limited use of pesticides, and so pesticide 
residues on the apples would be minimal.  The first way is to artificially introduce a 
resistance gene from another species such as a bacterium or animal into an apple tree to 
make it resistant to mildew and scab……..The second way is to artificially introduce a 
gene that exists naturally in wild/crab apples which provides resistance to mildew and 
scab.’74 
This apparent anomaly will be looked at in greater detail in Chapter 6, however it is 
interesting to note that in the Eurobarometer survey, 27% of respondents held GM food 
to be safe while the corresponding results were 37% for transgenic (the first example) 
and  53% for cisgenic (the second example).  Also worthy of note are the responses for 
whether the practices were deemed ‘unnatural’, which 76% deemed GM foods to be and 
78% for transgenic apples and 57% for cisgenic apples.  This last result highlights how 
crude survey data output is, in that such survey style statements report that 33% of the 
European public support transgenic apples yet the data has been published with the 
‘don’t know’ responses excluded.75  While the report is transparent about this, it is 
common for such blunt statements to be reproduced in the media and in regulatory-
policy documents without attention drawn to this fact.  Clearly this example shows that 
survey respondents can be led by the phrasing and framing of survey questions.   
In order to assess the direction of public opinion of genomics, it is necessary to compare 
relevant opinion data with that relating to other modern technological developments.  In 
doing so one can ask assess whether the public are simply anxious about novelty.  The 
Eurobarometer 2010 report states that 53% of the public think that biotechnology will 
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have a ‘positive effect’ on our way of life in the next 20 years; 7% responded ‘no 
effect’, 20% think it will have a ‘negative effect’ and a further 20% answered ‘don’t 
know’.  The report compares the results for seven technologies: solar energy with 
extremely positive responses: 87% responding that it will have a positive effect and the 
least popular being nuclear energy with a corresponding 39%.  Biotechnology ranked 
fourth of the seven technologies listed but the responses to biotechnology are almost 
evenly balanced between the positive effect responses and the combined no effect, 
negative effect and ‘don’t knows’.76  Condit points out that there is not a uniform 
negativity to new technologies but that genetic technologies do receive less support 
from the public than other technologies and that the responses are more polarised.77 
Gaskell et al discuss the concept of a habituation effect in relation to public perceptions 
of biotechnology whereby the ‘novel of the past becomes the taken-for-granted of the 
present’.78  As an aside however, it is evident that this type of effect is not relevant to 
the case of nuclear energy which has equal numbers of people for it as against in the 
2010 Eurobarometer Report.79 In terms of any habituation effect in relation to 
biotechnology, the same report shows that the trend for optimism towards 
biotechnology in the UK from 1991 to 2010 has been quite unpredictable and irregular. 
In order to show the irregularities I have analysed the relevant data from the 
Eurobarometer report 2010 below.   
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Figure 2: Trends in optimism for biotechnology in the UK 
 
While the lowest point for public optimism in biotechnology is consistent across the 
European states, the UK is not in line with the rest of the European states in the period 
since 2005 where there has been a marked decrease in the levels of optimism.   
(ii) Intensity 
Examples of an intense public mood would be public protests and the boycotting of 
products and companies.  However, in terms of measuring the intensity of public 
opinion through survey data, indicators are more subtle and will range from the 
numbers of ‘don’t knows’ expressed and the polarisation of opinion.  The ‘don’t know’ 
responses may be high as a result of public apathy, lack of interest in either the subject 
and/or the survey per se, confusion, or lack of knowledge about the subject of the 
survey.  In terms of interest in genomics, the 2003 BSA highlights that half of all people 
surveyed in Britain described themselves as being ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ interested in 
modern genetic science’.80  In the chapter on GM food, a discussion will be had 
surrounding the levels of polarisation of views relating to GM and it will be asked 
whether increased polarisation correlates with contentious issues; has the confusion 
over the scientific arguments led people to more readily take sides on the issue? 
In the case of genomics, the public referred to in regulatory debate are often patients or 
consumers.  Thus should we only consider the public attitude at the point of a choice 
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regarding whether to take up the outputs of genomics?  I believe that there exists a 
pragmatic or utilitarian attitude to the embracing of knowledge on a ‘need to know’ 
basis because, as Lippmann argues, we cannot as individuals have extensive knowledge 
on all areas of policy.  There is a distinction to be made between the public and the 
individuals utilising the technology.  There is a strong difference between the abstract 
situation where an individual is asked in a survey whether there should be strict laws to 
regulate xenotransplantation and the reality when an individual is seriously unwell and 
the use of this application may save their life.  This distinction is related to the gap 
which is often commented on between what people say in surveys and their actual 
behaviour.   
(iii) Stability 
Regulators respond more easily to survey data which shows stability over time.  
Volatility however may also be useful if there is an obvious trigger for the changes such 
as a regulatory change, heightened media coverage, a food or health scare relevant to 
the survey subject.  In the case-study chapters I will ask whether regulators are taking 
account of stability or changeability of public opinion over time. It makes sense to 
presuppose that for regulation to successfully respond to public opinion a stable public 
opinion is important.   
At the heart of the drive to collect data pertaining to the public’s views on genomics is a 
critical lack of coherence both across and within organisations.  This leads, for example, 
to the limitations in analysis resulting from a lack of data which would enable a 
researcher to conduct a longitudinal study from one consistent data source.  For 
example in the cache of questions devoted to genomics in the BSA survey those on 
prenatal testing were only asked in 1998, 2000 and 2003 and those relating to GM foods 
in 1999 and 2003.  Additionally the questions posed were not always duplicated.  
Sturgis and Allum comment on this thus: 
‘While it is likely that the current mix of ad hoc initiatives and recurrent Eurobarometer 
modules will continue to provide an insight into public opinion toward biomedical 
science for the foreseeable future, by its very nature this form of evidence is partial.  
Lacking core funding and a clear a priori research agenda in the medium to long term, 
the content and timing of initiatives is likely to remain sporadic and irregular’. 81 
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(iv) Information Content 
The questions I wish to address in this section and across the thesis as a whole are: 
Does informed opinion carry more weight in the regulatory-policy arena? 
Does greater knowledge of a technology lead to a more positive view? 
The idea of ‘public understanding’ of science and technology gives the impression that 
a person either has a level of knowledge about science and technology or not.  From the 
outset, it is critical to move away from this mode of thinking.  As Sturgis et al highlight, 
there is no arbitrary threshold which signals understanding.82  Any such demarcations 
are the constructs of the social scientist or regulator.  As a general rule, levels of 
scientific literacy amongst the public are often considered by researchers and policy 
makers alike as being surprisingly low.   
Surveys can show inter alia how well a respondent fares in a quiz on genetics or 
whether the respondent has a degree in science and this data is useful relative to the 
representativeness of the sample.  However, the point where survey respondents are 
deemed knowledgeable is subjective: be that as a crude measure such as whether 
respondents attain a certain number of correct answers in a quiz or a more sophisticated 
measure.  Durant et al have been trying to ascertain knowledge levels not only on a 
factual level but additionally the underlying ‘processes of scientific inquiry’.  From their 
research they conclude that there is a positive correlation between the level of scientific 
understanding and the self-reported interest in science.83   
The example of Durant et al is but one example of the attempts by survey practitioners 
to strive for increasingly sophisticated techniques in the drive for that ever more 
representative sample of public opinion and the public’s understanding of science 
(PUS).  The collection of public opinion data is not only big business, it is highly 
evolved. The question of whether respondents are knowledgeable about science 
continues to be strongly contested and while survey techniques are elaborated to include 
more sophisticated measures and variables there is an additional argument; that there is 
a strong value to lay opinion.  Wynne’s research on Cumbrian sheep farmers after the 
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Chernobyl incident illustrates this latter point. Wynne highlights the way that a lay 
person’s valuable knowledge is denigrated in contrast with the ‘expert’ opinion.  The 
sheep farmers drew on their understanding of their terrain and cattle which Wynne 
describes as ‘specialist knowledge’. If this knowledge had been acknowledged and 
added to the knowledge of the scientists studying the impact of Chernobyl in Cumbria it 
would have led to a more representative picture.  In the case of one experiment (where 
sheep were being penned off in order to test the effects of the chemical absorption of 
minerals in the soil as a means to prevent recontamination of the sheep) the farmers 
claimed that hill sheep do not respond well to being penned up and would ‘waste’, 
which is what happened and this experiment was ultimately abandoned.84 
Information content is a key variable in any discussion of the features or potential sui 
generis nature of public attitudes to genomics.  Sturgis & Allum state: 
‘A key issue in measuring public opinion to new and emerging technologies relates to 
how the researcher should go about measuring opinion towards areas of science and 
technology about which most members of the public are only dimly aware’.85 
It has long been known that there are inherent problems in the establishment of 
knowledge levels of individuals.  Interestingly, findings on the knowledge-attitude 
relationship differ in relation to whether an individual has self-certificated their level of 
knowledge or whether it has been assessed by a third party.  (The question of self-
perception of knowledge is outside the scope of this thesis.)   
Rates of genetic literacy are rising over time in response to increased familiarity with 
the technologies, and the clearest indicators of this increase are education and age.  For 
instance, there is evidence that the younger age groups have greater knowledge of what 
DNA, gene and chromosome are.86    Interestingly, Wolpert picks up on some examples 
in the 2005 Eurobarometer where even the question setters have displayed a lack of 
understanding of the science in the wording of the questions! For instance: ‘the cloning 
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of human beings results in perfectly identical descendents’. 87  Sturgis et al comment 
that ‘empirical research […] finds that public ‘scientific literacy’ is generally low, 
falling well short of what normative criteria would consider ‘acceptable’.88  The study 
conducted by Sturgis et al in 2005 carried out a regression-based modelling technique to 
investigate whether attitude correlated with knowledge level in relation to 
biotechnology using data from the 2000 BSA and the 1999 Wellcome Consultative 
Panel on Gene Therapy.  The paper concludes that while scientific knowledge does 
appear to have an impact on attitude, in that increased knowledge is more likely to lead 
to a positive attitude, these results do not apply across the board because both the 
biotechnology product and the social location of the individual have an influence.89  The 
relationship is too complex to be interpreted as simply supporting the deficit model.  It 
is argued by many academics and politicians that a knowledgeable public is a vital 
element of a vibrant democracy and as a consequence there has been an outpouring of 
data collection concentrated on the measurement of the public’s knowledge of science – 
or ‘civic scientific literacy’ (Miller90) levels.  While it is laudable to strive for a 
knowledgeable public, one must consider a number of points: firstly: how realistic is 
this? The previous discussion of how an individual cannot maintain knowledge on every 
conceivable subject sheds light on this question. Secondly, it is the case that science-
communication funding has been pumped into this area but this will always only affect 
a small proportion of the public.  Finally, over time and as a technology becomes more 
familiar, data shows that genetic literacy levels increase.  In line with the deficit model 
it is often assumed that increased familiarity with a technology leads to increased 
engagement and subsequently a more positive view of the said product.  However, 
studies including  Sturgis et al 2005, and the MORI poll of 2001 on genetic information 
commissioned by the Human Genetics Commission found that the respondents with a 
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higher level of knowledge were the most likely to be critical and less optimistic about 
genetic technologies.91 
2.3.3 The sources and gauges of public opinion  
For the purposes of the thesis, the principal survey data referred to is drawn from the 
British Social Attitude Survey and Eurobarometer.  Sturgis and Allum argue that the 
BSA survey series has been the most consistent (outside Eurobarometer) site of survey 
investigations of public opinion toward science and technology.  It included a cache of 
questions on biomedicine in the years: 1993, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2003.92  
Eurobarometer have conducted a series of seven surveys which specifically examine 
biotechnology with the most recent conducted in 2010.  Sturgis et al argue that with 
reference to biotechnology: ‘public knowledge is low and opposition high in most 
contexts in which it has been studied’.93  The critical point relates to the context of study 
but equally if a large number of reliably collected surveys show similar results these can 
be given a stronger standing and resonance in regulatory decision-making.  This raises 
the question as to whether such meta-reviews of surveys on the same subject are being 
seen by regulators or whether regulators rely on the latest survey or consultation 
exercise commissioned by their own institution. 
As already discussed, Sturgis and Allum criticise the lack of co-ordination of data 
collection in this realm and describe the survey collection as sporadic.  They argue that 
surveys are generally conducted in a reactive manner, for example as a response to 
heightened media attention, but due to the varied funding bodies and different teams 
leading the survey collections the results are difficult to analyse in conjunction with 
each other.94 
The high levels of funding and resources on data pertaining to genomics is evidenced in 
the enormous volume of survey data are indicators of the political and commercial 
import given to such an undertaking.  Lezaun and Soneryd state that: 
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‘In many countries, the need to seek lay views that could inform complex technical and 
scientific decisions has become almost a new orthodoxy, and it is to increase public 
participation in science and technology policies that the most innovative instruments of 
consultation are being devised today, at a time when citizen engagement in other 
spheres of policy-making is waning’.95   
In the next chapter this enhanced reference by the IRAs to public opinion in the domain 
of genomics is addressed in terms of whether it arises from a need for the IRAs to 
appear to be more responsive to the public as a result of the controversial issues raised 
by the novel technologies.  An alternative perspective is that this enhanced reference to 
the public voice results from the drive to placate public anxiety over novel technologies.  
Regulators may feel that their best way of proceeding in the introduction of novel 
products is to move ‘softly softly’ in line with increased familiarity.    
2.4 Conclusions 
Public opinion measurement has serious limitations and the resulting data can never be 
called an accurate representation of public opinion.  However, the data which is 
collected is a measurement of something, even if to call it representative of the public is 
inaccurate, this data retains significance in the regulatory system.  The question then 
turns on how one marries these two inconsistencies.  Is it simply a case of renaming 
public opinion ‘public opinion data’?  Would it be better if policy makers and regulators 
become more open and transparent in the discussion of this data and highlight its 
inconsistencies and limitations?  Is it feasible to ask for data results to be communicated 
in a more accurate manner in that a result such as ‘x% of the public believe y’, has 
greater punch that ‘we have consulted 300 people and x% of these believe y’.  It is 
pertinent to return to Blumer’s argument here in which he highlights the discrepancy 
between the ordinary use and interpretation of public opinion in everyday life and the 
narrow operationalist view that public opinion is what surveys survey. 96  The latter 
perspective ties in with the argument that public opinion only exists where it serves a 
purpose.   
Does this line of argument turn the quest for an answer to the question ‘is there a public 
opinion of genomics?’ into a moot point?  Undoubtedly, there has been a high level of 
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funding and manpower applied to the measurement of public opinion in this sector and 
as such some of the data collected will be deemed to be robust relative to the limitations 
of all survey data.  The data findings are that the public are generally supportive of 
health genomics and fairly split in relation to agricultural genomics.  Such data will be 
explored in greater depth in the case-study chapters and in doing so the specific 
idiosyncrasies of the data pertaining to genomics such as the information content will be 
highlighted.  The findings resulting from an instrument are often regarded as 
constituting the object of study instead of being some contributory addition to 
knowledge of the object of study.97  Although this conflation can be criticised on the 
grounds that it is not representative, the conflation enhances the role of public opinion 
data in the regulatory-policy process.  An alternative route would be to move away from 
this conflation approach to the operationalist view mentioned at the start of the chapter 
and maintain that the survey data retains a value and role but should be presented in a 
more transparent way.  This gap between the data per se and the representativeness 
value attributed to it in the regulatory-policy documents is analysed in depth in the case-
study chapters.   
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Chapter 3 
An Exploration of the Definitions of Regulation and  
the Regulation of Genomics 
3.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the meaning of the term ‘regulation’ and then to 
locate a definition which is workable for the thesis when applied to the regulation of 
genomics.  It is important to recognise that not only are there many definitions of the 
term regulation but additionally that it is acceptable for these meanings to work 
alongside each other and co-exist.  Further to this, Baldwin, Scott and Hood state that 
such multiple usages of the term regulation are not ‘reducible to some platonic essence 
or single concept’.98  While this suggests that arriving at a definition of regulation may 
be problematic, definitions are necessary prerequisites for both academics and 
practitioners in order to frame analysis and implementation.  Within the multiple uses of 
regulation, a working definition of regulation is established for the purposes of situating 
and delimiting the field of research in the thesis.  It is the case therefore that the 
definition of regulation given here will be utilitarian and act as a framing or boundary-
setting tool.  Additionally, the understandings of regulation outlined in this chapter act 
as a platform for the discussion of the regulation that has developed in response to the 
products, devices and techniques which have emerged from the techno-science of 
genomics.   
A common portrayal of genetic and genomic technologies is that they need to be 
controlled and if left unleashed have the potential to wreak social havoc.  As Black 
states: 
‘Regulation of genetic technology some would claim is an oxymoron.  Genetic 
technology is simply out of control.’99 
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This idea has dominated the regulatory ethos and can be seen to be part of the framing 
of the technology as far back as the influential Asilomar conference of 1973, which 
focussed on the recent reports of successful recombination of DNA molecules.  The 
Asilomar conference is generally viewed as one of the principal triggers of the 
regulatory system and helped to set the course of the regulatory agenda in genomics.  
The raison d’être for Asilomar was to find a balance between scientific autonomy and 
the protection of the public from any potential risks.  There was some concern at the 
time relating to the risk of the release of pathogens into the environment and a particular 
concern relating to a strain of E. coli bacteria, K-12, and whether it could colonise in the 
human gut.  At this conference letters from leading scientists were published calling for 
a moratorium on research relating to recombinant DNA.100  It is argued in this thesis 
therefore that there has been a strong push for regulation as a means to oversee the 
development of genomics, although there are cases where the genomics revolution has 
run its course unchecked and these specifically relate to cases where the science has 
outstripped the regulation.  Additionally, there is not a consensus across the 
stakeholders (the scientists, the medical professionals, the interest groups, the food 
suppliers) as to the substance of the regulation.  When reviewing the regulatory field of 
genomics however, the regulators and scientists alike are in favour of regulation as a 
means to protect the public while also acting to facilitate and validate scientific 
endeavours.  There arises a regulatory dialectic with which the regulation of genomics 
wrestles: to exert control over the technology in order to protect the public and the 
environment from potential harm while at the same time to facilitate the development of 
genomics in order to maximise the benefits for humankind and to maintain industrial 
and commercial advantage.   
This chapter is divided into two parts: in the first part, understandings of regulation and 
the rationale for regulation are outlined and the principal theoretical perspectives are 
described.  In the second part of the chapter, the regulation of genomics is examined in 
terms of whether it is correct to describe it as a discrete area of regulation, and the 
differences between the terms genetics, genomics and biotechnology are explored.  The 
question is posed as to whether the regulation of genomics is special relative to other 
fields of regulation and in addressing this, the regulatory set-up is examined.  The 
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regulation of genomics is reviewed to see whether it can be classed as being sui generis 
or as having regulatory features which are idiosyncratic.  These discussions set up the 
theoretical frames with which the role played by public opinion can be analysed in the 
ensuing empirical chapters.     
The principal goal of the second part of the chapter is to define and describe what is 
meant in this thesis by the regulation of genomics.  In justifying the study of the 
regulation of genomics in the thesis as opposed to the regulation of biotechnology or 
genetics, the trajectory of the gene and its transformation from a scientific to a legal 
entity is discussed.  The chapter poses the argument that there are cognitive gaps 
between law, regulatory policy making and the scientific community and that there is 
evidence that the concepts of genomics and the gene have carved out legitimate 
ontological spaces in both camps, but that when the epistemological communities meet 
it can lead to problems of cognitive dissonance. 
In this chapter, I hope to extend the current literature on the regulation of genomics 
which is currently, according to Scott, ‘concerned with the construction of only one 
element of a regulatory regime – the normative structure of principles, standards and 
rules’. 101  I aim to address this limited approach in the literature and set out to do so by 
bringing together the normative debate with an overview of the substantive regulation.  
In the following section of the chapter, I set out an overview of the principal normative 
justifications given to support the case that the regulation of genomics merits special 
regulatory handling.  The regulatory response to these normative drivers is then outlined 
in an attempt to draw out whether the regulation has been handled differently relative to 
other policy domains.   
The regulation of genomics offers up a multitude of ways that the problématique can be 
formulated and this in itself may lead us to question whether it constitutes a discrete 
area.  As Black notes, the problematisation can be framed in terms of risk to human 
health or the environment, it can be a question of consumer or patient choice, a matter 
of property rights relating to patents or to an individual’s DNA, an issue of 
confidentiality related to employers, insurance companies or family members, and 
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finally the regulation of genomics may be framed in terms of the inherent ethical 
issues.102  There is no doubt therefore that this creates difficulties in terms of 
streamlining the ethos of the regulation and legal rationality. Thus Scott argues that: 
‘Biotechnology regulation, as a field of public policy, has not yet matured to the point 
where other elements of regulatory regimes – notably processes for monitoring and 
mechanisms of behavioural modification – are routinely considered or 
problematised.’103 
3.1 Understanding Regulation 
3.1.1 Definitions of Regulation 
The Oxford English Dictionary offers the following definition of regulation which has 
etymological roots in the latin régula, a rule: 
‘A rule prescribed for the management of some matter, or for the regulating of conduct; 
a governing precept or direction; a standing rule.’ 
Traditional definitions of regulation generally refer solely to a command and control 
(CAC) form of regulation whereby regulation is introduced by the state through the use 
of legal rules and is backed up by criminal sanctions.104  While command and control is 
a style of regulating it is often conflated with an understanding of regulation.  It is 
characterised by being highly prescriptive and positivist in its application and receives 
heavy criticism for its rigidity.  CAC is a linear and unilateral form of regulation, in that 
it functions by governments dictating the behaviour of the people.  As such it is often 
criticised for being an unsophisticated form of regulation and subject to information and 
knowledge failures which lead to both motivation failure and potentially to regulatory 
capture.  Regulatory capture is when the regulators who have been commissioned to act 
in the public interest develop an overly close relationship with those they are regulating 
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which has an impact on their independence as a regulatory agency.105  Additional 
criticism comes from socio-legal academics, for instance, Griffiths has written 
extensively on the subject of the relationship of regulation and simple cause-effect 
relations between the state and the public.106  Black points out however that CAC is a 
straw man in many senses and becomes an easy target for all criticism levelled at 
regulation as a policy tool.107 Currently, the ‘rules backed by sanctions’ interpretation 
still holds ground but it is more common for regulators and academics to talk beyond 
this form and conceptualisation.  
Baldwin et al offer three meanings of regulation which are a natural starting point for a 
discussion of definitions of regulation.  The first of these three definitions is essentially 
the classic command and control view of regulation.  In describing this Baldwin states 
that: 
‘at its simplest, regulation refers to the promulgation of an authoritative set of rules, 
accompanied by some mechanism, typically a public agency, for monitoring and 
promoting compliance with these rules’.108   
The second meaning put forward by Baldwin expands the concept of regulation to 
include all modes of state intervention or influence which act to steer society, industry 
and/or the economy.  Importantly, this conceptualisation still maintains that state 
autonomy is a prerequisite for regulation.  The third understanding of regulation is yet 
more expansive and refers to all forms of social control or influence including those 
which are beyond state-led intervention, for example, the influence of the financial 
market.109  These three meanings of regulation evolve and as they do so there is a 
softening of the use of control as a regulatory mechanism to one of influence.  The three 
definitions may be viewed as points along a continuum and as such are a useful 
heuristic in deliberation of regulatory styles and definitions of regulation.  In terms of 
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causal relationships between the regulator and the regulated it is significant that the 
third meaning given here includes incidental causality.110  This is significant in terms of 
intentionality (which is often classified as a prerequisite of regulation in a 
conventionalist sense) and is unavoidable in terms of describing state-derived 
regulation, and yet arguably absent in relation to market influence upon behaviour.     
It is generally argued that lawyers and economists adhere to the understandings of 
regulation given in the first two of Baldwin’s definitions, whereas the third definition is 
a less commonly held interpretation and is more likely to appeal to socio-legal scholars 
and academics in that it refers to concepts such as the discovery of regulation in 
‘unsuspected places’.111  Black criticises the use of the three meanings identified by 
Baldwin and contends that even to identify these is to ‘gloss over the multiplicity of 
meanings given to regulation’.  Black also highlights the way that academics, and she 
includes herself, are very utilitarian when it comes to selecting an interpretation of 
regulation in their writing, and it is common for them to switch between definitions.112  
Black argues that regulation should be viewed as an ever expanding concept and 
produces a table to illustrate this point. 113  However, as a social scientist it is important 
to make an attempt to clearly define the object of study, and in this thesis it is necessary 
to put forward a definition of regulation to be used as a means to define the remit of the 
study. Black’s table explores the competing conceptualisations of regulation as a type of 
legal instrument, as an action, as a process, as an outcome and as a property.  
Brownsword prefers to view regulation as any type of controlling or channelling 
strategy. 114  As such it is conceptualised as an activity, which is also the way regulation 
is talked of in autopoietic analyses of regulation where regulation is controlling, 
governing or directing.115   
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Black highlights that in decentred analyses of regulation, the ‘regulation is not so much 
an activity as a product of activity’.116  From this perspective, the focus of the regulation 
moves from the centre to a more decentred conceptualisation in which regulation is 
diffused throughout society.  Such a conceptualisation of regulation draws heavily on 
systems theory.  The third definition of regulation offered by Baldwin, as noted above, 
relates to a decentred perspective. It is however problematic as a definition of regulation 
which can be utilised for an area of study because, as Black notes, it; 
‘provides no boundaries as to where regulation might end and some other influencing 
factor take effect and so provides very little analytical purchase.’117 
Decentrism works from the assumption that there is an ‘inherent ungovernability of 
social actors, systems and networks’.118  To assume such a stance would not be 
appropriate for the examination of this thesis’ research questions which are focussed on 
the relationship between regulation and public opinion.  However in relation to the 
thesis, whether social actors may be deemed ungovernable or not is a moot point, as the 
influence of regulation on public opinion is not a question of governability. 
A further commonly held interpretation of regulation is that it is a form of 
institutionalised norm control.  From this perspective questions arise, such as: Can we 
distil the essence of regulation down to a set of processes by which norms are 
established?  How are such norms promulgated and perpetuated?  Regulation may be 
viewed as either an activity or a process that has the capacity to facilitate and prohibit 
specific activities.  Foucault describes regulation along these lines as ‘the conduct of 
conduct’.119   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
116
 Black (2002) op cit. at p.6. 
117
 Black (2002) op cit. at p.8. 
118
 Black, J. (2002) op cit. at p,6. 
119
 Foucault M. (1991) ‘Governmentality’ in Faubion, James D. (Ed), ‘Power: The Essential Works 3’ 
70 
 
3.1.2 The Rationale given for Regulation 
‘Regulation has existed forever, but regulation for defensible reasons of economic or 
social policy is more recent’.  (McLean 2004120) 
Baldwin and Cave make a distinction between the technical justifications for regulation 
and ‘motives for regulating’ by which they include, inter alia, the influence upon 
governments of a powerful economic argument, an industrial lobby or a particular 
regulatory stance which may benefit their chances of re-election.121  The overriding 
rationale for regulation is that of market failure. This is the argument that the market 
alone will not account for certain areas of public interest, and that externalities such as 
environmental pollution will arise.  Additional reasons why the uncontrolled market 
would fail include the emergence of monopolies, windfall profits, and anti-competitive 
behaviour. Regulation is deemed a corrective solution to such problems.  A further 
potential problem would be the emergence of information inadequacies. This is 
pertinent to the case of genomics, since regulation can provide information to give a 
consumer the knowledge to make a choice over products (as in the labelling of GM 
foods) and regulation can ensure that new health techniques are researched and attain 
quality standards (as in the case of prenatal testing and PGD).  It is important to 
acknowledge the point made by Baldwin and Cave that: 
‘Any analysis of the need to regulate will be skewed if it is assumed that regulatory 
techniques will operate perfectly’.122   
The market failure understanding of regulation derives from the function that regulation 
performs in the name of public interest, which is to restore equity following the vagaries 
of the market; i.e. to iron out market failures in the interests of the public.  This theory is 
dominant as a justification given for the necessity of regulation.  However, the 
traditional definition of this theory has shifted slightly, and it is common now to hear 
reference to additional factors which stand alongside the identification of market failure 
as the sole rationale for regulation.  Thus market failure alone may not be enough as a 
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justification for intervention, and subsequent economic or social reasons may also be 
required.123  Additionally, questions arise about whether it is the public that is calling 
for regulatory intervention in order to remedy the inequity of the market and, if not, who 
is driving this strongly normative mandate. 
Classically, regulation has been viewed as a mechanism which can plug the gap caused 
by market failures and thus provide a safety net for the protection of the public.  Market 
failures traditionally arise as the result of inter alia: externalities, information 
asymmetries and inadequate competition, or as a combination of these.124  To take these 
in turn: externalities or spillovers are usually taken to be the costs or benefits which 
result from an activity but do not accrue to the people undertaking that activity. The 
classic example of this is pollution.  Without regulation it would in many cases be 
cheaper for a firm to pollute and for society to suffer the social costs.  Regulatory 
intervention acts to internalise the cost of the externalities and to protect society.  
Information asymmetries or deficits will occur without regulation and the majority of 
these relate to a lack of consumer protection.  For example, a lack of product 
information may mean that consumers are unable to compare competing products, or 
the situation could arise where producers failed to inform consumers of possible side-
effects or associated harm.125  Interestingly, some commentators would now argue that 
access to information has led to a form of ‘regulation by information’ which links to the 
proceduralist126 mandate and as such the justification for regulation includes more than 
a market failure justification, since it engulfs democratic principles such as the 
advancement of an active and engaged citizenship.  Majone states: 
‘It is a truism that public policy is increasingly dependent on relevant, timely and 
especially, credible information.  Nowhere is such dependence stronger than in the area 
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of social regulation – environmental and consumer protection, risk regulation, 
occupational health – where the policy-maker often faces problems at the frontier of 
scientific and technological knowledge.’127 
The third rationale for intervention is the assumption that the self-regulating or 
unregulated market will engender the development of monopolies.  From a public 
interest perspective, this may lead to the monopoly powers maximising their profits and 
restricting their output which may result in consumers paying prices which are set in 
excess of the marginal cost.128  The corollary of this has been the development of 
competition (anti-trust) law, although it should be noted that not all monopolies work 
against the public interest.  Baldwin and Cave highlight the case of ‘natural monopolies’ 
where it may be less costly to society and more efficient to exempt certain cases from 
competition law.  An example of this given by Baldwin and Cave is the building and 
maintenance of railway lines, where the economies of scale are so large that it is more 
efficient to allow a single firm to dominate.129 
The failure of the market is examined to see whether it justifies regulatory intervention.  
Importantly, regulation is not the only mechanism which can remedy such a failure: 
market failure may be remedied through the introduction of certain market transactions.  
Ogus adds that the civil law system also remedies such failings and as such he argues 
that civil law falls outside his conception of regulation. 130  Thus the identification of 
market failure alone is not an adequate justification for regulatory intervention. As 
already noted, market failure is not the only theory given to justify the introduction of 
regulation, and Prosser identifies other reasons for regulatory intervention which are the 
protection of rights and the maintenance of social solidarity.131   
The motives for regulation are reviewed in this next part of the thesis through the 
theoretical framework outlined by Baldwin and Cave, and these are: public interest 
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theories, private interest theories, interest group theories, force of ideas theory and 
institutional theories.132  These perspectives are neither mutually exclusive nor without 
overlap and thus to some extent the differentiation between them masks the multiplicity 
of theories and sub-theories between and across them.  The purpose of giving these 
explanations for regulation is to provide an introduction to discussion of the role that 
regulation plays in genomics which is discussed in section 3.2.  In the overview of these 
four perspectives it is clear that disciplinary divisions on the theory of regulation have 
played a consequential role and are more than merely post-facto tools of intra-academic 
analysis.  The theoretical underpinnings help to define regulation in that they may push 
a specific ideological agenda which influences the regulatory form and style and as such 
the meanings of regulation over time.   
Understandings or definitions of regulation may be viewed from a number of 
standpoints, for instance one may take a functional, essentialist or conventionalist 
perspective.  Black gives an overview of these three stances. The functionalist 
viewpoint is that regulation performs a function and so a functionalist would want to 
know how regulation performs as a contribution to society and would discuss regulation 
in terms of ‘regulation does...’ The second perspective is that of the essentialist which 
involves the identification of the principal components of regulation. Once these have 
been identified, the essentialist will assess whether these components are all present and 
if they are then they attribute to this concept the term regulation.  Thus an essentialist 
would question what it is that regulation achieves or does in practice.  Finally, the 
conventionalist examines the ways that the term regulation is used in practice and where 
the community being considered identifies something as regulation and as such talks in 
terms such as ‘regulation is conventionally taken to mean……...’.133  The 
conventionalist perspective allows multiple definitions of regulation to co-exist.   
Baldwin et al attribute the multitude of definitions of the term ‘regulation’ to the rush of 
professionals and academics ‘to colonise a new or newly important field of activity’.134  
This may be something which is recognisable in the area of novel technologies.  
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However, this argument is surely weakened by the fact that regulation has a rather 
vague and sometimes amorphous character in order to encompass and accommodate the 
wide number of applications that are attributed to it.  In this sense the meaning is often 
determined by application, for example, in the choice of command and control over 
self-regulation.  However, it is common in the literature for either regulatory form 
(legislation, tradeable permits and codes of conduct) or regulatory strategy to be 
conflated with the definition of regulation.   
(i) The Public Interest Theory  
The public interest theory overlaps with the market failure model outlined above in that 
it relates to the idea that regulation is drafted with the public interest in mind and 
regulators are thus viewed as agents acting in the public interest.  Such regulators are 
deemed to be trustworthy, disinterested and public-spirited.135 The rationale for the 
regulation has been given above in that in cases where the public interest is not being 
protected, regulation can act to resolve this.  Criticism of this theory arises in relation to 
the fact that regulation often has to deal with competing interests which represent the 
public interest, meaning that the public interest is not such a clear objective in many 
cases.  For instance in the case of genomics, many of the applications of genomics 
correspond to the needs of the public but equally they are entangled in a myriad of 
ethical issues.   
(ii) Interest Group Theory 
The interest group theory views regulation as a product of relationships between groups 
and relationships between these groups and the state.  Rather than seeing public interest 
as the main driver for regulation, this theory is premised upon competition for power.  
As such it focuses on power struggles, the politics of negotiation and issues such as 
political compromise.  From this perspective regulation happens as a response to the 
most powerful and strategic political lobbying and bargaining.  Within this theory stand 
two predominant theoretical strands: the pluralists and the corporatists.  While pluralists 
analyse the role played by parties within power struggles, coalitions and factions, 
corporatists examine the ways and reasons why partnerships are formed between certain 
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factions and the state, and how subsequent regulation serves to restrict further political 
access by competing parties to the regulatory arena.136 
(iii) Private Interest Theories 
Private interest theories take the view that regulation is driven and developed by private 
interests and these theories include inter alia: the economic theories, the Chicago theory, 
private interest, public choice, regulatory capture theory, special interest, economic, and 
rent-seeking theory.137  It is worthwhile to look at the economic theories.  Posner 
highlights two pervasive assumptions within economic theory which are limitations to 
this theory; firstly that economic markets are extremely fragile and will act inefficiently 
or inequitably, and secondly that government regulation is costless.  Ogus argues that 
the economic theory has had a profound impact on the way that regulation has been 
both analysed by academics and implemented as policy.138  The theory was developed 
in the 1960s and 1970s and according to Ogus is part of the reason for the rationale for 
and failure of the regulation of this period.  The theory fell out of favour in the period of 
deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s and according to Ogus was of little explanatory 
value in this period.  The focus of the economic theory of regulation is on individual 
policy actors who behave according to their own private self-interest and act in a 
rational manner to this end.  There is thus a deviation from the pursuit of regulatory 
goals, and individual motives are acknowledged behind the collective rationale, such as 
the rationale for regulation as given by a state.  This theory denies a role for public 
interest regulation and as Baldwin et al state: 
‘Stress is placed on the propensity of such individual actors to circumvent official 
regulatory goals by substituting objectives that are self-serving and to act in pursuit of 
such ends as job retention or aggrandisement, re-election or the accumulation of 
personal wealth’.139 
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Within this theory, individuals behave as agents in a market where regulation is viewed 
as a commodity to be purchased by the most powerful player.140  According to this 
theory, regulators as political actors act no differently when it comes to regulation than 
they would in their private lives.  Policies are therefore implemented in order to increase 
the wealth or utility positions of the most powerful actor or actors.141   
The ‘Chicago theory’ was developed by Stigler, 1971 and Peltzman, 1989, and 
functions when there is a failure of competition law to prevent monopoly dominance.  
From this perspective regulation becomes a market commodity and its substantive 
content and quantification are dependent upon the forces of demand and supply.  The 
principal political demands come from producer groups such as firms, trade unions and 
consumer groups, and the supply emanates from the authority of politicians who always 
have re-election in mind.  The demands from industry carry the most political weight 
and the regulation is thus captured by industry. As such, the regulation is synonymous 
with industry’s wishes.  Criticisms of the Chicago theory are that there is the 
assumption that all parties are income maximisers, that they all are as well informed as 
possible and learn from experience, and that regulation carries no costs. 142  
(iv) The Force of Ideas Theory 
The force of ideas theory came about in response to the Reagan and Thatcher 
deregulation programmes. Baldwin and Cave explain that: 
‘[deregulation] was driven not by interest group pressures but by an intellectually 
guided process of economic rationalism that managed to benefit dispersed consumer 
groups at the expense of concentrated producers’ interests’.143  
This citation is premised upon the theory of the force of ideas, and attempts to offer an 
insight into the process of regulatory change.  Force of ideas explanations are generally 
discussed in tandem with the economic theory of regulation as a rationale for the 
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government regulation of business.  However, the force of ideas theories carry some 
merit beyond the economic account in that ideas or intellectual conceptions can be 
separated from private interests 
(v) Institutional Theories 
The final theoretical standpoint posited here centres on the role of institutions in shaping 
regulation and offer an explanation of regulatory change.  There is scepticism that 
individuals act solely as rational maximisers, instead, institutional theories hold that 
there is more going on in the push for regulatory development than merely the pursuit of 
individual goals. Wider factors are at play such as institutional structure and the social 
setting of regulation.  Individuals are deemed to be subject to the influences of 
institutional procedures.  Within this theoretical shift away from atomistic accounts of 
regulatory development is the ‘new institutionalist’ account.144  This derives from socio-
legal literature and includes analysis of the problems of bureaucratic and legislative drift 
and the potentiality of corrective administrative processes.145  A further important strand 
of institutional theories is the principal agent theories. These examine the workings of 
institutions through the power relationships between the principals and agents and 
supporters of these theories would hold that this type of analysis enables a 
quantification of optimum levels of regulation.146   
3.1.3 Thesis Definition of Regulation 
Having reviewed the principal theoretical perspectives on regulation, it is evident that 
regulation involves an assertion of control or influence on the part of the regulators over 
another party.  This control or influence may be achieved through the use of sanctions 
or incentives in order to achieve compliance. Regulation additionally may occur outside 
of state activity and apply to all areas of society.  The definition of regulation to be used 
in this thesis comes from Hood’s cybernetic analysis of regulation which Black draws 
upon. She proposes the following definition of regulation: 
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‘regulation is the sustained and focussed attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly 
identified outcome or outcomes which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, 
information-gathering and behaviour-modification’.147 
The forms of regulation studied in the thesis cross the three tiers of regulation as set out 
by Baldwin. These include rules which emanate from Government and rules which are 
produced by the departments of state and government agencies.  The decision to focus 
on governmental rather than parliamentary rules stems not merely from a concern to 
impose limits on this study but from a special interest in the problems of legitimising 
governmental rules which differ from parliamentary rules.  The thesis examines the 
ways that public opinion as an input into the regulatory process can help IRAs to 
legitimise their regulatory position and the regulation they produce.  In relation to the 
layers of regulation, primary legislation is analysed as it is central to the regulation of 
GM foods in the shape of European Directives and for the PGD and prenatal testing in 
the form of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act.  However, secondary rules 
are also included. These are rules which have legal force and are conferred by an Act of 
Parliament and are often called delegated law or ‘the regulations’.  Further to this 
tertiary rules are included in the regulation examined here. These relate to guidance 
notes, codes of practice, professional codes and voluntary codes and as such are rules 
which do not create rights that are directly enforceable through criminal or civil 
proceedings, although they may have the capacity to produce indirect legal effects. 148  I 
adopt the boundary set by Baldwin on the matter of tertiary rules in that they will only 
fall within the scope of this study if they are in written form. This therefore excludes 
social convention and informal understanding.149  I wish to remain within the decentrist 
school of thought and look for regulation in unexpected places and additionally to 
highlight areas which escape regulation and the reasons for such lacunae.  Self 
regulation may be an example of this, and this form of regulation is commented upon in 
the case of GM foods where the role of the retailers in response to the public mood led 
to a very clear self regulatory stance. This is described in more detail in chapter 5. 
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In reviewing the role played by the IRAs, one approach taken in the thesis is to analyse 
the ‘discretionary zone’ which is a concept developed by Heritier to examine the area 
between the mandate set for the IRAs and their powers of discretion to move beyond 
this mandate.  In the thesis the discretionary zone is examined in terms of the IRAs’ 
mandate and powers of discretion relating to the measurement of and responsiveness to 
public opinion.  The IRAs which regulate GM foods and PGD and prenatal testing are 
outlined in the next section of the chapter.  It is interesting to reflect upon Horkheimer’s 
commentary on the preoccupation of modern thought with means, where the ends are 
taken as given. This stands in stark contrast to classical thought which views regulation 
as instrumental in understanding and determining the ends.150  In the course of this 
thesis, it will be interesting to ask whether in the case of the regulation of genomics the 
regulators are driven by means or ends based decision-making. 
3.2 The Regulation of Genomics  
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to define what is meant by regulation of 
genomics in this thesis.  Firstly, a précis is given of the history of the gene and an 
overview of the principal definitions of genomics. Following this, the differences 
between genetics, genomics and biotechnology are given as a means to support my 
chosen interpretation of genomics.  A discussion follows relating to whether the 
regulation of genomics is special and is subject to special regulatory handling, which 
leads into an examination of whether this sector can be deemed a discrete area of 
regulation.  
3.2.1 The role of the gene in science and definitions of genomics  
It is argued that the gene is a ‘fuzzy object’ and that ‘a gene is anything a competent 
biologist chooses to call a gene’.151   However fuzzy, the trajectory of the term ‘gene’ in 
the twentieth century has been unprecedented and, as Moss argues, it is viewed as a 
central organising theme of twentieth century biology.152  In this thesis I will only 
briefly touch upon the fascinating debate of how biology has been transformed by the 
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concept of the gene and to some extent re-organised itself around it.  What is important 
in the context of this thesis is to gain a measure of how the level of significance given to 
the gene in biology has rubbed off on the public, in terms of public opinion of those 
products resulting from genetic science as well as levels of genetic literacy.  As a very 
crude heuristic device, I will outline ideas of genes as functional and molecular; from 
here I will describe the movement from genetics to genomics which involves a spatial 
dimension.   
An interesting framing of any discussion of the gene, is Moss’ theory of gene P and 
gene D and how these become conflated by the general public.  Gene P is described by 
Moss as preformationist153 and in crude terms it equates to a Mendelian type of genetics 
which is concerned with the relationship between gene function and phenotype.  Thus in 
classical genetics this interpretation aided the development of agricultural practices 
related to inherited traits in plants.  In such an interpretation the gene is functional as a 
carrier of DNA information which when expressed produces a specific trait.  Moss adds 
that ‘the preformationist gene predicts phenotypes only on an instrumental basis where 
immediate medical and/or economic benefits can be had’.154  This is described here as 
the functional conceptualisation of the gene and is commonly referred to in the media in 
terms such as ‘the gene for x’, where x may be a disease such as breast cancer, Down’s 
syndrome, or a phenotypic feature such as having brown eyes.  Moss argues that this 
conceptualisation is overly simplistic and is misleading to the public. 
In contrast, Moss’ Gene-D accords to an epigenesist understanding and relates to a 
molecular understanding.  Interestingly, Gene-D is not a gene at all but is a molecular 
sequence of DNA along the chromosome, a developmental resource.155  Moss argues 
that the public and media often conflate these understandings of Gene-P and Gene-D. 
He states that: 
‘Genes are not at once both molecular sequences and pieces of the phenotype, and yet it 
is precisely this conflationary confusion which has buoyed up the notion of the genetic 
code and a blueprint that regulates its own execution’.156 
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Keller comments that the conceptualisation of the gene has a great deal to do with its 
construction as an entity which enables scientific investigation.157  To this end therefore, 
the gene is socially constructed and fulfils a perfomative role.  When the term is taken 
up into legal regulation it can be manipulated, so it is additionally dynamic and 
evolving.  Regulatory science in this area is fascinating in terms of opening up novel 
insights into the meeting of the different epistemic cultures of law and science.  
Additionally, it allows us to understand how the legal system enables norms to become 
facts.  The performative role of the gene is widely held in the philosophy of biology 
literature and is reflected neatly in Moss’ statement that: 
 
‘Unlike proteins, lipids and carbohydrates, the gene did not come onto the scene as a 
physical entity at all but rather as a kind of placeholder in a biological theory’.158   
The conceptualisation of the gene in this fluid manner enabled the science to progress 
and has additionally led to both a greater recognition of the preformatism of the term 
and a narrowing down of the definition of the term.  This performative role of the gene 
is the background for any definition of the genome and genomics.   
The term ‘genomics’ was publicly launched by McKusick and Ruddle in 1987 when 
they used the term to name a journal.159  Hearsay claims that the term was coined by 
Roderick in 1986 at a party where a group of scientists were playing with the term 
‘genome’.  It is argued that the distinction made between genome, a term attributed to 
Winkler in the 1920s, and the gene signifies the shift from a thing to an activity.160  Part 
of the move from genetics to genomics is evidence of an acceptance of the complexity 
of the science in this field.  Genomics covers the mapping and sequencing of genomes 
but there is the promise of much more.  As such the genome can be conceived in spatial 
terms as a place where things happen which involve the entire genetic complement of an 
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organism.161  It is argued that the term ‘genomics’ results from sheer pragmatism, as a 
consequence of the human genome being mapped and the development of the 
technology, which was so consequential that it almost demanded a renaming in order to 
highlight how enormous the developments were.162  The importance of giving this 
background is twofold in that understandings of the terms ‘genetics’ and ‘genomics’ 
will both aid the understanding of the gap between the science and the regulation and 
shed light on whether the applications emerging from genomics denote that they should 
be regulated in similar ways under the umbrella ‘the regulation of genomics’.  The next 
section discusses applications relating to the science a product or technique emerged 
from, and the utilisation of the products.  Regulators then make a decision about where 
to locate the product in terms of related products and devices. 
3.2.2 What is the regulation of genomics as opposed to the regulation of 
biotechnology? 
Following on from the last section where the shift from the gene and genetics to 
genomics was discussed, there is now the question of the term ‘biotechnology’.  We 
have established that there are a variety of titles applied to this field which include inter 
alia: genetics, the new genetics, genomics, post genomics and biotechnology.  Let’s turn 
firstly to the term ‘biotechnology’ which is defined in the Convention on Biological 
Diversity as:   
‘Any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or 
derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use.’163  
The distinction between biotechnology and genomics lies in the question of application 
and specific use.  Genomics as a term conjures up images which rest closer to the 
laboratory and is not end-goal orientated.  In my choice of the term, I view genomics as 
a technosience that encompasses all the stages from the laboratory to product.  Thus the 
use of the term genomics allows me to extend the analysis beyond the products, which 
the term biotechnology would not allow.  This I believe is an important exception as it 
will enable me to refer to the various stages of development from the laboratory to the 
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clinic or shop floor.  As such, I argue that a more in-depth analysis of the nature and use 
of rhetorical function in the evolution of the regulatory science will be achieved.  It is 
acknowledged that in the thesis the terms ‘genetics’ and ‘biotechnology’ will be used as 
they appear in the literature, however the central focus will remain ‘genomics’. 
Regulatory science is simply the science which has been adopted to form the basis for 
policy making and regulation.  It is generally perceived that the use and application of 
regulatory science in relation to genomic technologies is more controversial than 
relative to other areas of technology.  Indeed in the later chapter on GM foods, it is 
evident that the contested nature of the science is central to the regulatory response.  
Calvert highlights the issue of ‘policy folklore’ which refers to the acknowledgement by 
policy makers of the results of studies which are supportive of the policy status quo 
while being unable to cite the sources or references.  As Calvert sums up: ‘it is not 
necessary for policy makers to know the details of the justification for the outcome of a 
paper, they only have to be aware of the conclusions of the argument’.164  In this way 
therefore policy makers have the capacity to pick and chose research which supports the 
direction they have outlined for the policy as a means to legitimise and crystallise their 
policy stance.165  What must be a part of this process is the shoehorning of science into 
a package which is readily digestible by the regulatory policy arena.  It is without doubt 
that scientists take into account the regulatory framework in addition to the profitability 
(in terms of further funding or practical applicability) when designing and undertaking 
their research.  As Calvert comments, policy makers want ‘hard and fast answers’ and 
‘quantitative ways of setting priorities and choosing different scientific fields’.166  It is 
profitable for scientists to attempt to meet such requirements and as such regulation 
becomes a factor in the shaping of the science.     
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3.2.3 Historical Evolution of the Regulation 
Whether to direct, regulate and exploit are issues which mirror the central tension at the 
heart of the Asilomar conference of 1975.  Many feel that the Asilomar conference 
carries some kind of legacy and this relates to the fact that the issues dominating the 
conference discussion have not been resolved in the thirty plus years since.  Resolution 
has not been brought about by virtue of the dichotomous nature of the regulatory 
position.  The International Congress on Recombinant DNA Molecules at Asilomar, 
California (Asilomar) brought together 140 people. The majority were biologists 
together with some lawyers, physicians and there were additionally, sixteen members of 
the press.  The aim of the conference was to discuss the safety of recombinant DNA 
research and to discuss a voluntary moratorium on research into r-DNA until the risks 
or hazards posed were understood.167  This followed the results of Cohen and Boyer’s 
research in 1973 which is hailed as the ‘invention’ of recombinant DNA (rDNA) which 
involved the splicing together of genes from different species and their transfer into 
bacteria.168  It appears that the majority of the scientists at Asilomar were in favour of 
self-governance.  So the conference was called amid the voluntary moratorium which 
had been directed by the US bioresearch community in 1974 as a result of the heated 
controversy surrounding Berg’s work.  Paul Berg, a US biochemist, had the idea of 
inserting the tumour producing virus SV40 into Escherichia coli (E coli) which is a 
bacterium found in the human gut.  As is a common theme, this is probably the first 
case in genomics where the science has arisen and the regulatory bodies are pushed to 
respond due to societal pressures or perhaps pressure from within the scientific 
community. The problem of the science outstripping the regulation had only just begun.  
The account given is that scientists believed that they could divine what socially 
responsible behaviour was and argued in favour of self-regulation.   
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3.2.4 Should genomics be given special regulatory handling? 
In the course of time it became clear that self-regulation by scientists would not be 
adequate as a means of overseeing the introduction of the novel products and techniques 
emerging from genomics.  The regulation relating to the case-studies will be described 
in chapters 5 and 6 and it is apparent that there is evidence of special regulatory 
handling.  This section provides an overview of the principal arguments given in 
support of special regulation for genomics relative to other novel foods and novel 
medical devices.  I have synthesised the principal arguments which have repeatedly 
arisen in the literature and these are:  
a) genomics touches upon the very meaning of life;  
b) the ethical issues are singularly significant and complex;  
c) genomics is without any frames of reference and demands novel regulatory 
handling; 
d) the issues are controversial and there is a lack of consensus on how to regulate;  
e) it is difficult to marry the promotion of biotechnology with the protection of the 
public and the environment from risks;  
f) there are risks associated with genomics, not all of which we are aware;   
g) there is a very large imbalance of knowledge between the scientific community 
and regulators;   
h) there is a breakdown of public trust in this area;  
i) it is an area of highly contested science; 
j) the speed of scientific developments often outstrips the regulatory response. 
It is difficult to distinguish these arguments from features of the regulation of genomics 
and as such they endow this field of regulation with particular idiosyncrasies.  An 
additional characteristic has been the hype and promise surrounding the development of 
the technology in this area, since genomics is rich in technological promise.  For 
example, GM crops are often heralded as a means to alleviate world hunger.  The 
justifications for a special handling of the regulation of genomics are commonly framed 
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alongside technologically determinist arguments, which hold that new technologies are 
autonomous or out of control.  Martin notes that this perception of technology is shared 
by both policy makers and the public.169  Wheale et al contend that the direction, 
regulation and exploitation of scientific revolutions need to be managed in social 
terms.170  Each of the arguments given for special regulatory handling will be discussed. 
Following this, I review the regulatory response in terms of whether it can be 
demonstrated that the regulation is special.  In matching the arguments given for special 
regulatory handling with any demonstrable substantive regulatory response an analysis 
is undertaken as to whether a gap exists between this normative rhetoric and what 
happens in practice. 
 
To delve deeper into the arguments raised above, the first argument posed is that 
genomics touches on the very meaning of life.  Fukuyama writes of a posthuman future 
and proposes one visualisation of a world where there no longer exists any notion of a 
shared humanity because we have mixed human genes with those of so many other 
species that we no longer have a clear idea of what a human being is.171  This links in 
with Huxley’s ‘Brave New World’ where biotechnology has developed to ensure that 
everyone is happy and healthy but the payoff is that in achieving this something 
intrinsic to being a human being has been sacrificed.  I think it is important to stress the 
fictional bases which do hold sway as cultural reference points in the determination of 
public opinion.  Fukuyama argues that the ‘most significant threat posed by 
contemporary biotechnology is the possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby 
move us into a ‘posthuman’ stage of history’.172  The central root of Fukuyama’s 
concerns over biotechnology is that it ‘in contrast to many other scientific advances [it] 
mixes obvious benefits with subtle harms in one seamless package’.173   
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Developments in genetics and genomics such as the mapping of the human genome and 
the potential of stem cell science to advance medicine have been widely hailed as 
revolutionary.  This characterisation results from the potential of genomics to reshape 
the relationship between scientific disciplines, and to recreate the boundaries between 
species and organisms and additionally to offer us information about human 
identification.174  If we accept that the advent of this techno-science is revolutionary 
then the next logical step is to decide whether it needs to be managed or whether it can 
progress under its own direction without causing harm.  This connects with the 
additional argument that the ethical issues raised by genomics are singularly significant 
and complex.  Genomics raises a wide array of ethical issues which relate to the use of 
genetic information, the ownership of genetic material, the use of embryos for research 
purposes, animal welfare, and issues relating to human identity.  There is overlap with 
this argument and the one above, because if genomics deals with issues pertaining to 
our very understandings of what it is to be human then it is not surprising that we have 
witnessed a rise in the number of bioethicists entering the regulatory-policy arena.  One 
area of particular ethical concern is that relating to reprogenetics and genetic screening 
of the foetus.  MacKenzie states that: 
‘Eugenic underpinnings of current medico-legal practices may be discerned by 
disability activists and their supporters who contend that the lack of social assistance 
provided for the handicapped renders increasingly possible a free choice over whether 
to abort a foetus under s.1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act 1967’.175 
The interpretation of statute is open to controversy in relation to the use of the Abortion 
Act 1967 as the means to permit abortions in relation to the increase and ever-growing 
array of pre-natal testing and screening.  Section 1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act 1967 
permits a legal abortion of a foetus at any stage of the pregnancy where there is a 
substantial risk that if the child were born s/he would suffer from such physical or 
mental abnormalities as to render him/her ‘seriously handicapped’.  What genomics has 
done is raised the profile of the status of the embryo and brought novel legal and ethical 
issues which test the legal status quo.  Thus society’s duty towards the foetus is re-
evaluated.  Genomics is a harbinger of increased regulatory debate.  In many ways it is 
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viewed as an onslaught on the legal status quo because developments are moving at 
such a rapid pace that the regulatory system is finding it impossible to adjust and adapt.  
In the course of the case-studies it is clear that the role of the regulatory institutions as 
interpreters of the regulation is enhanced.  This is but one issue that raises ethical 
discussion and there are many more, from admixed embryos and cloning to genetically 
modified cattle.   
The novelty of genomics means that there are no pre-existing frames of reference and as 
a result, there is evidence of greater regulatory variation across policy regimes.  
Appleyard refers to the absence of a stable set of expectations or discourses through 
which the language of acceptable and legitimate genetics might be constructed.176  
Added to this is the controversy arising from the ethical issues posed and the ensuing 
lack of consensus on regulatory direction.  It is argued that the regulation of genomics 
has no clear policy objectives.  This is unusual compared to other areas of regulation 
where there are broad policy objectives expressing some consensus.  Gunningham states 
of this area that even the protagonists are diametrically opposed on fundamental 
issues.177  This is often a case of diametrically opposed interests.  For instance, 
regulators are faced with having to marry and balance the commercial interests of the 
biotechnology companies with the protection of the public, be that protection from 
actual or perceived risks.  Such a regulatory dialectic is not unique in regulation but 
perhaps the polarisation of public opinion when linked with the contested science adds 
some weight to the argument that there are sui generis features within the regulation of 
genomics.  It is argued by Beck that there is a substantial imbalance of knowledge and 
power between the scientific community and the state.  Beck talks of this phenomenon, 
not strictly with reference to genomics per se but science as a whole, and argues that 
science is defining the regulatory agenda.  Beck argues that the debate about the course 
of science occurs as an obituary for activities begun long ago.178   
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The argument that there has been a breakdown of public trust springs from the case of 
GM crops and food. It is debateable whether this was a short-term issue in the late 
1990s or whether it persists today both in relation to GM products and across the whole 
of genomics.  The link between public opinion and public trust is inevitably very 
significant, especially in areas where the science and risks posed are highly contested, 
as in some areas of genomics.  However it can be argued that the science is no more 
contested than in other novel technologies, but it is the role of NGOs that has made 
more evident this internal conflict.   
 
One very clear feature of the regulation of genomics has been the speed of scientific 
development in outstripping regulatory mechanisms.  There is no doubt that this is 
taking place and it has led to concerns from the scientific community that the UK will 
lose its competitive position in, for example, the consternation amongst scientists over 
the accreditation of stem cell storage179.  In such circumstances, the scientists need the 
regulation in order to legitimise their activities.  As such, many of these justifications 
for special regulatory handling have been triggers for regulation. 
 
In relation to these arguments or justifications for the special regulatory handling of 
genomics, I am of the belief that when questioning where these normative arguments 
have come from, it is important to examine our own role as social scientists in 
perpetuating them.  Yet, I argue that the corollary to the dominance of the normative 
discussion in the literature is necessary, and that is to assess whether the there is 
evidence in the regulation of anything sui generis.  One must also acknowledge the 
enhanced role of the social scientist in this sector as being an additional feature and 
possible indicator of specialness.  However in the endeavour of the social scientist to 
carve a space for themselves has this resulted in an overly privileged set of arguments? 
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3.2.5 Is there evidence that the regulation of genomics is special? 
This section of the chapter will outline the principal regulatory approach to genomics by 
examining the substantive regulation and the institutional organisation.  Scott argues 
that the focus of the regulation of genomics has been upon ‘the normative structures of 
principles, standards and rules’ and this has led to the ‘neglect of the machinery for 
implementation of regulatory policy’.  Scott contends that ‘processes for monitoring and 
mechanisms of behavioural modification are not routinely considered or 
problematised’.180  Thus it may be argued that the current regulatory regime is in the 
process of maturation and is currently preoccupied with establishing the norms and 
appropriate regulatory mechanisms to achieve them.  This regime is described in detail 
later in the chapter.  Scott makes a second pertinent distinction between the focus of the 
regulatory scholarship and that of the people working in biotechnology policy per se.  
The former, argues Scott, ‘take policy objectives as given and focus on the means by 
which they may be delivered’.  In doing so they may question the types of rules and 
regulatory institutions needed and the best means to monitor compliance.  In contrast, 
those who work within biotechnology policy are preoccupied with the development of 
normative guiding principles. 181  This idea is developed in this next section whereby the 
normative drivers pushing for special regulation are outlined and the response made to 
them by the regulators.  A further point made by Scott is that the scope of the regulation 
analysed should be extended beyond governmental powers to legislate, to include 
biotechnology firms, retailers and NGOs. 182   This is indeed done in this thesis where, 
as already stated, an extensive definition of regulation is being applied which includes a 
wider net of influences on the regulation.  
In the table below the normative arguments for special regulatory handling of genomics 
are listed with the corresponding substantive regulatory response.  From these responses 
it can be divined that the regulation in this area does demonstrate certain features which 
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are sui generis.  It is as a result of these idiosyncracies, which thus become common to 
most areas of genomics, that the regulation of genomics is often talked of as discrete 
area of regulation.  However, I argue that in many ways although each product or 
process is being treated differently (or as a special case) relative to other novel products 
or processes, they are not being grouped as a regulatory regime by the regulators.  The 
products and techniques emerging from genomics are part of many overlapping 
regulatory spheres both nationally, at EU level and internationally.  And while GM 
products are regulated by a body that oversees food safety and prenatal testing by the 
Department of Health, PGD is covered by an IRA which deals specifically with 
genomics regulation.  These variations are not as central in identifying what is common 
across the regulation of genomics.  I contend that there is evidence of specific features 
in the regulation of genomics which are related to the normative arguments and 
justifications which underpin its regulation and the responses made by the regulatory 
organisations to these arguments. 
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Figure 3: Normative arguments given for the special regulatory handling of 
genomics and the substantive regulatory responses 
Normative Substantive 
Genomics touches upon the fundamental meaning of 
life 
Enhanced reference to public opinion and a greater use 
of the rhetoric that regulation is responsive to public 
opinion 
Shifting responsibility from central Government to 
IRAs 
Ethical issues Enhanced role for bioethicists (Salter183) and of the 
public voice in deliberative governance 
Ontological novelty  
There are no established frames of reference to draw 
upon 
Institutional structures 
Proliferation of soft law responses 
Controversy and lack of consensus Regulatory science  
Public engagement 
Institutional structures 
The politics of negotiation (Beck) 
Regulatory dialectic to promote biotechnology and 
protect the public/environment 
Institutional set-up 
Regulatory pluralism: civil engagement, NGOs and 
industry 
Perceived and actual risks to human health and the 
environment 
Again an enhanced use of the rhetoric that regulators 
are responding to public opinion 
Higher levels of prescriptivism –stricter regulation 
Imbalance of knowledge between scientific 
community and regulators (science outstripping 
regulation) 
Institutional structures 
Science communication programmes 
Raised levels of funding to social scientists to bridge 
the gap  
Breakdown of public trust Enhanced role given to public consultation 
The contested nature of the science & the role of 
regulatory science 
Novel ways of handling expert opinion & regulatory 
science 
  
From figure 3, the principal and most evident regulatory responses which demonstrate 
that the regulation of genomics is being handled as a special case are: 
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• An enhanced reference to public opinion  and a greater use of the rhetoric that 
regulation is responsive to public opinion by the regulators 
• Features of the institutional structure which include the particularly high 
numbers of advisory bodies and morass of regulatory institutions 
• The enhanced ethical dimension in regulatory decision making including the 
increased autonomy given to bioethicists 
• A proliferation of soft law mechanisms 
• The stricter regulatory approach relative to similar non-genomics products and 
devices (for instance, GM foods in contrast to other novel foods) 
 
While each of the responses by the regulators to the sui generis features is of note, it is 
the response in the form of enhanced deliberation in the formulation of regulatory 
policy which is most pertinent to the thesis.   
The time which elapses between basic research and product approval in the sector of 
genomics influences the nature of the public’s relationship to the regulation.  It is 
argued by Norton-Wise that increasingly research which is carried out for profit is not 
actually in the public interest and that the commercialisation of research is skewing ‘its 
direction away from what would most benefit society’.184  This is in line with Krimsky 
who believes that science is increasingly conducted in the private interest and that the 
‘entire system of biomedical research no longer serves the public’.185  The speed of 
approval systems for novel genomic products or techniques is a critical issue to biotech 
companies in terms of maintaining market competition. 
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3.2.6 The Regulatory Regime of Genomics 
The responses to the normative drivers for the special regulatory handling have in many 
ways become self-prophesying as they have meant that this area of regulation has some 
very distinctive features which were outlined above.  With regard to the institutional set 
up, there are a large number of new authorities of which the HFEA is the most 
prominent. However in other areas of genomics, there has been a mapping onto current 
IRAs, for instance the regulation of GM foods is overseen in the UK by the Food 
Standards Agency (FSA).  However genetic modification is not so novel a product these 
days and when it was a novel technology there were a vast number of advisory 
organisations overseeing its development.  The institutional structure has been a 
response to the regulatory focus upon epistemological issues, such as what we know 
about these technologies and how we know this.186  The table below outlines the 
principal regulators overseeing the regulation of the cases under study in the thesis.   
Figure 4: Regulatory activity 
Regulatory Activity GM Foods Prenatal testing, screening & 
diagnosis 
Public Regulation of the 
Public Sector 
  
European  European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) 
The European Commission, DG 
Health & Consumer Protection 
(SANCO) 
 
Central Government 
 
Department for the 
Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (Defra) 
Department of Health (DoH)  
Statutory Bodies, Independent 
Regulatory Agencies  
Food Standards Authority (FSA) Human Fertilisation & 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) 
Non-statutory advisory 
organisations/committees  
Advisory Committee on Novel 
Foods and Processes (ACNFP) 
Human Genetics Commission 
(HGC) 
UK National Screening 
Committee (NSC) 
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Private Regulation of the 
Public Sector 
  
Industry Producers, Manufacturers & 
Retailers 
Scientists,  Pharmaceutical 
industry 
Self-regulation Retailers Clinicians 
Oversight by interest groups187  Greenpeace, Friends of the 
Earth (FoE)  
Consumer Organisations  
Comment on Reproductive 
Ethics (CORE) 
Patient Groups – such as the 
Genetics Interest Group (GiG) 
 
Beyond the principal regulators which are under review in this thesis, there have been a 
huge number of additional advisory groups, committees, government departmental 
directorates and agencies.  In terms of mapping the institutions which play a critical role 
in the regulation of genomics, Black’s comment is revelatory.  She states in 1998 that; 
‘If you turn to ask what structures exist to regulate genetic technology……..then you 
find a mass of legal regulations, non-legal rules, codes, circulars, practice notes, 
international conventions, and ethical codes.  There exists an enormously complex set 
of advisory bodies, regulatory bodies, committees, professional bodies, and industry 
associations, operating at international, national, and sub-national level.  In the UK, at 
national level alone there are over eleven different bodies involved in the regulation of 
some aspect of genetic technology.  Surely in this morass of regulation someone, 
somewhere, must be exerting some sort of control?’188 
It is the case that the response to the controversy and ethical dimensions posed by these 
novel technologies has been to establish a large number of bodies to oversee every 
potential aspect of the object of regulation.   
A number of political trends regarding regulation generally by necessity impact upon 
the regulation of genomics.   These include the increased role of the private sector in 
matters which may be described as public.  Beck describes a ‘reinvention of politics’ 
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which he relates to the growth of regulatory agencies, advisory bodies, quangos and 
advocacy groups which he terms ‘subpolitics’.189  Beck contends that newer modes of 
governance have arisen as a result of this and that there has been a subsequent shift from 
‘the authoritarian decision and action state ….to the negotiation state.190  This idea that 
the regulation is more negotiable and less authoritarian will be examined in relation to 
the discretion given to independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in the following chapter.   
Gunningham and Grabosky outline a number of regulatory instruments utilised in 
environmental law and these include: information, education, voluntarism, self and co-
regulation, market-based and direct regulation.  Gunningham makes a case that the 
majority of these instruments do not translate easily from environmental to 
biotechnology regulation.  To summarise Gunningham’s argument, he highlights the 
limited range of instruments which are applicable. Information and education, for 
example, are not likely to influence the regulatees (the biotechnology companies).  He 
questions whether self-regulation is feasible ‘given the gap between the self-interest of 
those companies in rapid commercialisation and the public interest in minimizing the 
unanticipated consequences of biotechnology’.191 Similarly, market-based instruments 
are dismissed as being unable to bring about any change in regulatee activity, although 
Gunningham accepts that these may have some use in relation to consumer behaviour.  
Thus, concludes Gunningham, we are left with a limited selection of instruments and 
those selected in the regulation of biotechnology are principally direct government 
regulation.  This relates primarily to biotechnology products being regulated through 
systems of mandatory pre-market risk assessment and approval.  Safety standards are 
imposed and regulatory agencies established to monitor and enforce them.  Liability 
rules are set out and these are capable of sending powerful economic signals about the 
consequence of failure to meet the legal standard.  Additionally, informational 
regulation is implemented, for instance, in relation to GM foods as product labelling. 192  
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In the mapping of the interactions between public opinion and regulation, it is apparent 
that both the levels of control exerted by the regulation and the regulatory instrument 
can have critical consequences.  Gunningham states that: 
‘[O]nce the biotechnology genie is out of the bottle (or the genetically modified crop 
has escaped into adjoining fields) it is very difficult to get it back, and the consequences 
if the initial policy instrument fails are unacceptable’.193   
There is an argument posed in the next chapter which posits that stricter regulation 
helps to alleviate public concerns in the case of novel technologies.  It is interesting 
throughout the thesis to see how this corresponds with the attempts by regulators to 
facilitate the development of genomics.  Genomics is one of the enabling technologies 
and as such the opportunities arising from it are viewed by regulators as generally 
positive.   
As stated in the earlier part of the chapter, the regulation has principally taken the form 
of administrative oversight which is bound in a facilitating and enabling ethos combined 
with procedural safeguards, product standards, product authorisations, codes, and pre 
and post-market approval systems.  It is therefore rich in softer regulation, however, 
there is very clear statute in relation to the authorisation processes surrounding GM 
foods and the newly revised Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act oversees PGD.  
There has been a strong trend towards a precautionary approach in relation to GM foods 
which is not seen in relation to health genomics. The contrasting regulatory approaches 
are analysed in depth in chapters 5 and 6.   
3.2.7 Does the Regulation of Genomics Constitute a Discrete Area? 
A very wide range of products, devices and processes fall under the umbrella of 
genomics.  These are regulated in two ways: the establishment of novel regulatory 
institutions or regulation in existing institutions.  The critical divide is the bifurcation 
between human/medical genomics and food/agricultural genomics.  This study 
acknowledges this by selecting case-studies from each side of the bifurcation: one red 
and one green biotechnology.   As is shown in the later chapters, these technologies 
have had very different public receptions and regulatory frameworks.  There has been a 
high level of opposition and resistance to the introduction of GM crops and foods.  
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Prenatal testing and PGD on the other hand, have received more support from the 
public, and it is argued that such technologies have become ingrained in our society 
through normalization.194  There will be some rich comparisons to be found in 
examining these two technologies.  The choice of GM foods is of great value in that it 
carries a historical legacy deriving from the debates over the regulation of genetic 
engineering in the 1970s and 1980s.  It therefore invites us to pose questions relating to 
the initial regulatory rationality about whether there have been any shifts in the 
rationality resulting from technological developments or whether the central premises of 
the genetic engineering regulation are evident in more recent regulation.  The regulation 
is reviewed in the thesis to show whether it is a case of regulating by product or process 
or whether the regulation is distinctive enough to be called a discrete area in its own 
right.   
While there is a consensus that genomics involves the manipulation of the genome or 
genomic information then there is potentially a case to say that these technologies 
should all be regulated as one discrete area along the same criteria.  It is immediately 
evident however that the wide range of products and techniques emerging from 
genomics necessitate very different regulatory responses. For instance, an unregulated 
escape of GMOs may pose a risk to the environment whereas the provision of an 
unregulated new genetic test poses concerns for human health.  The application of 
genomics is far-reaching and by necessity therefore touches upon a wide range of 
regulatory areas such as intellectual property, international trade law, consumer 
protection, health law, medical ethics, environmental law, human rights, security, and 
insurance law.   
Scott defines the principal regulatory issues which may be viewed as the central 
problematisations as: 
1. the safety of new technological applications (in particular with respect to 
food) 
2. the protection of the environment from irreparable change (in particular with 
respect to crops) 
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3. the protection of consumers’ economic interests (largely focussed on issues 
of disclosure and labelling) 
4. the protection of intellectual property rights 
5. the complex ethical issues concerned with such issues as genetic testing, 
cloning and therapeutic applications of recombinant DNA.195 
 
The central theme of this section is the question of whether genomics can be classed as 
a discrete area, or whether the techno-science enters so many areas of regulation that it 
is unhelpful to classify it in this manner.  All of the regulatory areas discussed have in 
common the normative issues raised in the above sections, that is, they are controversial 
and pose novel ethical questions.  The crux is therefore whether they are subject to 
special regulation or whether there has been an adoption or adaptation of existing 
regulation to encompass them.   
An important point is how the novel products and techniques emerging from genomics 
are defined. The regulation which they map onto is critical to both the public perception 
and the levels of permissiveness given to facilitate development.  A common strategy of 
new technologies which is often adopted in order to avoid any controversy which may 
be attached to them, is to associate their ‘products’ with already legitimated practices.  
This relates to the lack of categorical precedence.  One example of such a pragmatic 
approach which enabled the development of gene therapy was that a demarcation was 
made between germ-line and somatic therapy.  Germ-line therapy alters the sperm and 
egg and thus passes on any alterations to future generations, whereas somatic limits the 
alterations to the non-reproductive cells.  This distinction allowed the technology of 
somatic gene therapy for people suffering from life-threatening diseases to develop and 
become viable, whilst moving away from concerns that it was eugenic.  Martin has 
argued that the impact of this has been a shift in perceptions of gene-therapy from what 
was viewed by some as a controversial neo-eugenic treatment to a promising new 
technology.196 
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3.3 Conclusion 
In the first part of this chapter the understanding of regulation as applied to the thesis 
was made clear. An extensive definition of regulation is applied which is in keeping 
with cybernetic regulatory theory.  The role of IRAs in terms of the discretionary zone 
will be introduced in greater depth in the next chapter and examined in relation to the 
case-studies later in the thesis.  It has been established that the regulation of genomics is 
the study of the regulation relating to the development of products from laboratory to 
clinic and from the clinic to the consumer.  Genomics is defined for the purposes of this 
thesis as the place where things happen which involve the entire genetic complement of 
an organism.197  The second issue addressed in this chapter was whether the regulation 
of genomics is a discrete area and how the normative cries for regulatory specialness 
have been responded to.  This thesis is concerned with one regulatory response in 
particular: the idea of increased reference to the public.  This chapter has outlined the 
regulatory form and institutions in genomics. The overriding impression of this area of 
regulation is that the Government’s response to the potential harm or risks posed by 
genomics has been the creation of a vast morass of regulatory and advisory oversight 
bodies which in turn produce a huge volume of predominantly soft law, codes and 
quality standards, and authorisation procedures.   
It is presented here that the regulation of genomics should be deemed a discrete area of 
regulation.  It is the case that the regulation encompasses a wide range of products and 
techniques and there is a lack of commonality with regard to the regulation whereby 
some products are regulated by mapping on to existing structures while others are 
overseen by IRAs specifically tasked with regulating genomics.   However, the products 
and techniques have inherent sui generis features which have been clearly defined in 
this chapter.  It is argued therefore that while the genomics does not correspond neatly 
to the definition of a regulatory regime as set out by Doern and Wilks, there are a 
number of common features which hold the products and techniques together.  In this 
sense therefore genomics does respond to the contention of Doern and Wilks state that 
‘the first test of the existence of a regime is the presence of some inner core of shared 
norms, features, or characteristics that warrant such a designation for analytical or 
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practical purposes’.198  It is contended here that the debate over whether genomics 
should be regulated in response to the process from which the products and techniques 
originated from or in terms of the products produced is too basic.  For instance, GM 
foods are regulated with an IRA responsible for food products and not genomics, yet 
GM foods receive very special regulatory handling relative to the other novel foods 
regulated by that institution.  These issues are analysed in more depth in the case-study 
chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
The Interaction between Public Opinion and Regulation 
4.0 Introduction 
New technological developments bring with them novel challenges to the regulation and 
policy systems and to society at large.  As outlined in the previous chapter, the techno-
science genomics is having an enormous impact upon agriculture, food and medicine 
and has produced a vast number of novel products and techniques in these sectors.  It is 
vital to explore the interactions between public opinion and regulation in order to 
determine whether regulation has the capacity to offer some level of resolution to 
anxieties or problems in the minds of the public.  The aim of this chapter is to explore 
the different theoretical angles and arguments pertaining to the relationship between 
public opinion and regulation as a means to introduce the focus of the analysis of this 
relationship in relation to the case-studies examined in the next two chapters.  This 
chapter explores how public opinion is valorised as an input into the regulatory-policy 
process; how public opinion triggers and shapes regulation; and the role played by 
regulation in affecting public opinion.   The speed of technological developments 
outstripping the regulation has been discussed already, however the focus shifts in this 
and subsequent chapters to how and if the regulation closes up the then created lacunae 
and can achieve a level of resolution.  One measure of successful resolution may be 
measured by a reduction in public anxieties surrounding the product.   
This chapter opens with an overview of the central justifications given for the inclusion 
of public opinion in regulatory decision-making.  Extricating the role of public opinion 
from the very strong normative drivers surrounding the role of public opinion is 
necessary as a means to delimit this thesis.  While it is interesting to question the role 
we want public opinion to play in the regulatory process and to ask whether there is an 
optimal level, these issues are not being addressed in the thesis.  These questions lead 
into the following section of the chapter which examines the distinction between 
regulation which responds to public opinion, responsive regulation, and regulation 
produced in the public interest.  The chapter outlines the principal models of opinion-
responsiveness from the political science literature: the public thermostat (Wlezien 1995 
and 1996) and Attention Cycles model (Jones 2001, Jones and Baumgartner 2005), and 
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Bernstein’s life cycle model of regulation.  The purpose of describing these models is to 
gain a view of the central theories surrounding interactions between regulation and 
public opinion and as such provide a framework for the conceptualisation of public 
opinion and regulation.  The regulatory output may serve a dual purpose: to aid the 
resolution of the attention cycle so that it helps establish equilibrium, and to alleviate 
public concern and by doing so result in reduced political attention.  The latter will 
mean that the issue is removed from the attention cycle entirely or shifts it down the 
agenda, in other words, issue decay occurs.  This raises two questions in relation to 
genomics: firstly whether regulation has the capacity to alleviate public concern in this 
sector, and secondly whether genomics as a policy subsystem responds according to the 
model of Punctuated Equilibrium.    
In the final section of the chapter, the influence of public opinion on regulation is 
explored, and the capacity of public opinion to trigger and shape the regulatory direction 
is discussed.  Evidently, inputs additional to public opinion are at play in the 
development and production of regulation.  On the subject of additional factors or 
variables which influence the interaction between regulation and public opinion, Page 
and Shapiro state: 
‘To cast doubt on the likelihood of spuriousness is by no means to deny that third 
factors affect opinion and policy, which they surely do.  We only argue that public 
opinion is a real influence – often an intervening one – upon policy, in many (probably 
more than half) of our cases of congruent change.  When some third factor affects both 
opinion and policy, it tends to affect policy through opinion; policy changes only 
because opinion changes.’199   
This is a very forceful and resounding statement that public opinion has a marked 
impact on policy. Additional variables at play are mentioned throughout the thesis and 
include references to the media output, NGO lobbying, commercial activity and 
clinician and expert opinions. 
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4.1 The rationale for public opinion as an input into the regulatory process 
Many reasons are given for the justification of the inclusion of public opinion in 
regulatory decision-making.  I have identified the four most commonly cited and 
discuss them below.  They come with a couple of caveats, which are that the reasons 
given are not exhaustive and that they are overlapping and not mutually exclusive.  The 
principal reasons given for the inclusion of public opinion in the regulatory process are: 
(i) It is in keeping with the central tenets of liberal democracy 
(ii) It legitimates IRA activity and is a measure of accountability for a regulatory 
stance 
(iii) Regulation which is responsive to public opinion leads to more effective output  
(iv) It raises levels of public trust in the regulatory body and the regulatory output 
The sources of evidence to support or detract from these arguments for inclusion are 
analysed in this thesis in terms of both the rhetorical use of public opinion and the 
public opinion input in practice.  These four issues are now addressed in turn as a means 
to tease out the underlying arguments.   
4.1.1The inclusion of public opinion in the regulatory process is in keeping with the 
central tenets of liberal democracy 
The first of the reasons given for the incorporation of public opinion in regulation is that 
it is in keeping with the central tenets of liberal democracy, that is, it is a critical part of 
a representative democracy.  It is democratically laudable to invite the public to 
participate in decision making.  Indeed, the literal meaning of ‘democracy’ is rule by the 
people (from the Greek ‘demos’, people and kratos, rule).  Classical thinking on 
democracy held that for a democracy to function there had to be direct citizen 
participation.  Rousseau argued that for citizens to be truly sovereign they should gather 
in a sovereign assembly.  However, it is evident that it is not feasible for each citizen of 
a nation to have his or her opinion heard on every issue.  Dahl refers to this as the 
problem of the ‘arithmetic of participation.’200  The solution created to solve this 
problem is representative democracy which is defined by Birch as: 
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‘……..one in which representatives of the people share, to a significant degree, in the 
making of political decisions.’201 
Representation by the elected elite still requires that a balance is struck to ensure that 
the citizens of the democracy feel like participants in the decision making process and 
not alienated from it.  Interestingly, it is often questioned whether public consultation is 
necessary as a means to enhance democratic and accountable process.  There is the view 
that once an election takes place, the elected are the public’s representatives and as such 
there is no requirement to consult further.  In support of this view, an MP at a public 
meeting I attended stated that: 
'If Parliament decides that something should be lawful and subject to regulation then it 
ought to be done.  Certain decisions if well debated in Parliament shouldn't be subject to 
veto by public consultation.' 202 
However the push for increased participation and public involvement in regulation is 
showing no signs of slowing down.  Indeed the recently updated Code of Practice on 
Consultation constantly reiterates the Government’s commitment to effective 
consultation and it states therein that the code ‘should help improve the transparency, 
responsiveness and accessibility of consultations.’203  On the practicalities of attempting 
to listen to the public, Dahl states that:   
‘To propose that all persons significantly affected by these decisions should be included 
in the process would seem fanciful:  that they should be included as political equals, 
democratic citizens if you like, seems an even more utopian claim.’204 
The issue of delimitation of those consulted thus becomes central to the regulators; in 
later chapters, the questions of who those consulted are, and to what extent they are 
representative of public opinion, are analysed. 
Underlying these questions of democracy is the value of the public opinion input, and 
one criticism often levelled against the process, which was highlighted in chapter 2, is 
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that the public have low levels of knowledge of the issues under deliberation (such as 
genomics), and therefore the public input would not be worthwhile.  In this thesis, data 
was collected from interviews with regulators suggesting that they do not generally 
question whether the public opinion data they use is based on informed opinions.  
Fishkin argues that ‘an ordinary opinion poll models what the public thinks, given how 
little it knows.’205  It is argued in some quarters that some citizens are more qualified 
than others to make decisions, thus leading to expert-lead consultation.  Public 
consultation and deliberation are important for maintaining the tenets of democracy 
where all citizens are equal in the decision-making process. However if the resulting 
public opinion data identifies an uniformed public then the participation process may be 
deemed futile.  Whether findings of this nature are then utilised by the regulators in 
their decision-making, regardless of their limitations, is addressed in the case-study 
chapters.  It should be noted however that to some degree the consultation process, the 
survey, is bound and delimited from the outset by the IRA, since it is argued that only 
responses which are intelligible and digestible by the regulatory system are valid.  The 
level that this is deemed manipulation is arguable.  Dahl argues processes should be put 
in place to enable the citizens to educate themselves in order to be able to participate 
fruitfully.206  It is not only the issue of whether the public are adequately educated to 
respond to a particular question on a topic, a further issue is whether they are actually 
interested and wish to be involved in the decision-making process.  Finally, it is 
worthwhile noting that the process of deliberation itself may enhance public awareness 
of issues such as genomics.  
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4.1.2 The inclusion of public opinion in the regulatory decision-making 
legitimates the Independent Regulatory Agency’s activity 
The purpose of this section is to give an overview of the capacity of public opinion to 
enhance the performance of regulatory bodies in terms of credibility, accountability and 
legitimacy.  As already discussed, in the last chapter, an IRA functions because a level 
of discretionary control has been passed to it from central government.  This 
discretionary control may come in the form of a legislative mandate or it may be a 
looser relationship.  Even with the existence of a legislative mandate, this discretion is 
necessary because, as Fessler and Kettl state: ‘no legislature could ever specify all the 
factors that administrators must weigh in making decisions’.207   The discretionary zone 
mentioned in chapter 4 is relevant here as regulations and guidance exist on when and 
how an IRA should undertake consultation, yet such regulations cannot dictate the level 
at which an IRA must respond to the public opinion data.  Secondly, discretion within 
the system gives an IRA the opportunity to use public opinion as a tool and to 
manipulate the findings.  It is very difficult to undertake a post-facto examination of 
how public opinion data was utilised by regulators because a large proportion of 
decision making happens in committees and is successfully hidden between the lines of 
the minutes of such meetings.  Meeting reports examined in this thesis may offer 
insights but it should be borne in mind that they can often be misleading. 
IRAs are also termed non-majoritarian agencies due to the fact that the regulators are 
neither elected nor directly supervised by the government.  This facet combined with the 
levels of discretion pertaining to decision-making which these agencies can assume 
imbues them with a level of power.  Critics argue however that IRAs lack accountability 
and create a democratic deficit in the regulatory process.  It is argued that IRAs attempt 
to carve out a credible position in an attempt to gain legitimacy.  Scott pertains that the 
most usual means of achieving legitimacy is through a level of demonstrable 
accountability.208  Thus the enhancing of public opinion as an input into the regulatory 
process is a mechanism which imbues both this level of demonstrable accountability 
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and in doing so can aid an IRA’s legitimacy.  One argument is that legitimacy occurs at 
the point of public acceptance of the activities and decisions made by an IRA.   It is 
useful however, to examine this in terms of Baldwin’s five potential claims for 
legitimacy:  
(i) The legislative mandate claim; 
(ii) The accountability or control claim; 
(iii) The due process claim; 
(iv) The expertise claim; 
(v) The efficiency claim.209 
Baldwin argues that government processes may be regarded as legitimate if they can 
fulfil one or more of these claims. In practice there are high levels of interaction 
between the claims and variations in the weighting devoted to each.  The regulatory 
agencies analysed in the case-study chapters have a legislative mandate, yet there is 
always the problem of an IRA moving beyond this mandate by stretching their 
discretionary powers so that in some cases there is a blurring of the lines of control 
between central Government and the IRA.  Indeed, the HFEA has been taken to judicial 
review for just such a claim that it was behaving ultra vires with regard to PGD for 
tissue-typing in the ‘saviour siblings’ cases.  This case is discussed further in chapter 6 
and it must be stressed that the HFEA were not found to be acting beyond their legal 
mandate.210   
The accountability or control claim is pertinent here because it is invoked when an IRA 
claims that they are basing their decisions on public opinion or ‘more narrowly-defined 
groupings as conduits for the democratic voice’.211  This concept of responding to ‘more 
narrowly-defined groupings’ is comparable to the understanding of public opinion as 
the channelling of the public voice by interest groups.  While on the one hand the IRA 
could argue that they are behaving in a responsive and representative manner in that 
they have consulted stakeholders and are enacting transparent decision-making 
structures, Baldwin notes that regulation by IRAs is open to the criticism of being 
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unrepresentative because the system is not controlled by an elected body.212  The due 
process claim relates to the ideas of procedurally just activities which uphold individual 
rights and interests.  However, it does not always follow that the corollary of a system 
of just or democratic processes is a set of efficient and morally just outcomes.  The 
fourth claim which may be held by an IRA is that the decision-making is credible and 
legitimate because it is based on expert opinion.  Within the regulation of genomics it is 
indeed the case that the role of scientists and clinicians is sought, often in conjunction 
with public participation or consultation exercises, and the weighting given to each is 
explored further in the next two chapters.  However, a heavy reliance on expert 
judgement as the basis for regulatory output may not be deemed representative and can 
lead to the public not understanding the bases for decisions.  Furthermore, as Baldwin 
highlights, where there is conflict between the experts, as is the case in GM foods, this 
can lead to a further weakening of the IRA policy position or regulatory output.213 
The final claim an IRA may make is that it is behaving in an efficient manner. Baldwin 
discusses two ways that this can be claimed: that stated objectives are achieved in an 
effective manner; and that economically efficient actions are being taken.214  Baldwin 
contends that these claims are the most contentious, and it seems apparent that they are 
indeed a difficult means of inculcating public acceptance or engendering credibility to a 
regulatory agency, partly due to the problems of measurement of, for example, an IRA’s 
objectives. 
It is thus apparent that in addition to the concept of the inclusion of public opinion in the 
making of regulation, there are other mechanisms and processes which an IRA may 
utilise as a means to enhance its legitimacy.  The central question is: does the public per 
se prefer a system of responsiveness to their desires, however that is divined, to one 
based on reference to elite or stakeholder opinion?  What is evident is that IRAs such as 
the HFEA and FSA publish the findings of consultations and public meetings in 
conjunction with their policy or regulatory documents as a means to show that they are 
responding to the public voice.  In relation to the weighting given to the five claims for 
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legitimacy posited by Baldwin, it is argued here that in the sphere of genomics the 
second claim, the accountability or control claim, is privileged.  By this it is argued in 
this thesis that public opinion is utilised more heavily as a mechanism to denote 
legitimacy and credibility to the IRAs dealing with issues relating to genetic 
technologies.  However, it is additionally the case that in areas of contested and 
complex science and technology there is a greater resort by the IRA to expert opinion, 
and that this is a feature of policy making in the field of genomics.  The capacity of an 
IRA to argue that the decision-making was deferred to public opinion allows arms-
length bodies to mitigate their responsibility or to shift blame for the regulatory stance, 
and this is a common feature of IRAs.  Hood talks of blame management and blame 
avoidance in relation to this phenomenon.215   
The final point to make here in relation to the strength of the argument that the role of 
public opinion is a valuable input in the regulatory process is that while regulators 
themselves may back up this contention on the grounds of democratic principles, they 
would not argue openly in favour of it being used to enhance the role of their own 
regulatory body.  However, while raising the latter argument may be viewed as 
politically damaging, the impact of enhanced legitimacy of an IRA’s activities may not 
be.  For instance, the legitimisation of the regulatory position may result in reduced 
anxiety over novel technologies.   
4.1.3 The inclusion of public opinion in the regulatory process leads to more 
effective regulatory output 
The third argument given in support of feeding public opinion into the regulatory 
decision-making is that it leads to more effective regulatory output.   Proponents of this 
would argue that the consulted public provide ‘the creative reservoir’ which introduces 
novel solutions and new approaches to regulatory problems which would have not been 
envisaged by the regulators and administrators alone.  However, we can ask how 
realistic the ‘creative reservoir’ idea is. It may be more the case that this is the result of 
consulting stakeholders, that is, people who know the object and area of regulation, and 
not the public who may have low awareness and knowledge of the subject.  It is 
purported that solutions resultant from public consultations are not conducive with the 
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regulatory process.  Keynes writes that one of the problems faced by regulators is that 
of coping with the mass of information made available to them; public opinion is 
sometimes a knotty issue which adds to this mass.  Keynes states that: 
‘there is nothing a Government hates more than being well informed: for it makes the 
process of arriving at decisions much more complicated and difficult’.216 
4.1.4 The inclusion of public opinion in regulatory decision-making increases 
public trust in the IRA and the regulation 
‘A system – economic, legal or political – requires trust as an input condition.  Without 
trust it cannot stimulate supportive activities in situations of uncertainty or risk’. 
(Luhmann)217 
The final argument posited here for the inclusion of public opinion in regulation is that 
it enhances public trust in the IRA and the regulation per se.  While this issue evidently 
overlaps and falls under the issues of legitimacy and accountability of regulatory 
agencies, it has been listed separately in order to highlight its importance in the process.  
A further element to this argument would be that the public needs to know that public 
participation processes are taking place in order to place trust in the regulatory system.  
The public may therefore have a level of expectation that such would occur and a 
regulatory body would be found lacking if it was discovered that regulation was being 
produced and enacted without recourse to public opinion on the matter. 
With reference to regulation per se, a level of trust in the regulation is usually taken to 
be a prerequisite to the idea that a causal link can be made between public attitude and 
regulation.  Regulation will only offer some level of reassurance if the public trust its 
capacity to remedy some problem.  Public trust in regulation has been widely discussed 
in academic circles and it is useful to take Weber’s comments on ‘intellectualised 
rationalisation’ as a starting point.218  Intellectualised rationalisation arises as a result of 
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the increasing complexity, differentiation and specialisation of society and refers to the 
process by which we can make use of a technology without needing to know explicitly 
how it functions.  We place this kind of trust in people and technologies on a daily basis 
in order to function in modern society.  Figure 5 which I have produced using the BSA 
survey data (2003), shows attitudes to four public trust statements.  The concept  of 
intellectualised rationalisation can be linked to a trust statement from the BSA survey of 
2003 in which fifty per cent of people stated that they strongly agreed or agreed that 
‘modern genetic science is so complex that public involvement in policy decisions is not 
realistic’.219  I contend however that the gap between the layperson and the scientist is 
not greater in this realm than in relation to, for example, nuclear power, an area where 
there is no doubt that the public feel themselves to be important in the creation of 
policy.   
Figure 5: UK Public Trust (2003)  
(n=3,272, the ‘don’t know’ answers have not been included) 
Trust Statement Agree 
strongly 
 
Agree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Disagree 
 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Those in favour of new 
developments in genetic science 
cannot be trusted to act in society’s 
interest 
7% 27% 35% 23% 2% 
Rules set by Government will keep 
us safe from any risks linked to 
modern genetic science 
2% 21% 27% 36% 8% 
Modern genetic science is so 
complex that public involvement in 
policy decisions is not realistic 
7% 43% 18% 22% 4% 
Genetic scientists only tend to tell 
us what the people paying their 
wages want us to hear 
10% 34% 15% 10% 0.5% 
 
It is evident from the table above that mistrust is more prevalent than trust.  
Unfortunately, these trust measures were not included again in the BSA survey so no 
measure of change over time can be analysed.  However, there is one question which 
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was repeated in the BSA survey in 1999 that was repeated in 2003 which relates to 
levels of public confidence in the government’s regulation of biotechnology.  This 
showed a negative score of -4 in 1999, which represents a confidence deficit. By 2003 
this figure had risen to 8, indicating a small confidence surplus.220 
Eurobarometer use the same statement relating to trust in government regulation of 
biotechnology, which Gaskell et al have analysed in a different way but which also 
shows a rise in trust from 1999 to 2005.  Eurobarometer includes two additional 
statements relating to trust in scientists carrying out research in biotechnology and trust 
in industry developing new products with biotechnology.  Both of these also show 
significant increases in trust, but especially the latter which rises from -12 in 1999 to 20 
in 2002 and to 41 in 2005. 221  Freudenburg argues that ‘recreancy and trustworthiness 
have been shown by systematic research to be key factors behind the increasingly toxic 
social chemistry that has been associated with an ever-increasing range of 
technologies’.222  Bier warns that in cases of distrust, it is important to listen to the 
concerns of the public prior to giving out any new information.  Bier adds that giving 
information in order to allay public concerns often backfires, as it is viewed as not 
taking those concerns seriously.  Hence this kind of policy is more likely to increase 
distrust than to engender trust.223   This view is pertinent in relation to GM foods where 
labelling regulation is the focus in recent years which would constitute an increase in 
information to the public and evidently is in opposition to Bier’s advice.  The impact of 
labelling regulation on public opinion is examined in the next chapter. 
Lofstedt contests that there is a direct correlation between levels of public trust in a 
regulator and the perception of that regulator as a tough or weak player.  He continues 
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that new regulatory agencies may improve their public perception by the introduction of 
strict, prohibitive regulation which shows that they are not industry lapdogs and likely 
to be the subject of regulatory capture.224  This argument is reviewed in terms of its 
relevance in relation to the two case-studies.  Lofstedt adheres strongly to the view that 
public involvement in the policy process helps in the process of public acceptance, and 
he contends that this has been a fashionable view since the late 1980s, following 
academic research in the UK and US.225  From this research Lofstedt notes two reasons 
why public involvement increases public trust: firstly, it gives the public or stakeholders 
ownership of the process, and secondly, if the consultees feel that they were listened to 
then they are more likely to accept the regulatory position.226  This latter reason is not 
without problems as there is a great difference between listening to comments from the 
participants of a public engagement exercise and incorporating such views into the 
regulatory policy position. 
4.2 Responsive Regulation versus Regulating in the Public Interest 
Skilful manipulation of the concepts of a public voice, the ‘public attitude’ and 
competing constructions of such occur on a number of political levels.  Often, the 
regulators’ normative directions underpin regulatory development which they may 
equate with acting in the public interest.  Paternalism is not, however, the same thing as 
the production of regulation which reflects public attitude.  Regulators may struggle to 
reconcile their own interests with their perceptions of what would produce ‘good law’ in 
a moral sense.  George Gallop argued that democracy entailed responding to the voters 
and not to ‘organised interests, elite opinion, experts or simply those who shout 
loudest’.227  In contrast, Warnock argues that: 
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 ‘The law must not outrage the feelings of too many people; but it cannot reflect the 
feelings of them all.  It must therefore be drawn with a view to the common good’ 228 
Although the strong normative push that an IRA should incorporate public participation 
into its decision-making processes has been established, the IRA has a choice to 
respond to this public voice or alternatively to regulate in accordance with their own 
views which they may justify as being in the public interest. 
It is argued by Hood et al that there is no correlation between responsive systems and 
public satisfaction with regulation.  Hood et al note that that the public may not even be 
positive about regulation which they were initially calling for once it is imposed upon 
them.  Such a scenario, it is purported, arises when the regulation called for produces 
unexpected side-effects, so that the novelty of the regulation wears off, the public 
become aware of these side-effects and their initial support for such a policy direction 
fades.229  The form and substantive content of regulation is therefore critical if it is the 
objective of policy makers and regulators to act in a truly responsive manner which 
moves beyond a notional half-hearted attempt to appease the public.  The marrying of 
public attitudes to suitable regulatory output is not a straightforward process and Dicey 
goes so far as to argue that in certain instances there may not be a mechanism that can 
meet the change in regulation demanded by public opinion.230   
Rousseau presents an idea that the ‘true’ public opinion is that opinion which is best for 
the public as a whole.  This introduces an idea of paternalistic stewardship of the 
regulators, the Executive over the Demos.  The idea is that regulation is determined by 
regulators who are acting in the public interest as opposed to responding to the wishes 
of the public.  As Glynn et al argue: 
‘Since the quality of public opinion is so central to reaching such normative conclusions 
about the opinion-policy relationship, we should not dismiss policymakers’ failures to 
respond to public opinion as undemocratic.  There can be cases in which policymakers 
feel they must make policy decisions which do not have public support because they 
feel that the public has been misled or manipulated or has not yet become fully 
informed about a policy at issue.’231   
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Further to this Feintuck, comments that ‘public interest will often appear to be an empty 
vessel, to be filled at different times with differing values’ yet in spite of the lack of a 
consistent definition, public interest continues to be discussed in debate and regulatory 
matters.232  Indeed, to invoke the public interest in a debate adds an enormous sense of 
power and force to an argument even though it is evident that there may be little behind 
its use beyond a strategic rhetorical device.   A regulator may argue that the public 
interest is a compromise between various competing interests, and this is described by 
Pal and Maxwell as the utilitarian approach. 233  Pal and Maxwell state further that ‘the 
nature of regulatory decision-making imposes an obligation to be guided by a concept 
[the public interest] that by its very nature is nebulous and shifts case by case’.234  They 
continue by arguing further in relation to Canadian regulation that ‘a concept of the 
public interest that floats disconnected from what Canadians actually think will not be 
helpful’.235  Lee contends that ‘the point is not that public opinion should be followed 
(even if public opinion were ever so monolithic that it realistically could be), but that it 
should be heard and addressed.’236   
On responsiveness, Hood et al state that: 
‘opinion-responsiveness is little if any more definite or reliable as a predictor of the 
content of regulatory regimes than the market failure hypothesis………’237 
Hood et al cite two reasons for this: there is no single way of listening to the public 
voice and secondly, they argue that in relation to the research they have conducted in 
risk regulation regimes, regulation is only partially opinion-responsive both in process 
and outcome.  The first reason therefore relates to the various methods of gauging and 
analysing public opinion.  In relation to the first of these points, this ties in with the 
debate over informed publics and the commonly made argument that surveys and 
opinion polls only record split second judgements often based on limited information.  
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Hood et al suggest therefore that the opinion-responsiveness relates to how the opinion 
is sought, which I suggest is the wrong way to look at this.238  There are better and 
worse ways of gauging opinions but this is only one stage in the process.  The second 
critical stage is whether the regulator chooses to respond to the data collected.  This 
begs the question of how consistent regulators and policy-makers are across regulatory 
regimes in requesting and commissioning public opinion data to be collected.  As 
already stated, this stage is significantly removed from the process of analysing and 
taking into account the findings of public opinion data.   
4.3 Models of Opinion-Responsiveness 
One may analyse the level of political attention devoted to a specific issue or sector in 
terms of the attention received from inter alia: the public, interest groups, industry, the 
politicians, regulators and the media.  Studies often attempt to link these different agents 
in an effort to show the complexity of drawing casual relationships between them.  
While it is evident that these agents do interact across attention cycles to varied issues, 
there are sometimes idiosyncrasies which highlight pronounced activity in one area 
which may be attributable to, for example, an abnormal level of public discontent with 
policy or a level of industry lobbying which cannot be easily ignored by policy makers.  
Technological developments have been marginalised in the attention cycles literature as 
triggers for a policy attention cycle.   The study of attention cycles relating to specific 
sectors over time is valuable when combined with the role of the public in that it gives 
some indication of whether regulatory policy is having an impact.  Political attention 
can be measured in terms of budgetary spend, resource allocation and legislative output.   
One method of analysing attention cycles is according to the theory of punctuated 
equilibrium.  While Baumgartner and Jones were not the first to adapt the concept of 
punctuated equilibrium from palaeontology to the field of political science, they did 
break ground in their application of the metaphor to policy cycles. Baumgartner and 
Jones refined the term to mean that punctuations in policy outcomes are the result of 
interactions between changes in the environment and activity from within the political 
system.239  Thus policy change may be the result of both endogenous and exogenous 
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events.  Baumgartner and Jones argue that when issues first merit political attention 
there is often a growth of institutional structures. This structural set up will often remain 
in place for decades and as such tightly dictates participatory mechanisms.  It is this 
process which succeeds in giving ‘the illusion of equilibrium’.240  The theory of 
punctuated equilibrium attempts to give an explanation for the observed pattern of 
longer periods of policy equilibrium within sectors which are sometimes disturbed by 
punctuations.  The punctuations to the equilibrium are shorter periods of volatility, 
change and instability.241 
In conjunction with their work on the punctuated equilibrium model, Baumgartner and 
Jones advocate that a policy subsystem should be conceived as dynamic and fluid, 
whereas the traditional and more static model of a policy subsystem consisted of interest 
groups, committees, and regulatory agencies which worked together to establish an 
equilibrium of interests.  The element which Jones et al argue provides dynamism to the 
process is that of the disfavoured side in the policy subsystem and additionally includes 
parliament, political leaders and parties and public opinion.242   
Jones and Baumgartner introduce the idea of ‘catch up’ whereby once an idea has 
succeeded in being given attention by the primary policymaking institutions, it is 
necessary for punctuations to occur in order to ‘catch up with changing reality’.243  This 
is a primary feature of the attention cycle of genomics.  To develop the idea further, 
Jones et al argue that the focus of policy attention cycles should be upon information 
processing and the means by which ‘institutional procedures constrain policy reactions 
to the flow of information’. It is imperfections in the information flows through the 
policy process that lead to punctuations.244  Jones and Baumgartner’s concept of 
disproportionate information processing is combined with the idea that political systems 
respond to ‘signals’ and this is the basis for variation in attention cycles.  All such 
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signals are characterised by uncertainty and ambiguity and are information flows.  
Critically, as Jones et al note, governments will often overact to signals because of these 
characteristics of uncertainty and ambiguity.245  The issues raised by genomics are rich 
in uncertainty and ambiguity so this plays in to the sector analysed here.  Critically, the 
seriousness or potential harm raised by an issue is no determinant of its uptake by the 
policy system.  Issues are promoted by political agents and mobilised by public opinion 
or interest groups resulting in certain issues receiving political attention which may 
arguably be undeserved, or conversely issues of significance may be blocked from the 
agenda.   
A second model of opinion-responsiveness is the public thermostat model.  Following 
empirical research in the USA, Soroka and Wlezien highlight a correspondence between 
public opinion and policy-making, showing that there is a two-way relationship between 
policy makers and public attitudes.  They argue that:   
‘A responsive public behaves much like a thermostat.  That is, the public adjusts its  
preferences for more or less policy in response to what policy makers do’.246  
Interestingly, they suggest that the British public are notable and idiosyncratic in their 
responsiveness.247  As such, a new variable is at play here influencing the workings of 
the regulation and public attitudes.  Evidently, without such a level of public 
responsiveness, there would be little incentive for policy makers to act in accordance 
with public attitudes.  Soroka et al advocate that effective democracy depends upon a 
responsive public and that policy budget changes are symbolic of shifts in public 
attitudes.248   
Kingdon presents the idea that an issue has its own specific attributes which are 
influential in its treatment and have an effect on the level of political attention received 
and the type of policy response given.  Kingdon outlines some attributes which will help 
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an issue gain political attention.  These are: the attractiveness of an issue to politicians 
in terms of vote drawing capacity; the potential of an issue to be defined as cause for 
public concern; issues resulting from dramatic innovations which have an impact upon 
humans; and issues which relate to enormous promise in areas of food and health249.  It 
is evident that genomics ticks all of these boxes and this, combined with the features it 
exhibits of uncertainty and the framing of the issues within the sector in terms of public 
risk, have promulgated the sector to a high level of recent sustained political attention.   
Felstiner et al advocate a three stage process in the transformation of a private grievance 
to a public concern and then a political issue. The stages are: naming, blaming and 
claiming.250  The first stage is naming the problem and thus involves constructive 
framing of the issue. I argue here in relation to genomics that such framing does not 
need to be constructed by the public but that a problem may be framed and defined prior 
to the presentation to the public, by for example, interest groups or the industry per se.  
Industry may wish to promote regulatory activity in a bid to legitimise its activities and 
perhaps to see off competitors.  The second stage in the transformation of an issue into a 
political grievance is to isolate a target of blame.  In relation to genomics, the subject of 
blame has often been industry, for example, in the case of GM food and crops Monsanto 
was widely blamed as a harbinger of potential harm to human health and the 
environment.  
Felstiner’s third stage is that of claiming and is broken down further into five 
components for success: ambiguity, social significance, temporal relevance, non-
technical issue definition and the absence of categorical precedence.  All of these factors 
are central to the framing of genomics as a political issue, but it is to the issue of 
categorical precedence that I now turn.  As discussed in chapter 3, if there is an absence 
of categorical precedence then policy makers are unable to draw upon policy learning 
and to manage it as they have done in the past or in relation to a similar issue.  The 
argument that there is no categorical precedence is critical as a major justification for 
the high levels of political attention given to genomics.  The idea is that the issues raised 
are singularly unique and that the technological developments pose unique problems 
about which regulators cannot draw upon the rule learning of earlier decisions.  
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Combined with the lack of rule learning is the fact that the technology is creating very 
critical social and ethical dilemmas and there are no frames of reference to be drawn 
upon.  It is thus concluded and argued by the regulators that genomics needs novel and 
special regulatory handling as it is testing the cognitive limits of the existing structures, 
something which has been illustrated in the last chapter.  One solution advocated by 
regulators is to give an enhanced role to the public in the policy deliberation of 
genomics.  This policy position has been accepted as a fait accompli, yet surely it is 
open to debate.  If each of the areas of genomics relates and falls under the areas of 
health, food or agriculture then why is the issue of categorical precedence being pushed 
so hard and who is doing the pushing? It is, I argue, this attribute above all others which 
is responsible for the sustained political attention to the technological developments of 
genomics. Indicators of attention come from a number of sources including structural 
measures, the institutional set up, the budget and the enormous policy and regulatory 
output.  
4.4 The role of public opinion in triggering, shaping and gaining regulatory 
attention 
 ‘As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support 
them but opinion’ (Hume251) 
While the ‘governors’ may have nothing to support them but opinion, it is the 
interpretation and construction of this opinion that is pertinent here.  There is no doubt 
that public opinion is critical to the production of regulation and is often cited as both a 
trigger for regulatory attention and the rationale for regulatory change.  Indeed, one 
justification given by regulators for the disproportionate attention devoted to genomics 
relates to the alleviation of public concern in terms of the appropriate ethical line to be 
taken.  In these terms, policy makers make reference to the public in connection with 
the potential implications of technologies and public concern relating to, for instance, 
stem cell research and gene therapy.  In this case, genomics is not ranked according to 
the priorities of the public’s ‘most important problems’ alongside issues such as 
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housing, employment and crime.252  However, the application of genomics may fall 
within the sectors of food and health which are valence issues and therefore carry some 
substantive political purchase.  The manipulation of public opinion data is not, however, 
a recent phenomenon.  There are many cases where policy ‘problems’ are not deemed 
resoluble by the regulators and in order for the problem to be removed from the political 
agenda there may be resort to a management of the indicators so that the problem no 
longer exists.253  As one of the principal indicators is a measure of public opinion then 
this is particularly pertinent.   
Yet, we need to ask whether public opinion as it is generally constructed and interpreted 
is effective in policy making or whether the political manipulation of public 
participation and engagement exercises negates its force.  I do not wish to critique and 
outline the inherent flaws of deliberative processes here; it is sufficient to note that 
when a measure of public opinion is cited it is open to debate on a number of levels.  As 
discussed in chapter 2, not least, the belief that individuals present a temporary attitude 
for the purposes of surveys and participatory processes.254  In this sense it is postulated 
that ‘attitudes’ don’t exist, people make attitude reports or ‘survey responses’.255 
Cobb & Ross differentiate between the public agenda and the formal agenda. The 
formal agenda is said to have three characteristics: firstly, there must be some form of 
objective evidence that a problem exists.  This is usually in the form of survey data, a 
governmental study or statistics related to the problem, for instance, crime or housing.  
The second characteristic of the formal agenda is that it must have made the public 
agenda, thus the public believes that there is a problem which requires action.  Finally, 
the third feature has a comparative element in that the government will question 
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whether such an issue is already on the formal agendas of those nations with similar 
social systems.256 
In relation to agenda setting and attention cycles, we need to break down the public into 
different components, thus we have the ‘attentive public’ and the ‘mass public’.257  In 
the case of genomics, the public referred to in regulatory debate are often the patients or 
consumers.  Thus, should we only consider the public attitude at the point of a choice 
regarding whether to take up or not the outputs of genomics?  As Sturgis & Allum 
highlight, the measure of public opinion of new and emerging technologies is 
particularly difficult as most members of the public have little knowledge of them.258 
One presupposes that in order for regulators to recognise any kind of prevailing attitude, 
it is necessary to have a stable attitude mood which is easily identified by polls and 
surveys.  Two important factors are the level of polarisation and the stability of the 
attitude over time.259  Dicey introduces the concepts of counter-currents and cross-
currents of opinion.  Counter-currents may act as a check upon the prevailing dominant 
opinion, and may delay a reform or an innovation.  In some circumstances, the effect of 
this counter-current may be strong enough to delay the reform for so long that it is not 
put into effect, or by the time the reform is carried into effect, it has changed 
dramatically from the original form.260  Cross-currents do not directly oppose the 
dominant opinion, but may deflect or modify the dominant prevailing opinion.261   
Gauging the prevailing public attitude is an enormously complex task.  It is argued that 
there is a stark contrast between opinions which reflect peoples’ snap judgements based 
on limited information and opinions sought from people possessing a greater knowledge 
base.  Additionally, the response to public attitude by the regulators may take many 
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different forms.  Van den Burg comments that there is often agreement to regulate 
without there being any consensus on the substantive content of such regulation.  This, 
he argues, leads to vague and ambiguous regulation as policy-makers struggle to 
respond to public opinion.  Such regulation ‘does not rest on very principled positions 
and often changes substantially during the public debate’262.  It is contented in Chapter 6 
that this is in common with the earlier GM labelling regulations.  Hood et al comment 
that regulators themselves are ambiguous about the definition of ‘public attitude’.  
Indeed, they argue further that policy makers appear more likely to respond to 
protesters’ and critics’ views than to attempt to establish the preferences of the public 
more widely.263  This has also been a point made in relation to GM foods, where it is 
argued that the section of the public opposed to GM foods are consistently taken to be 
the dominant public, even though in more recent years this is not the case as will be 
shown in Chapter 5. 
A further issue relates to the marrying of public attitudes to suitable regulatory output.  
Dicey raises this issue when he argues that there may not be a mechanism that can meet 
the change in regulation demanded by public opinion.264    I believe this is the case for 
GM foods where only the EU de facto moratorium fully met the remit in terms of 
responding to the dominant public attitude.  Hood et al describe a scenario where 
regulators respond to the public mood but where there are side-effects as a consequence 
of regulatory short-falls: thus as the novelty of the regulation wears off, the public 
become aware of these side-effects and their initial support for such a policy direction 
fades.265  The form of regulation is therefore critical if it is the objective of policy 
makers and regulators to act in a truly responsive manner which moves beyond a 
notional half-hearted attempt to appease the public.   
Regulatory output plays a significant role in the removal of an issue or lowering of its 
political importance: it may act as a mechanism to provide reassurance; it may comfort 
the public simply by looking rational or modern; it may appease certain factions or form 
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a compromise between factions. Bernstein’s life cycle model is pertinent to this 
discussion.  This model is based upon the premise that regulation is produced in 
response to disaster, which may be interpreted as scandal or catastrophe.  It is feasible to 
argue that the model could be applied to the high levels of opposition to GM foods in 
the late 1990s.  These disasters become means by which to bypass traditional regulatory 
agenda setting; regulators are forced to react to them.  Bernstein’s model includes the 
requirement of an external catalyst which triggers the public or the legislators and 
propels the regulatory process into action.  A persistent, high level public mood could 
be interpreted as such a trigger.  It is anticipated that this mood would then diminish in 
response to the implementation of appropriate regulation.  The critical point in this 
model is what happens subsequently to the nature of the regulation.  Bernstein purports 
that the regulators respond to subsidence of the public opposition by adapting the 
regulatory output accordingly. 266   
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the theory surrounding the interaction between public 
opinion and regulation.  It is clear that the policy and regulatory approach relating to 
genomics is still in a state of flux reflecting the speed of technological development.  
The products and techniques emerging from genomics present novel issues for policy 
makers to deal with and are often difficult to incorporate within a predetermined system.  
The structural limits of the regulatory system are being stretched to accommodate the 
novel objects of regulation.  In addition to the speed of technological advances is the 
subsequent and equally rapid commercialisation of products.  There are several standard 
accepted types of policy change and these include: ideas, interests, nature of policy 
issues, policy and political actors, institutions, socio-economic conditions and public 
opinion.  I wish to add technological developments to this list with a nod to Capano and 
Howlett’s advice that one should note the favouring of one driver over the others.267  An 
additional factor is that it is argued that the technology in question is still in a state of 
development and transformation and has not yet reached ‘closure’. This is mirrored in 
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the framing of the issues in the public arena.268  Technology does embody specific 
forms of power and authority and the social construction of technological developments 
means that it can be seen as a political artefact.269  Thus in the context of attention 
cycles, it is interesting to assess the control that technology can exert upon the public 
and the regulatory system.   
Levels of congruence between public opinion and regulation differ across issues and 
sectors.  I wish to isolate the idiosyncrasies of the regulation-opinion inter-relationship 
identifiable in the regulation of genomics.  Schattschneider’s argument about the scope 
of conflict is an area that I wish to test in the course of this thesis.  He argues that: 
‘On issues about which the public has more well-defined opinions and shows more 
concern, where the scope of conflict is broad, policy tends to move in harmony with 
public opinion’.270 
It is interesting to address these thoughts in relation to the case-studies of prenatal 
testing and PGD and GM foods in the next chapters.  In addition, in the next couple of 
chapters, the opinion-responsive models outlined above are reviewed in terms of how 
they relate to the mapping of the interactions between regulation and public opinion. 
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Chapter 5 
The Interaction between Public Opinion and the Regulation of 
Genetically Modified (GM) Foods 
5.0 Introduction 
It is now well over a decade since the issue of GM foods was thrust onto the political 
agenda and in many senses there has been a regulatory deadlock ever since.  The crux of 
the issue remains the tussle between the biotech industry and producers who wish to 
open up the UK markets to GM products and those sections of the public who are 
concerned over the safety of GM foods.  The regulators are forced to balance the 
competing demands of protecting the public while at the same time maintaining a level 
of access for the biotechnology companies to the European markets.  Without some 
level of regulatory resolution GM foods will remain problematic.  Over the last couple 
of years, it has become increasingly difficult for farmers to get hold of non-GM animal 
feed and this shortage, and this, combined with an increased public awareness that 
products in our supermarkets contain ingredients from animals fed GM food, has led to 
commentators stating that this issue will reach a head in the next five years.  Keith 
Hawkins’ view is very pertinent; he was the Director-General of the British Retail 
Consortium at the time of these comments: 
‘There is an issue coming to the boil that, when it does, will dwarf all else – the 
rehabilitation of GM food. The science has moved decisively in its favour, while the 
government is hoping someone (the industry) will take the plunge and start selling GM 
lines again. When that happens the tabloids will scream, flat earthers will rage, Prince 
Charles will make a speech.  But it’s coming, all the same’.271 
 
For this reason, it is argued in this thesis that GM foods is an incredibly rich choice of 
case-study and offers policy makers insights into the reasons why regulation has not 
managed to placate public concern.  The relationship between public opinion and 
regulation is absolutely central to any discussion of the GM food issue.   
A Defra official stated in interview that: ‘GM is a lightning rod for other novel 
technologies’.  This provides a further reason why it is important to revisit the 
regulation of GM foods, which is the argument that this case-study will throw light on 
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the best ways to regulate new technologies.  Synthetic biology is described as the ‘new 
GM’ and indeed currently falls under the same regulation as GM.272  There is a 
commonly held belief that lessons learned from the GM food case could be applied to 
future technologies.  Here it is asked, what are these lessons and how can the 
application be made?  Indeed in April 2011, The FSA warned that ‘new 
nanotechnology-based food products risk being rejected in a similar way to GM foods 
unless they start engaging with consumers over their perceptions of the risks 
involved’.273 
Central to any discussion of GM foods is whether the products cause harm, and this 
hugely contested area is the opening for this chapter.  Difficulties abound in attempting 
to give a balanced overview of the debate as there are scientists on both sides of the 
argument.  What is clear is that the debate over the harm posed by GM foods, be it 
perceived or actual, is absolutely critical to how the regulation has been enacted.  The 
lack of consensus on the issues of harm and risk, while colouring the regulatory 
approach, has also led to public confusion and anxiety.  Indeed, without the 
idiosyncratic reaction of the European public to GM, we would probably have adopted a 
regulatory system more on a par with that adopted by the USA.  In the USA, the general 
food regulations have been extended to include GM foods, and hence GM foods as a 
category are not as distinctive as they are in the EU.  Following the discussion of 
contested harm, the regulation is set out and it is apparent that in the UK there has been 
a high level of special regulatory handling of GM relative to other novel foods.  The 
regulation is discussed in relation to two time periods which are basically split by the 
ending of the moratorium on GM foods entering the EU in 2003.  The first period 
covers the years from 1999-2003 and looks at the early labelling regulations and the 
events leading to the moratorium, whereas the second period examines the regulation 
post-moratorium and the subsequent second phase of labelling regulations: 2003-2011.  
These two periods are later mirrored in the discussion of public opinion data. They 
show significant differences in the public opinion and the responsiveness of the 
regulation to such.  Throughout the chapter the five understandings of public opinion 
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described in Chapter 2 are returned to as a reference point, and some data showing the 
coverage of GM in the media is analysed as a means to examine the idea that one 
understanding of public opinion is that it is the media opinion.  The next section of the 
chapter is devoted to examining whether regulation has helped to placate public 
concerns over GM foods and in doing so the principal findings of the interaction 
between public opinion and regulation of GM foods are summarised.  Further to this, 
the interview data is explored as a means to identify the understandings of public 
opinion which are held by the regulators.  The importance of public opinion to the IRAs 
is discussed in relation to the extensive efforts in collecting data relating to GM.  There 
follows a final synthesis of the data findings and analyses in the chapter conclusion. 
5.1 Contested Harm 
For the remit of this thesis the environmental issues raised by the production of GM 
foods are not being addressed, the focus here is on the purchase and consumption of 
GM foods.  While a response to the risk (perceived or actual) is at the heart of the 
regulatory approach to GM foods, the regulation of GM foods is not simply a case of 
risk regulation.  As already discussed, it is argued in the thesis that the regulators are 
attempting to juggle two competing forces and this has led to a duality of regulatory 
approach. This involves on the one hand that regulators respond to the very powerful 
commercial lobbing from suppliers of GM products to enable product development and 
sales, and on the other hand, that they respond to what is in some quarters a high level 
of public uncertainty and concern over the safety of GM products.  Within the 
regulatory arena, the problematisation of GMOs and of GM foods has been so strongly 
conceptualised and the parameters of the debate defined in terms of risk that it is 
difficult for the issue to be conceived differently.  Critically, Black argues that within 
the regulatory fora it is agreed that GMOs pose a risk but the level of this risk is not 
agreed.  However, interview data shows that senior regulators from the FSA and EFSA 
do not see any risk in the GM foods which are authorised for sale in UK shops. 
Concerns pertaining to GMOs can be grouped into either environmental/biodiversity or 
human health.  A third area of concern has been the role of multinational companies in 
pushing GM agriculture.  I argue however that while the survey data alludes to public 
concerns it does not attempt to identify the specific concerns.  In relation to the potential 
risks to human health of consumption of GM foods, I believe that members of the 
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public have a vague unease which is not generally voiced even to themselves in 
scientific terms.  The public are not stating that the anxiety arises from their belief that 
consumption of recombinant DNA could lead to transgenic DNA being transferred 
across the gut wall and genetically interacting with their body.  These concerns arise 
because they are levied on a number of well rehearsed discourses which stress that GM 
food is unnatural. 274  
The lack of unanimity over the science surrounding GMOs is a very important element 
in any discussion of GM foods.  A strong criticism levelled at opponents of GM foods is 
that there is no evidence that these products cause harm to human health, and those who 
are pro-GM argue further that no harm has come to the American public who have been 
eating them for decades now.  However, as survey data will show in the following 
section, the public are concerned, and as a consequence the EU has adopted a 
precautionary and cautious stance on GM foods in response to the level of public 
unease.  A number of commentators stress further that if these foods were deemed 
unsafe by policy makers they would not be sold and labelling would have been replaced 
by prohibition.275  In order for a GM product to reach the market, it undergoes rigorous 
risk assessment and authorisation processes which are far more stringent than those 
applied to non-GM foods.  As already stated, the concern centres on the risk that 
transgenic DNA could be transferred across the gut wall and detrimentally affect the 
consumer.  The counter argument to this is that there is nothing special about transgenic 
DNA that would make it more harmful than other DNA that we consume daily without 
ill effect.276   
Interestingly, the case of GM can be contrasted to other food safety controversies such 
as BSE, salmonella and E-coli in that these food ‘scares’ were grounded in ‘identifiable 
and ultimately established risk’.277  Carson et al argue that the concept of GM foods is 
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‘rooted more in public perception of risk and public scepticism of science than in any 
discernible food risk’.278  I contend that the concept of ‘GM food’ becomes a discursive 
space into which people project their own, often negative, ideas about modernity, 
technology, unnaturalness and artificiality.  As such, it stands in direct contrast to 
organic foods where the discursive space is one into which people project concepts of 
natural goodness, wholesomeness, and wellbeing.  It is commonly felt that a level of 
ambiguity surrounds the concept of GM foods in people’s minds.  I argue that a 
combination of factors has exacerbated this confusion: reduced trust in the authority of 
science, lower levels of trust in regulation and the very nature of the development of the 
labelling of GM foods.  This argument is developed throughout this chapter.  As an 
interesting aside, it is possible to purchase an organic product which may have GM 
content, albeit at very low levels.  Additionally, while it is accepted that our relationship 
with food products is different to our relationship to other products, why is it that when 
GMOs are used to produce medical products such as insulin, the concerns of the public 
are seemingly nonexistent?   People make a judgement, and the benefits of GM foods 
are not clearly defined, whereas the benefits of taking insulin for someone suffering 
from diabetes are very clear.  While there is a high level of speculation that GM food 
products would be cheaper than their non-GM equivalents, and also have the advantage 
of a longer shelf life and potentially an increased nutritional value, it appears that the 
public are not aware of or convinced by such potential benefits. 
Martin and Tait argue that the risks of GM have hardened along disciplinary lines, with 
laboratory based scientists who do not believe the risks exist, and ecologists who are 
convinced that there are risks.279  Whatever opinions may be held with regard to the 
perceived or actual risks posed, it is noteworthy that such public discourses play a 
critical role in the development of regulation in this field.  The ‘yuk factor’ attached to 
GM foods carries political clout.  Hughes and Bryant stress that however illogical and 
inconsistent the natural/un-natural boundary may seem, it ‘does highlight the need for 
ethical principles to support the drawing of lines between socially acceptable and non-
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acceptable intervention, and between reasonable and overbearing regulatory 
imposition’.280   
5.2 Science and Regulation 
There are a number of difficulties surrounding the marrying of the regulation to the 
science in the area of GMOs.  It is often argued that a ‘regulatory science’ ensues which 
is a compromise of the two epistemic areas, attempting to create something akin to the 
science which can also be incorporated into the regulatory system.  The second issue of 
importance with reference to the science of GM relates to how informed survey 
respondents are about GM foods.  Firstly it is important to analyse the controversy 
surrounding the science.  Many would argue that the GM foods case gives weight to the 
argument made by scientists and policy makers that it is frustratingly difficult to ‘get the 
message of science across to the public’.281  However, in the GM debate, the use of 
science as a political tool is particularly noteworthy and suggests a novel approach to 
campaigning and public engagement.  In the midst of such persuasive arguments on 
both sides, we have to ask what is ‘sound science’?  The lack of scientific unanimity in 
this area has served to inflame public debate and increase public anxiety.  The 
traditional construction of science as a homogenous entity which carries authority and is 
the ultimate arbiter in decision-making no longer appears to be widely accepted.   
The Bioindustry Association states that ‘much of the regulation put in place by the 
European Commission is based on old science and reflects concerns that have not 
proved justified’.282  A different slant on this might be that the EU adopted its stance as 
a strategic move in a bid to enable the development of the technologies while at the 
same time offering some reassurance to the public283.  From the very stringent risk 
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regulation of the late 1990s, we have seen some relaxation in terms of a shift of the 
burden of risk quantification onto the public in the form of the labelling regulations.  
Thus the public become more responsible and autonomous, in line with the current 
thinking that we are moving from a system of risk regulation to the regulation of 
uncertainty.  While the ‘regulatory fix’ provided by the ‘old science’ enables GM 
products to enter the shops, it does not serve to alleviate public concern.  Regulators 
have adopted this approach with the hope that the process of familiarisation with a 
product will lead reduced hostility to GM foods.284 
There is a gap between the science utilised for regulatory purposes and the science 
advocated by scientists.  This is illustrated by the technology adopted and the science 
used by the regulatory system in the measurement of the adventitious threshold.  This 
has been heavily criticised and the most vocal comments refer to the use of certified 
reference materials (CRMs).  There appears to be an area of incommensurability where 
the cognitive realms of policy makers jar with those of scientists.  There is a lack of 
recognition of the cognitive differences at work and little attempt to bridge the 
epistemic divide.  Weighardt, writing on the use of CRMs, expresses concern over the 
translation of the ‘gross genetic definition of ‘ingredient’ into something which makes 
sense at a molecular level’, and arguing that the level of error in the quantification of 
GM content makes the use of the technique inappropriate. 285  He suggests that ‘the 
regulations are unenforceable using the molecular tools available’.286  He lists a number 
of reasons to support this view but the essence of the argument rests upon the definition 
of relative GMO content in a product.  The current system relies upon the concept of an 
‘ingredient versus gene dosage ratio’. This implies that there is some correlation 
between the weight of the ingredients and the total number of modified genes in the 
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product.287  This leads to results which are inaccurate and thus it is argued that the CRM 
method does not enable an accurate GMO content to be calculated.  As such the 
threshold level is not being enforced.  However, there does not appear to be a 
technological fix to this problem and as such the regulation relies upon technology that 
has inherent imperfections.  As technological developments are made hopefully the 
regulatory sphere will respond, and will improve the accuracy of the measurement of 
the GMO content.   
It is argued here that the regulators have used scientific information in a very pragmatic 
way in order to balance the competing demands of the public and biotech companies.  
Science is used as a means to give authority to an argument.  Pestre comments that: 
‘Since science is a discourse that claims not to depend on partisan decisions, it enables 
one to ‘technicalise’ public action or to render it impersonal, to bypass the democratic 
rules of accountability…it gives to political decision the force of necessity’.288 
An example of the pragmatic and selective design of the regulation relates to the 
definition and categorisation of GMOs.  This argument is equally valid in relation to the 
number of exemptions made to the applicability of the mandatory labelling regulations.  
If the purpose of the regulation is to protect the public from potential risks, then the 
exemptions to the legislation appear very arbitrary.  Evidently, successful lobbying from 
industry and trade issues take precedence in such matters.  Such exemptions include 
organisms obtained through certain techniques of genetic modification.  Thus, the 
mutagenesis and cell fusion (including protoplast fusion) of plant cells of organisms 
which can exchange genetic material through traditional breeding methods are 
exempt.289  The categorisation of a GMO is a regulatory device, and for this reason a 
number of commentators question the more stringent regulation applied to GM foods 
over other novel foods.  They argue that GM foods are equivalent to products produced 
by radiation or hybridisation resulting from classical breeding techniques. 
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5.3 The Regulation of GM Foods in the UK 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the dominant themes of the regulation of Genetic 
Modification can be traced back to the Asilomar Conference of 1973.  With regard to 
GM food products the regulation in recent years has primarily focussed on the rhetoric 
of consumer choice through the labelling of products.  The regulatory stages can be 
separated into the years from 1997 to 2003 (to include the moratorium years) and from 
2003 onwards.  How labelling became the central approach in the regulation of GM 
foods will be examined here.  Indeed there was a distinct backlash to the suggestion in 
the 1990s when the system of ‘substantial equivalence’ was preferred.  At this time, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), issued a press release that 
disputed the need to introduce a labelling regime for GM foods unless the process of 
genetic modification produced food in such a way as to make it substantially different 
from its non-GM antecedents.290  The authorisation of GM foods operated instead under 
the principle of ‘substantial equivalence’.  Thus if a GM product was deemed 
substantially equivalent to its non-GM counterpart in terms of its composition, 
nutritional value, or intended use, then it was authorised for sale, a good example being 
sugar from GM sugar beet.  Interestingly, it is argued that biotech companies and food 
producers were opposed to the introduction of labelling as it was seen as a means of 
inculcating a greater adverse public reaction to the products.291  The former President of 
the US Biotechnology Industry Organisation contends that a label is viewed by a 
customer as ‘a stigma, like a skull and crossbones.’292  This is a commonly held view 
and runs with the idea that to label an item, ‘free of GM ingredients’ implies product 
superiority.  Additionally, biotech companies found that public relations exercises 
backfired as the public view was ‘if it’s as safe as you claim then why do we have all 
these precautions in place?’293     
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Figure 6 summarises the principal regulatory developments in the labelling of GM 
foods and illustrates the volume and complexity of legislative developments which is a 
corollary of the attempts by regulators to appease all factions of the GM debate. 294  The 
regulatory approach operates by oversight to protect from perceived or actual harm 
through a system of product assessment, authorisation and labelling.  Post-market 
regulation includes the traceability of GM foods and ingredients.  What will be asked 
here is whether this regulation pulls together and functions coherently in order to aid the 
consumer or the member of the public in the purchase of food, be that GM or non-GM. 
Figure 6: EU legislation relating to the labelling of GM foods 
Time -
frame 
Legislation Nature of Laws Introduced Exemptions to 
labelling 
PHASE 
I 
   
1997 Directive 1997/35  
 
Introduces Annex III to Directive 
90/220 and thus proposed labelling 
must be supplied at notification stage of 
GMO products 
Catering suppliers 
1997 Regulation (EC) 
258/97 concerning 
novel foods and novel 
food ingredients 
Review and approval of novel foods 
introduced after 15 May 1997 
GM soya/ maize on 
market pre 15 May 
1997 (addressed in 
Regulation 1813/97).  
Food additives, 
flavourings and 
extraction solvents 
1997 Regulation 1813/97 Attempt to impose labelling regulations 
upon pre-1997 GM food products.  
Repealed by Regulation 1139/98. 
 
1998 Regulation 1139/98  
 
Closes the loophole regarding GM 
maize and soya products which had 
been authorised pre-15 May 1997.  
Applies to GM maize and Soya unless 
there is no GM DNA/protein present. 
Repealed by Regulation 2003/1829. 
 
1998 Directive 98/81 
 
Amends Directive 90/219/EC, the 
contained use directive.  Simplifies the 
administrative procedures, introduces a 
list of GM micro-organisms believed to 
pose a risk to human health or to the 
environment. 
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2000 Regulation 49/2000  Relates to Animal Feed Food products derived 
from animals fed on 
GM feed may be 
labelled as GM free. 
2000 Regulation 50/2000 
 
De minimis threshold introduced to 
GM additives/ flavourings labelling. 
Catering establishments labelling 
obligations 
No labelling on 
additives or flavourings 
unless there is GM 
DNA/ protein present 
 
2001 Directive 2001/18/EC 
of the European 
Parliament and of the 
Council of March 12 
2001 on the 
deliberate release into 
the environment of 
genetically modified 
organisms and 
replaci0ng Directive 
220/90/EEC [2001] 
O.J. L106/1 
Repeals Directive 90/220, the 
Deliberate Release Directive 
 
Highly processed 
ingredients such as 
refined vegetable oils 
produced from a GM 
source but not if they 
contain GM 
DNA/protein. 
PHASE  
II 
   
2003 Regulation on Food 
& Feed 1829/2003 
Adventitious threshold changed to 0.9 
per cent. 
Expansion of compulsory labelling to 
include GM food and feed regardless of 
whether it can be detected or not.  
Therefore includes highly refined and 
processed products, additives and 
flavourings. 
Extends application to the labelling of 
GM animal feed. 
Only applies to food 
and feed ‘containing’ or 
‘derived from’ GMOs.  
Does not apply to food 
or feed made ‘with’ a 
GMO (such as a 
processing aid or an 
enzyme). 
There is no obligation 
upon the supplier to 
label as GM the end 
product as a 
consequence of animals 
fed on GM feed. 
2003 Regulation 
1830/2003 on 
Traceability and 
Labelling 
Amends and extends traceability 
regulations introduced under Directive 
2001/18. 
Introduction of unique identifier codes 
for certain products. 
Implements provisions of the Cartagena 
Protocol on preventing 
Biotechnological risks. 
 
 
Regulation relating to GMOs prior to 1997 focused upon the containment and deliberate 
release procedures in anticipation of the planting of GM crops in Europe.  Until 1997 
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there was no regulation relating to the marketing of GM products.  At this time, 
however, a shift in regulatory focus was apparent and preparation made for the 
marketing of GM foods in the form of the Novel Foods Regulation.  This Regulation 
relied on the substantial equivalence test as already mentioned and introduced labelling 
rules which Friant-Perrot argues ‘went beyond safety for human health’.295  It should be 
noted however, that entry into the EU market of GM foods preceded the transposition of 
this Regulation, as the first GM products had already received EC marketing licences. 
Monsanto’s ‘Round-up Ready’ soybean, for example, had received an EC marketing 
licence in 1996 for grain importation, storage and agricultural use.  This first shipment 
of GM produce to the EU resulted in huge public protest and there is no doubt that 
public pressure had a high level of influence at this time and is discussed in greater 
depth later in the chapter.296  Indeed evidence of the influence of public protests is clear 
at this time as by the end of 1996 a number of processors and distributors, including 
Unilever and Nestle, removed GM soybeans from their ingredients.   
In 1997, there was a flurry of regulatory activity at EU level resulting in the Novel 
Foods Regulation 297, the Directive 97/35298 and Regulation 1813/97299.  There is no 
doubt that this flurry of EU regulatory output was a response to the high levels of 
consumer anxiety over GM foods in this period which had been displayed through very 
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successful public protests.300  The question of whether the public protests are better 
described as NGO-led protests ties in with the categories of public opinion which were 
outlined in chapter 2 and this point will be picked up in the analysis section below.  
Directive 97/35 introduced Annex III to the Deliberate Release Directive301 which 
established the first compulsory labelling requirements and applied to foods produced 
from or containing GMOs listed under Directive 90/220.  Additionally, Directive 97/35 
prescribed a number of notification requirements for the placing on the market of a 
GMO including the requirement that the company responsible must inter alia supply 
labelling proposals that indicate:  
‘…that the product contains, or consists of genetically modified organisms.  In the case 
of products to be placed on the market in mixtures with non-genetically modified 
organisms, information on the possibility that the genetically modified organisms may 
be present, is sufficient’.302  
The Novel Foods Regulation further tightened up the GM regulation.  This legislation 
applied to six categories of novel foods, including foods which contain or consist of 
GMOs.  A GMO is defined in accordance with the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive 
as: 
‘an organism with the exception of human beings, in which the genetic material has 
been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural 
recombination’.303 
A second category is specified as foods and food ingredients produced from, but not 
containing GMOs.  The Novel Foods Regulation introduced a system of assessment and 
authorisation procedures for novel foods.  The Novel Foods Regulation is significant in 
that through the introduction of new labelling requirements, it enabled the large-scale 
entry of GM foods into the European market.  
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The Novel Foods Regulation does not apply to food additives, flavourings and 
extraction solvents.  A number of regulatory developments ensued in an attempt to close 
regulatory holes such as the problem of the products which were authorised for market 
prior to the Novel Foods Regulation.  Regulation 1913/97 tidied up this lacuna and 
applied an exemption to Monsanto’s ‘Round-up Ready’ Soya and Novartis BT 
Maize.304  However, this Regulation was repealed in 1998 by Regulation 1139/98305 
which applied the labelling requirements set out in the Novel Food Regulation to foods 
containing GM soya and maize.  The impact of these regulations upon public opinion is 
nebulous in part because the supermarkets took it upon themselves to respond to the 
public mood in a number of ways.  Even before the regulatory developments of 1997, a 
number of UK supermarkets established voluntary labelling codes. 306  In doing so the 
supermarkets argued that this was a result of public demand which had been identified 
in a survey of consumers.307   
It is noteworthy that there are a large number of exemptions to the scope of the 1997 
regulations and in 1997 a number of GM foods had been formally permitted for use in 
the food processing industry in the UK.  These include: GM soya, maize, products made 
with a GMO enzyme (such as chymosin which is used widely to make vegetarian 
cheese), and tomato paste.  Consumers were able to exert power with the aid of the 
labelling mechanism and this led supermarkets and the food processing industry to 
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source non-GM ingredients.  Barling argues that ‘in effect, a private system of market-
led regulation appeared.308   
The story of Zeneca Plant Science’s tomato paste, the first GM product to receive 
authorisation for sale on both sides of the Atlantic, illustrates the food industry’s 
changing perspective on GM foods during the 1990s. At the end of 1996 this tomato 
paste, a pioneer of GM produce, arrived on the shelves of UK supermarkets.  However, 
by the end of the decade the product had been withdrawn due solely to consumer 
protest.  Sainsbury’s initially attributed the lack of consumer backlash to the product to 
the clarity of the labelling.  Sainsbury’s stated:  
‘Sainsbury’s are able to clearly label the genetically modified tomato puree only 
because we worked in partnership with the grower and planned for segregation and 
appropriate labelling.  This is the exact opposite to the way in which the genetically 
modified commodity crops are being introduced to the market and why consumer 
acceptance of these products is markedly lower’.309 
The picture had changed dramatically by the end of the decade when the following 
statement was issued by Sainsbury’s: 
‘In response to overwhelming customer concern, Sainsbury’s has eliminated genetically 
modified ingredients from all own brand products.  This was a considerable task, 
involving over 10,000 products and was achieved by replacing soya and maize 
ingredients with alternatives or by using guaranteed non-GM sources’.310 
The level of consumer opposition is evidenced by the introduction by Sainsbury’s of a 
customer helpline solely for calls relating to GM products.  Astoundingly, this received 
approximately 300 calls in the first four hours of opening.311  The tomato paste case is 
clear evidence of the influence of public attitudes over commercial development.   
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5.3.1 The Regulators 
Figure 7: The regulators of GM foods 
Regulatory Activity  GM Foods 
Public Regulation of the Public 
Sector 
 
European  European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
 
The European Commission, DG Health & Consumer Protection 
(SANCO) 
 
Central Government 
 
Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) 
Statutory Bodies Food Standards Authority (FSA) 
Non-statutory advisory 
organisations/committees  
Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP) 
  
Private Regulation of the Public 
Sector 
 
Industry Producers, Manufacturers & Retailers 
Self-regulation Retailers 
Oversight by interest groups312  Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth (FoE)  
 
Consumer Organisations  
 
As discussed, the role played by retailers in this sector has been very important. The 
acts of self-regulation by the retailers prior to the moratorium related to the removal of 
GM produce from their stores are very significant.  In terms of the thermostatic control 
model, it is argued that this demonstrated a higher and speedier level of responsiveness 
to public opinion than shown by the regulatory agencies. Indeed this is in keeping with 
Scott’s thoughts on ‘co-regulation’ where actions of the private sector stimulate public 
involvement and I contend that the actions of the retailers increased the pressure on the 
regulators and politicians on this issue bringing about the moratorium on GM.313  
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5.3.2 Phase 1 of the Regulation of GM foods: (1997 – 2003) 
‘Through the vehicle of regulation, states provide assurance that the risks of new 
technologies can be contained in manageable bounds’.314 
It is all too clear that despite the introduction of the first labelling regulations in 1997 
the public were not placated and these regulations did not prevent a huge public outcry 
against GM food in the late 1990s.  It is argued here that while the politicians and 
regulators were slow to respond to the public mood of the late 1990s, public opinion in 
the form of consumer demand conferred a significant level of leverage and influence 
over the supermarkets.  This in turn has had ramifications further down the supply chain 
and upon the biotech industry at large.  There is no doubt that the public have played an 
enormous role in the regulation of these novel GM foods.  It is due to the shortcomings 
of the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation that six nations (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy and Luxembourg) decided to instigate a moratorium on GM food. These 
Member States declared that they had acted in response to consumer concern.  Friant-
Perrot argues that the Novel Foods Regulation ‘did not adequately assure that foodstuffs 
are free from risk or guarantee to the consumer either a sufficiently robust regime in 
terms of traceability or sufficient level of information’.315  The consequence of this is 
that in June 1999, the Council of Ministers declared a de facto moratorium upon further 
approvals of GM products.  This meant that consideration of all new applications for 
GM food products and crops were suspended.  The moratorium ran from June 1999 
until August 2003.316  Surprisingly, promoters of the biotech industry also backed the 
move in the hope that a more codified system would emerge from such a development.   
In 2000, two Regulations were issued in an attempt to remove a few of the caveats 
inherent in the earlier legislation: The Animal Feed Regulation and the Labelling 
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Regulation.  The Labelling Regulation 49/2000317, which extends the labelling 
requirements by requiring catering establishments to label their produce, introduced a 
single authorisation procedure and additionally introduced the adventitious threshold 
concept.  This is a de minimis threshold level, originally set at 1 per cent, for the 
accidental or adventitious content of DNA or proteins resulting from the genetic 
modification of food.  The intention of this provision is that it would lead to a more 
transparent self-auditing system across the supply chain.  Regulation 50/2000318 also 
closes the loophole relating to the labelling of foods containing or produced from GM 
additives and flavourings.  This first phase of the labelling period closes with Directive 
2001/18, the new Deliberate Release Directive.319  This Directive establishes a new 
regime for the marketing of GM foods, including minimum labelling requirements.  
These include a statement to be placed on the product that reads: ‘this product contains 
genetically modified organisms’.320  An exemption applies to products with levels of 
GM below the adventitious threshold.  The Directive imposes a clear duty upon the 
producer to specify a product as being or containing GMOs.321  The Directive also 
enables the consumer to access additional product information pertaining to the genetic 
modification from a public register.322  The most significant aspect of Directive 2001/18 
is that it lays the ground for further regulation in this area paving the way for the 2003 
Regulations introduced in the second phase of labelling of GM foods. 
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5.3.3 Phase 2 of the regulation of GM foods: 2003 – 2011 
The year 2003 is taken as our marker of the new regulatory phase for GM food and the 
harbingers of this change are the introduction of two substantive pieces of legislation: 
Regulation 1830/2003 relating to traceability and labelling of GMOs and the traceability 
of food and feed products produced from GMOs,323 and Regulation 1829/2003 
pertaining to genetically modified food and feed.324   It is argued by Durrant and Legge 
that these Regulations prepared the public for the end of the moratorium.  On the basis 
of such comments it can be inferred that Durant et al believe the 2003 Regulations 
provide the public with some level of reassurance that they are protected from any harm 
posed by GM foods.  Interestingly, Durrant et al posit that the period of the moratorium 
was an important time for the Governments of the Member States to increase public 
trust in their abilities to regulate GM foods.325  This relationship between public opinion 
and strong regulation ties in with Lofstedt’s views which were introduced in Chapter 4, 
Lofstedt contends that the public felt reassured by strict regulation and strong regulatory 
stances.  Despite the volume of regulation prior to 2003, Member States were keen to 
tidy up the GM problem, and the introduction of further regulation was viewed as a 
means to both consolidate the existing regulations and to close lacunae within them.  
The EU chose to introduce these provisions in the form of Regulations to ensure that 
they were applied uniformly across the Member States.326    
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Carson et al argue that the focus of the labelling Regulations places the emphasis on the 
consumer’s right to know rather than any attendant concerns with the safety of the 
products.327  In support of this they point to the shortfalls in the labelling Regulations: 
the unreliability of the traceability and testing methods combined with the exemptions 
to the Regulations.328  Clear evidence that the regulators wished to respond to public 
opinion is found in the preamble to the Food and Feed Directive 1829/2003, which 
states that: 
‘Clear labelling, irrespective of the detectability of DNA or protein resulting from the 
genetic modification in the final product, meets the demands expressed in numerous 
surveys by a large majority of consumers, facilitates consumer choice and precludes 
potential misleading of consumers as regards methods of manufacture or production.’ 
(emphasis added)329 
It is of particular note that mention is made of the survey data and this promotes the 
argument that this is both the principal source of public opinion data referred to by 
regulators and the one they view as ‘public opinion’.  All foods within the scope of the 
2003 Regulations must be labelled appropriately, regardless of whether they are pre-
packaged.  The most common examples of label content are ‘produced from genetically 
modified (name of the ingredient)’ or ‘genetically modified’.330  The exemption to foods 
made with the aid of GMOs, remains however, and Carson et al ask whether consumers 
understand the distinction between food ‘from GMOs’ and food ‘made with GMOs’.331   
What is not clear from the Regulation is whether the consumer surveys mentioned 
showed high levels of public opposition to GM foods or a definitive call from the public 
for the labelling of GM food.  This is an important distinction as there is no consensus 
about whether the labelling mechanism is the appropriate legal form with which to 
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placate the public.  Suggested alternatives to the current system include a negative 
labelling process in which the GM-free foods are the products subject to labelling.332  
The 2003 Regulations introduced a new dimension to GM food labelling in that even if 
the GM content is undetectable in the final product, there is a duty upon suppliers to 
declare that it contains GM.   This extends the scope of the regulation to include 
processed foods.  The exemption to the labelling of animal products reared on GM food 
remains, although within the Regulation is the preparatory work for more stringent 
requirements.  Regulation 1829/2003 obliges suppliers of animal feed to declare by 
labelling whether the produce contains GM, which is the first stage in increased 
transparency across the food supply chain.   
The Food and Feed Regulation abandons the notification procedure for novel foods 
considered substantially equivalent to existing foods and also it extends to feed 
produced from GMOs which had not previously been subject to an authorisation 
procedure.  Within the authorisation of GM products there is an opportunity for 
members of the public to give their views on individual products which are under 
consideration for EU approval.  An open consultation is established once the EFSA 
have produced an opinion on a GM product application.  The opinion is made public on 
the European Commission website for thirty days and responses are invited from 
members of the general public which have to be considered by the European 
Commission in consultation with EFSA to determine whether these comments have an 
impact on the final decision.  I have analysed these responses from 2005 to 2010 and the 
majority of the responses are from NGOs.  However, there is not one case where it 
appears that the input from the NGOs has impacted the authorisation process, as all the 
products to date have been given approval.  A regulator from EFSA agreed in interview 
that due to the very low numbers of responses to this on-line feedback system it was not 
a worthwhile process. 
The enforcement and effectiveness of the traceability Regulations are often criticised as 
it is argued that there are many cases where GM foods are entering the European 
markets and not being detected.  Pertinent to the thesis is whether there is any public 
awareness of such events.  NGOs argue that GM foods are regularly entering the EU 
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undetected.  It has become the role of the NGOs to publicise the failings of the IRAs 
and take on the role of a watchdog.333  Thus while the public may gain a level of 
reassurance from the knowledge that regulation exists which authorises foods in the 
shops, it  seems that this can be misplaced trust if that system does not function as 
effectively as expected.  It can be argued that the regulation and the regulatory structure 
have the capacity to engender public trust regardless of the effectiveness of the 
regulations in practice.  However I contend that the labels are misleading to consumers, 
and while a consumer can avoid those products with labels, it is questionable whether 
the consumer is aware that there are GMOs in the unlabelled products.  Exemptions to 
the mandatory labelling requirements apply inter alia to a variety of biotech products, 
such as enzymes, vitamins and amino acids, which occur in a wide range of products 
including beer and processed cheese.  It was estimated that at the end of the last century, 
approximately 60 per cent of foodstuffs on sale in Europe contained GM soya 
derivatives but were not labelled as such.334  
 
5.4 The Public Opinion of GM Foods 
The analysis of public opinion in both this chapter and the prenatal and PGD Chapter is 
framed by the five understandings of public opinion which were discussed in Chapter 2.  
The table below sets out the public opinion data relating to GM foods which is reviewed 
in this chapter and attempts to classify them by the five understandings of public 
opinion.  However, it is evident that the choice of one understanding instead of another 
is not always clear. For instance, the understanding that public opinion is the majority 
view could be held to be true in the late 1990s yet is arguably not the case now.  
Equally, survey data, while it is a measure of the aggregation of individual opinions, 
may identify a majority view.  Finally, in the light of the complex shifting of public 
opinion data in the thesis and arguments about the representativeness of the data used in 
the regulatory process, the view that public opinion is a fiction may retain a certain 
appeal.  The table is therefore posited here as a discursive tool only.    
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Figure 8: The five principal understandings of public opinion 
Understanding of Public 
Opinion 
Measure of Public Opinion Examples: Use of Formal 
Channels or Informal Means 
Public opinion is the aggregation 
of individual opinions 
The British Social Attitudes 
Survey (BSA), Eurobarometer 
and the Food Standard Agencies’ 
Consumer Attitude Survey 
(CAS) 
Formal channel 
Public opinion is the majority 
view 
  
Public opinion is the result of the 
channelling of the public voice 
by interest groups 
Discussion relating to GM 
Nation? Debate  
Informal means – protests 
Formal channels – EFSA on-line 
feedback to authorisation of GM 
products 
Formal –asked to join a 
consultation exercise as a 
stakeholder 
Public opinion is a construct 
created by elite groups and the 
media 
Media – Lexis Counts of pro & 
anti GM stories 
Regulators 
Scientists 
 
Public opinion is a fiction as it is 
simply a construct. 
  
 
Survey data may or may not be picked up by the formal policy and regulatory channels. 
Additionally, it is argued by Mayer and Stirling that scientists do not look at the public 
opinion data either. They argue that: 
‘A large body of research on public attitudes and perceptions has direct relevance to 
these questions [relating to the rationality of the public’s attitude towards GM].  
Unfortunately, scientists who comment on the GM debate often ignore this’.335 
The review of the public opinion data mirrors the two time-periods for the regulation as 
a means to view more clearly whether the change in regulatory style and the ending of 
the moratorium has had an impact on public opinion.   
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The first measure of public opinion reflects the most commonly used understanding of 
public opinion, the aggregation of individual opinions, and can be measured by survey 
data.  As already outlined in the methodology in chapter 1, the principal sources of 
public opinion data under review are the BSA survey which included questions in the 
years 1999 and 2003 and the Eurobarometer covering seven surveys in the year: 1991, 
1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005 and 2010.  Critical to the study of interaction between 
regulation and public opinion is the issue of whether the data analysed is indicative and 
correlates with the public mood as measured or picked up by the regulators.  Of 
additional interest is whether the survey data reviewed here was known by the 
regulators, and indeed the Eurobarometer was known to all the regulators interviewed 
here.  In fact an official at Defra mentioned Eurobarometer in relation to public opinion. 
He stated that: 
 ‘GM is certainly not as hot as it was in certain polls such as Eurobarometer and they do 
seem to suggest that for most people it is not a big issue in the public’s mind or media’s 
mind as it was ten-twelve years ago but over the last few years it has increased…’ 
5.4.1 Public opinion of GM foods: Phase One: 1999- 2003 
‘We did the first ever public attitudes to GM survey in the 1980s for the DTI 
[Department of Trade and Industry] and we found everything that has been found in 
subsequent surveys – you know – the public don’t know much about GM, they might 
like it if there was something in it for them, they wanted to be sure it would be well 
regulated, they didn’t think it would be well regulated. If they wanted more information 
about GM they would go to NGOs and wouldn’t go to Government Agencies’ (Tait 
2011 interviewed for this thesis). 
 These comments made by Joyce Tait give the impression that public opinion on GM 
has been very stable over the last three decades.  While in general terms, one can agree 
with Tait’s statement, the public opinion data does show a variation across the years 
studied here.  The survey data for the years 1999-2003 demonstrates high levels of 
opposition to GM foods and additionally the responses are highly polarised.  
Throughout the 1990s, Eurobarometer data highlights a significant and growing level of 
opposition towards GM foods across the EU Member States which peaks in 1999.  1999 
is notable for a very significant growth in public opposition towards biotechnologies.  
This trend is picked up by the BSA survey data on GM foods.  The Eurobarometer data 
shows a shift in attitude from 1999 with the levels of opposition to GM foods and 
biotechnologies generally decreasing until 2002.  In the same period, the data reflects a 
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moderate rise in levels of support for GM foods and other biotechnologies.336  This is 
mirrored by the BSA surveys of 1999 and 2003 which reflect the same trend in the UK.  
In the late 1990s the public responded strongly to the introduction of GM food imports 
into the EU and the appearance of such products on supermarket shelves.  It should be 
remembered that the late 1990s saw a number of very successful civil protests, such as 
the destruction of GM crop trials in the UK. The radicalisation of NGOs around the 
issue was very clearly responded to by regulators and politicians and this is portrayed 
nicely by Tony Blair’s radical shift on the subject which was highlighted by the 
Independent on Sunday in February 2000 when Blair wrote a piece on GM foods in the 
paper.  The Independent on Sunday identified the comments Blair had made a year 
earlier when he stated that ‘GM foods are safe’ and that he happily ate GM foods. He 
referred to the ‘tyranny of the pressure groups’ for questioning the promotion of GM by 
his Government.337  In the following year, in a volte face position, Blair talked instead 
of the ‘Government’s determination to have as informed and balanced a debate as 
possible on GM and commented on the ‘potential harm’ of GM foods.338  The Director 
of Friends of the Earth stated that ‘for the first time, Mr Blair seems to be listening to 
the people on these issues’.339 The summer of 1999 was a time of heated debate on GM 
and crop destruction in the UK by Eco-Warriors.  This was compounded by the actions 
of Sainsbury’s who removed all GM foods from its stores and the decision by the Local 
Government Authority to prohibit GM ingredients in school meals.  
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Returning to the five understandings of public opinion, the NGO activities in the late 
1990s correspond to the third understanding of public opinion where public opinion is 
not deemed to be what individuals think but the reflection of these views as they are 
‘cultivated, crystallised and eventually communicated by interest groups’.340  Glynn et 
al argue that people who adhere to this version of public opinion do not deny that there 
are individual opinions but suggest that it is when they become represented by NGOs 
that they gain some political force and are more likely to be heard by the regulators.341  
In terms of the GM protests which began in Europe in 1995 and 1996, Imig and Tarrow 
contend that the issue of GM attracted such high levels of attention because of an 
‘unusual number of dimensions’.  These include the fact that ‘the issue was unknown 
and full of potential risks yet potential promise; there was an identifiable villain –  vast 
multinational corporations’.342  Additionally and very pertinent in the UK is that the 
GM controversy arose in a political environment ripe with public anxieties over food 
following the BSE scandal. 
1999 is a critical point in terms of analysis of the role of public opinion on regulatory 
decision-making relating to GM foods.  The regulators made a clear and very strong 
response to the public outcry, and 1999 marks the beginning of the de facto moratorium 
on cultivation and selling of GM foods across the EU which Durrant and Legge argue 
gave the Member States the chance to rebuild citizen trust in Government in relation to 
this issue.343  In 1999 the BSA survey data reflects this with very low levels of trust in 
the UK Government’s ability to regulate on biotechnology.344   
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The BSA survey data for 1999 highlights strongly polarised views in relation to whether 
GM foods in the shops are safe to eat.  At this time, as discussed above, labelling 
regulations came into force in the UK.  With regard to the survey statement ‘GM foods 
in the shops are safe to eat’ thirty five per cent of the people surveyed agreed that this 
was definitely or probably the case in 1999 rising to forty eight per cent stated in 2003.  
This attitude measure is significant in terms of its basis in a level of trust in regulation, 
because by agreeing with the statement, an individual implicitly acknowledges his/her 
trust in the regulatory processes relating to the assessment and authorisation of GM 
foods.   Combined with the low levels of public trust in GM foods, the BSA survey data 
for 1999 revealed evidence of strong opposition to the introduction of GM foods on to 
the UK market.  In 1999, 51.8 per cent of the BSA survey respondents supported an 
outright ban of GM foods even if this entailed knock-on effects on food prices, with 
22.1 per cent undecided and 19.4 per cent in disagreement with the statement.   
Figure 9: GM foods in the shops are safe to eat  
(1999)
Definitely
Probably 
Probably not
Definitely not 
Can't choose 
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The ‘natural/ unnatural’ discourse which surrounds GM foods was examined in the 
survey with 63.1 per cent of respondents in agreement with the statement that ‘we 
should never interfere with the genes of plants and animals’.345  This is a strong 
indicator of the pre-existing attitude to biotechnologies.  Further results from the BSA 
survey are equally reflective of strong opposition to GM foods at this time. 
The ‘don’t know’ response in a survey is significant as an indicator of people’s 
confidence in their knowledge on a subject and whether they feel they can have a view 
based on this knowledge.  In the Eurobarometer report of 2010, one fifth of those 
questioned answered that they ‘don’t know’ whether biotechnology and genetic 
engineering will improve their way of life or not.  This figure has remained pretty stable 
since 1999.346  A further noteworthy point is that the survey findings showed that people 
made application-specific judgements and did not hold an overarching opinion on 
biotechnologies.  The report found that in 2002 the majority of Europeans do not 
support GM foods.  Gaskell et al summarise the Eurobarometer 2002 data findings by 
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Figure 10: GM foods should be banned (1999) 
Agree strongly
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Disagree
Disagree strongly
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stating that the majority of Europeans believe that GM foods are ‘judged not to be 
useful and to be risky for society’.347   
5.4.2 Public opinion of GM foods: Phase 2: 2003 – 2010 
The BSA survey of 2003 contains a statement in relation to the labelling of GM foods 
which is very apposite here: ‘it is important to me to check whether or not foods contain 
genetically modified ingredients’.  This attitude statement produced some interesting 
results, with 44% of those surveyed stating that they strongly agreed or agreed that this 
is important compared to 17% who strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement.  
Yet a significant proportion of the people surveyed, 28 per cent, held no view on the 
matter.  This high proportion of undecided people is a trend reflected in further GM 
food questions from the 2003 BSA data.   
 
In stark contrast to the statistics in 1999 when 23 per cent of those surveyed disagreed 
strongly with the assertion that ‘on balance, the advantages of GM foods outweigh any 
dangers’, the 2003 figure for this is only 8 per cent of respondents.  Additionally, in 
1999 those in favour of banning GM foods accounted for 51 per cent of the people 
surveyed and yet by 2003 this had reduced to 29 per cent.348  The data findings show 
very clearly that public opposition to GM foods has reduced dramatically in the years 
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Figure 11: Carries out check to establish whether  
food contains GM ingredients (2003)
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Agree (32%)
Neither agree/disagree
(28%) 
Disagree (15%)
Disagree strongly (2%)
Can't choose (10%) 
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from 1999 to 2003.  An interesting finding relates to the levels of ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’ response given in the BSA survey.  For instance in figure 12, in answer to the 
statement ‘in order to compete with the rest of the world, Britain should grow GM 
foods’, the levels have increased by 12 percent.  This trend is also shown in the results 
to the statement: ‘GM foods should be banned even if food prices suffer as a result’, 
where there was an increase of 11 per cent.  The statement ‘On balance, the advantages 
of GM foods outweigh any dangers’ produced an increase of 14 per cent in the ‘neither 
agree nor disagree’ responses.  This finding I argue is in line with Gaskell et al’s 
contention that people are becoming more ambivalent about GM.  Gaskell et all 
reviewed Eurobarometer data in 2002 at the time just before the moratorium was to be 
lifted and while at this point the Eurobarometer showed lower levels of opposition to 
GM than had been evident in the 1990s, yet the data shows a 50/50 split on GM and this 
Gaskell el al attribute to ambivalence over the issue.349  The increase in numbers of 
neither agree/disagree’ could however be a result of higher levels of public uncertainty 
and confusion. 
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Figure 12: In order to compete with the rest of the world, Britain should grow GM 
foods
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The BSA survey data shows that in 1999, 36 per cent of people surveyed thought that 
the GM foods available in the shops were safe to eat.  In 2003, this figure had risen to 
46.6 per cent, a marked increase which reflects heightened trust in the regulations 
relating to authorisation and approval of GM foods.  
Figure 13: GM foods should be banned, even if food prices suffer as a result 
Agree   strongly 20 8 
Agree 31 21 
Neither agree/disagree 22 33 
Disagree 14 22 
Disagree strongly 5 3 
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Figure 14: On balance, the advantages of GM foods outweigh any dangers 
Agree   strongly 2 1 
Agree 10 13 
Neither agree/disagree 23 37 
Disagree 33 24 
Disagree strongly 23 8 
 
The Eurobarometer data offers an insight into public attitudes in the EU and UK beyond 
2003 and identifies a post 2003 shift in attitude.  Furthermore, the Eurobarometer data 
highlights decreasing levels of support in the UK and increased opposition to GM foods 
across the EU. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer has not covered levels of opposition to 
GM foods in the same format since 2005, so while this data is useful it is a noticeable 
limitation of the Eurobarometer survey that it has failed to incorporate consistent 
questions across the years. 
 
Figure 15 shows the trend in opposition to GM foods over time.  Using the BSA data 
from 1999 and 2003, it can be seen that the UK has kept in step with the mean for the 
Member States up to 2003.  The graph below highlights levels of support for 
biotechnology and more specifically GM foods in the UK. The principal point of note is 
that both measures show very labile levels of support; the levels of support for GM 
foods are considerably more erratic and unstable across the time frame shown.   
 
Figure 15: Level of Opposition to GM Foods in the EU  
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Figure 16: Support for biotechnology and GM food in the UK 
 
Interestingly, the Eurobarometer data from the 2010 survey shows that the UK had the 
highest levels of support for GM food across the 27 countries surveyed, yet when the 
survey respondents were asked to respond to ten statements on GM food this support is 
not as clear cut.  This is a critical point in relation to survey data; one should not just 
respond to the headline data. Analysis of the results from the additional survey 
statements show inconsistencies but generally the results were approximately two fifths 
pro and two fifths anti-GM with one fifth responding as ‘don’t knows’.  For example, 
46% agree that ‘GM food is good for the UK economy’ and 36% disagree, yet when 
asked to respond to the statement that ‘GM food is not good for you and your family’, 
40% agree and 39% disagree.  A startling result is that 59% agreed with the statement 
that ‘GM food helps people in developing countries’ but equally 55% agree that ‘GM 
food benefits some people but puts others at risk’.  These results are surprising in that 
they seem to suggest a view that GM food is acceptable for other people to eat but not 
for the UK public.  The survey shows that people still hold that GM food is ‘unnatural’, 
since 65% felt this to be true, and 49% agreed that GM food made them feel ‘uneasy’.  
The correlation in the data between awareness of GM food and an anti-GM food 
opinion is interesting.  Across the 27 countries participating, those who were aware of 
GM foods were more likely to disagree with the statement that GM food is good for 
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their nation’s economy (53%), than those who were not aware of GM foods, where 37% 
disagreed.350   
It is common to discuss levels of familiarisation with technologies in relation to support 
or opposition to them. It is often held that increased familiarity with a new technology 
can overcome resistance and lead to the assimilation of the new technology into daily 
life.  This does not appear to have happened in the UK in relation to GM foods where 
the pattern is much more erratic.  Since the end of the EU moratorium there has been a 
visible decrease in support for GM foods.  Across the EU, the new member states show 
the least public support for GM foods.  The markets of these states have been less 
tightly regulated than the EU in terms of authorization, approval and labelling of GM 
products.  This may indicate that the regulation has some influence over attitudes, as 
nations such as Latvia, Estonia and Slovenia were not subject to this type of regime 
prior to entry to the EU.  However, the Czech Republic which had quite stringent 
labelling regulations before accession to the EU demonstrates the highest levels of 
support for GM foods across the whole EU and there are a high number of GM products 
available in the shops.351  Eurobarometer data shows, however, that compared to other 
biotechnologies, the public is most familiar with GM foods, yet are also most opposed 
to the technology, refuting the familiarisation narrative.  The data shows that 80 per cent 
of respondents are familiar with GM foods, 45 per cent with gene therapy, 44 per cent 
with nanotechnology and 27 per cent with pharmacogenetics.352   
A useful heuristic is to stratify the public opinion data into those in opposition, those in 
support and those who are undecided about GM foods.  In terms of constructing 
narratives around these publics, I would like to stress that the narratives are not in 
competition with each other but mutually coexist.  Three narratives are evident: the idea 
that labelling leads to the entrenchment of opposition; the concept of increased support 
for GM foods through familiarisation; and the suggestion that increased knowledge 
leads to increased uncertainty.  While it is established that two of these are visible in the 
data, it is evident that familiarisation with GM foods is not leading to increased support.  
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In line with the deficit model, it is often assumed that those more informed will be the 
more enthusiastic supporters of new technologies.  This is premised by the concept that 
science is rational and informed by ‘fact and reason’ rather than by uninformed opinion 
based on emotion.353  However, it is important to differentiate between attentiveness 
and knowledge; perhaps surprisingly, the relationship between attentiveness and attitude 
does not hold for GM foods.  The research conducted within the remit of the BSA 
survey finds that those people who are most attentive to GM foods are least likely to 
support the development of them.354  This runs counter to the relationship found in the 
same survey for human genetic technologies.  The BSA survey found additionally that 
in relation to GM foods, those who are more attentive are less trusting of the regulators 
of modern genomics.355   
With reference to the levels of opposition to GM foods seen in figure 15, it is surprising 
that the 2005 rate of opposition is higher than the 1999 rate.  This supports the 
entrenchment or deliberative model which I offer as an explanatory narrative.  This 
narrative works on the premise that the regulation and attitudes are working together in 
a responsive, deliberative manner.  Deliberative mechanisms are beacons of recent 
regulatory trends to increase proceduralisation of the law.  Proceduralisation carries 
moral caché, in that it is subsumed within wider laudable motives such as increasing 
democratic accountability and transparency. Deliberative democracy refers to the 
concept that ‘legitimate lawmaking issues from the public deliberation of citizens’.356   
In relation to one sector of the public, those opposed to GM foods, Figure 17 attempts to 
explain why the negative attitude remains entrenched by postulating a closed 
deliberative circle.  I developed this model in response to the data I analysed in this 
thesis.  At the outset there was a public outcry against GM foods which was noted by 
policy makers.  The regulatory response was to remedy the situation by implementing a 
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deliberative tool: the labelling mechanism.  This mechanism provides the consumer 
with information, but the label reinforces the common narratives of nature and natural/ 
unnatural discourses and the associated idea that GM is different, that it is something 
that deviates from the norm and that non-GM is superior.  The consumer reacts on the 
basis of the information provided by the label, and their consumer habits influence the 
nature of the products available on the market with ramifications across the supply 
chain.  This leads to entrenchment of the labelling process and to tightening up of the 
regulatory mechanisms which underpin it.  In effect the regulatory process has enabled 
the legitimisation of public opposition to GM foods.  Regulation has an influence upon 
attitudes but not in such a way as to allay concerns.   
Figure 17: Opposition to GM foods as a deliberative circle (entrenchment model) 
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It has already been suggested that the high levels of regulatory activity themselves may 
have been one reason for the public feeling that GM foods are not safe.  In line with 
such an argument is Watson’s comment made in 1977 on the regulation of GMOs. He 
suggested that rather than alleviating public concern, the precautionary approach has 
had the response of ‘If it’s as safe as you say, why do we need all these precautions?’357 
The BSA survey data shows a rise from 1999 to 2003 in the numbers of respondents 
who are undecided about where they stand on the issue of GM foods. In the case of 
whether the advantages of GM foods outweigh the disadvantages, the ‘don’t knows’ 
figure rose from 23 per cent of respondents in 1999 to 37 per cent in 2003.  
Interestingly, it has been shown that the higher levels of genetic literacy have increased 
the polarisation of the views of the public towards GM foods and as such a more 
divided public.  On the one hand there are the ambivalent section and on the other the 
group who have quite strong anti-GM views.  Research conducted by Durrant and 
Legge found that respondents with greater knowledge are less able to come to a decision 
on GM foods.358  This is particularly interesting in light of the findings on those 
numbers who ‘neither agree/disagree’ as combined with the increased ‘don’t knows’ 
this is demonstrating an increase in respondents who do not wish to commit themselves 
on the issue. 
Turning to information content, in 2003, 44 per cent of people surveyed incorrectly 
answered the following true/false statement in the BSA survey genetics quiz:  ‘Ordinary 
tomatoes do not contain genes, while genetically modified tomatoes do’.359  Much has 
been made of this statistic but is it really that significant?  Also part of the quiz was the 
statement that: ‘By eating a genetically modified fruit, a person’s genes could also 
become modified’ to which 57.3 per cent correctly answered that this was false.   
A very significant filter in the case of GM foods is that they were introduced to the 
public in the wake of the BSE crisis.  As a result of that episode the public climate 
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became highly charged on the subject of food; this was not a neutral climate into which 
a new technology could be introduced.  It is argued therefore that the appearance in the 
media of headlines referring to ‘Frankenstein foods’ served to ossify the opinions of the 
public as consumers, rather than strongly influencing them.  In this second phase of the 
regulations, from 2002 to 2005, findings from the Eurobarometer data indicate 
decreased support and increased opposition to GM foods amongst the undecided sectors 
of the public.   
Research conducted by the Institute of Grocery Distribution (IGD) suggests that 
consumer decisions about food and shopping are ‘unashamedly selfish’, based on value 
for money, health concerns, taste, appearance and convenience, rather than being driven 
by altruistic motivations such as animal welfare and care for the environment (IGD, 
2002a). This finding is endorsed by FSA research which also highlights price, 
convenience and value as the three primary issues for consumers when shopping for 
food, as well as keeping within the family budget, satisfying children’s demands, and 
getting the family to eat a balanced diet (FSA, 2000).  In 2004, Sainsbury’s introduced 
non-GM milk which they argued was in response to demands from customers.  It was 
replaced in 2006 by ‘Farm Promise’ milk which is milk from farms which are in the 
process of becoming organic. Most pertinent is that while this milk is also non-GM, 
whereas the former milk had a ‘hard to miss’, non-GM label this does not.  Such a move 
suggests that there was no real market for a premium costing milk (the non-GM milk 
cost 10% over the conventional milk).  Further to this Sainsbury’s state that ‘several 
scientific studies by well-respected organisations have found no GM material in milk 
samples from cows fed on a GM diet’. Such comments raise the question: why did they 
market the product in the first place if this was their view? 
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5.5 The interaction between public opinion and the regulation of GM foods 
Prior to the EU moratorium on GM products, the purpose of regulation was as a means 
to facilitate the sale of GM products and thus was related to the assessment and 
authorisation processes for GM products.  Earlier in the 1990s, there were few warnings 
that there would be such vociferous and determined public opposition to GM foods.  
The public outcry was enough to dramatically alter the direction of the regulation.  The 
regulators had no option but to respond to the high levels of public opposition and the 
response came in the form of the EU moratorium on GM foods.  Once the moratorium 
came to an end however the demands of the biotech industry were tentatively embraced 
and the balancing of the regulation’s dual demands shifted.  The labelling regulations 
were deemed to be the means to enable the technologies to progress while also 
appeasing public concern.  This to some extent explains the deliberate pragmatism and 
flexibility inherent in the regulations, illustrated by the exemptions to the scope of the 
regulation and the adventitious threshold levels. 
The 2003 Regulations were viewed as a means of smoothing the end of the moratorium.   
These regulations are undoubtedly more codified and increase transparency across the 
supply chain.  However, enforcement and traceability issues mean that they lack the 
underpinnings to work effectively.  Exemptions include foods made with GMOs, GM 
animal feed and the adventitious threshold level.  Importantly, Gaskell et al suggest 
that the de facto moratorium is being perpetuated to some extent by the supermarkets 
themselves in response to consumer preferences.360  The introduction of the 2003 
Regulations led to less fuzzy levels of consumer autonomy.  It remains the case, 
however, that consumers are not aware of the exemptions to and derogations from the 
labelling regime, and as such they are not in full possession of the knowledge necessary 
to make an informed choice in the supermarkets.   
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5.6 Public Opinion is Media Opinion 
‘Some see the public as a victim of misleading information from non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) or newspapers that are seeking to increase their circulation 
numbers’.361 
In terms of the influence of the media upon public attitude, Frewer, Miles and Marsh 
argue that ‘at least some demographic groups have become more convinced of the 
negative aspects of genetically modified foods’.362 It is important to test whether most 
commentators would argue that generally public attitudes reflect the pattern of press 
coverage.  Bodiguel and Cardwell argue that: 
‘the heat of the debate has arguably been raised by the high media profile of GMOs.  
Again in the United Kingdom, the generally negative attitudes of journalists have 
incurred the criticism of the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, who had little 
sympathy with the Daily Mail for its use of such charged language as ‘Frankenfoods’ or 
with John Humphrys or the BBC Today programme for his pro-organic stance.’363 
While Tait supports the argument that the media predominantly take an anti-GM stance, 
she presents a different slant in that she contends that there is a high level of opposition 
to any publications or reports which are neutral towards or pro-GM. Tait argues that this 
‘attack’ on publications comes from public-interest groups and persists despite the 
controversy being at its most virulent between 1998-2002.  Further to this Tait points to 
the large volume of web-based anti-GM information which she claims is reported 
‘relatively uncritically in the media’.364  Interestingly and in contrast to this, Waltz 
writes in Nature that the publications of scientists which are deemed to be anti-GM are 
openly attacked by other scientists.365 
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In order to gain some idea of the level of media coverage relating to GM foods, I 
conducted a series of LexisNexis searches.  In some years there was such a high volume 
of stories relating to GM foods returned that Nexis would not return a specific figure 
and in these cases the counts were conducted on a month by month basis and the total 
accounted.  The counts were made for the term ‘GM food’ and ‘GM’.  The count for 
‘GM’ is shown graph number 18. The period covered was from January 1996 to 
December 2010 and searches and represents UK newspapers both tabloids and 
broadsheets.   
Figure 18: Media count for the term ‘GM’ in UK newspapers 
 
Augoustinos et al argue that in 2004, public confidence and trust in the Government to 
act within their wishes is portrayed by the media as being very low.366  The Daily Mail 
was a particularly vociferous critic of the Government’s stance on GM.  On 20 February 
2004 it produced its infamous headline: ‘If you ever had any doubts about 
FRANKENSTEIN FOODS read this litany of deceit, cynicism and manipulation’.  This 
article produced a chronological list of 40 significant events, findings and decisions 
relating to GM foods from April 1997 to January 2004 and reported that the Economic 
and Social Research Council stated that ‘no scientific evidence exists to support the 
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growing of GM crops in the UK’. 367  In terms of the enormous volume of newspaper 
coverage in the course of 1999, it would appear that indeed many journalists chose to 
emphasise and accentuate the risks rather than to reassure their readership.   
Significantly, this peak in media attention corresponds with the peak in opposition to 
GM foods highlighted by the BSA survey of 1999.   
In examining the content of the stories using LexisNexis, of those from February 1999 
when the volume of coverage peaks, the majority relate to plans to grow GM crops in 
the UK and to the Flavr Savr tomato paste fiasco.  Further stories covered the direct 
action initiatives taken by Greenpeace and FoE which was documented in detail by the 
media.  The Guardian stated that ‘sheer confusion has been the GM debate’s defining 
trait’.368  At the time, it is apparent that public anxiety was magnified by the constant 
press attention paid to it.  Concerns range from safety issues to the dominance of global 
corporations such as Monsanto over the food industry. The BSE crisis added to the mix 
in terms of fears over food safety and was a critical factor in the formation of attitudes 
to GM foods, since, as Kasperson notes, ‘publics typically have long memories’.369  
Murdock explains that it is better to view the media coverage of risk; 
 ‘not as a series of discrete responses to bounded events, but as the latest episodes in an 
intersecting series of continuing narratives about chance, choice, science, power, and 
accountability’.370 
The Independent interestingly questions who is in control of the GM regulation: the 
Government or the public.371  Bateson pertinently noted that not a single story published 
in February 1999 was written by a science journalist.372  During this time the term 
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‘Frankenstein foods’ was used repeatedly. However, a study by Cook, Robbins and 
Pieri shows that this term has been utilised more by the proponents than the opponents 
of GM foods.373   
 
The Figure above compiled with data from Eurobarometer and Lexis count for ‘GM 
food’ shows a clear trend between the media coverage and support for GM food for 
1999, where most intense media coverage corresponds with high levels of opposition 
and low levels of support for GM foods.  In the second phase of the labelling regulation, 
the peaks for media coverage are in the months of March and April 2004.  These peaks 
coincide with the lead up to the announcement by Margaret Beckett on the government 
decision to allow commercial planting of GM maize.  The Government would ‘in 
principle’ agree to the commercial cultivation of GM herbicide-tolerant maize, Chardon 
LL by Bayer Cropscience, to be used in cattle feed.  However, on 1 April 2004 Bayer 
withdrew its application to grow GM maize, stating that the restrictions imposed upon it 
by the Government had made it economically unviable.  Also, at this time, a number of 
stories appeared in relation to labelling GM foods as this is the period when the 2003 
regulations were implemented.  However, it appears that in 2005 the media no longer 
considered GM foods newsworthy despite high levels of opposition across Europe and 
the low levels of support in the UK.  Indeed from the graph above it is evident that 
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levels of support were parallel to that of 1999 which presents a mixed message in terms 
of the relationship between reading a paper and opinions surveyed.   
5.6.1 Is there a link between Newspaper Read and Attitude to GM foods?  
This section examines whether there is a correlation between the newspaper read and a 
person’s attitude to GM foods with the view that the media opinion is often deemed to 
be public opinion.  The BSA survey contains data on whether respondents regularly 
read a newspaper and which paper they read.  By cross-referencing the respondents that 
agree or disagree with certain statements on GM food and the newspaper read, some 
very clear patterns emerged.  In the BSA survey 1999, 55% of respondents said they 
read a newspaper more than three times a week. When all survey respondents are taken 
into account, so those who read a paper and those who do not, 65% disagree with the 
statement that GB should grow GM foods.  However, if the respondent reads a 
newspaper regularly, the percentage that disagree with this statement are as follows: the 
Guardian, 88%, the Scotsman/ the Daily Mail 83%, the Independent 42% and the 
Financial Times 25%. 
For the statement ‘GM foods in the shops are safe to eat’, the whole survey response for 
1999 shows that 35% felt that GM foods were definitely or probably safe and 48% felt 
they were probably or definitely not.  This was approximately the same as those 
respondents who read the Daily Mail but only 17.5% of Guardian readers considered 
GM foods in the shops safe to eat.  These findings do show a sharp difference in view in 
relation to newspaper taken.  In 2003, the findings for all respondents whether they read 
a paper or not was 47% thought that GM foods in the shops were definitely or probably 
safe. From those who read a paper regularly, the Mail came in at 37%, the Financial 
Times 60%, the Guardian 45% and the Independent at 50%.  The BSA data gives us a 
very clear impression of the bias of the newspaper on attitudes to GM.  
5.7 Public Opinion Data Collection by the IRAs 
The principal IRAs overseeing the regulation of GM foods in the UK are the Food 
Standards Agency (FSA) and Defra and they have both made significant efforts to 
gauge public opinion.  The most politically symbolic and attention grabbing attempt to 
gauge public opinion in this area was the GM Nation? debate of 2003.  This was an 
ambitious nationwide project which had the purpose of facilitating open public dialogue 
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on the commercialisation of GM crops in the UK.  It involved meetings across the UK 
where both anti and pro-GM information was presented and participants were asked to 
respond to 14 questions on GM.  Unfortunately, high levels of controversy surround the 
findings of the GM nation? debate and it has now been all but rejected as being non-
representative of the public and deemed to have been ‘captured’ by anti-GM interest 
groups.  The GM Nation? debate concluded that the majority view was anti-GM with 
feelings ranging from ‘suspicion to scepticism, to hostility and rejection’.374  Campbell 
and Townsend argue that the data was misrepresentative mainly as the results were 
flawed was a consequence of the self-selection procedure which it is argued attracted 
people who have a strong opinion about GM.375  Very persuasive and strong critiques of 
the GM nation? debate have been produced by inter alia, Campbell and Townsend and 
Horlick-Jones and it is for this reason that this consultation is not analysed in depth in 
the thesis.376  The important issues are that the data was responded to by the regulators 
despite it generally being deemed to be misrepresentative of public opinion.  The GM 
Nation? debate does clearly show the shifting understandings of public opinion as the 
findings were a reflection of the views of interest groups, which is one understanding of 
public opinion, and indeed the views of interest groups were a very vocal and active 
force in the shaping of the regulatory response to GM foods in the late 1990s and first 
few years of the 21st century.  Tait argues that: 
‘The trouble was that the GM dialogue in the UK was used in policy and it was based 
on bad data and everything that was done by the AEBC [the Agriculture and 
Environment Biotechnology Commission] was based on pretty bad science’.377   
Tait goes on to say that the ‘focus group material is hugely open to bias by the people 
conducting it’ which is a common criticism of the focus groups carried out in the GM 
Nation? debate.  Interestingly, Reynolds and Bronislaw discuss whether the GM 
Nation? debate should be measured against a quantitative survey as a means to establish 
the accuracy of its participants.  In their opinion this would mirror the composition of a 
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wider general public.  After toying with this and other potentially rewarding approaches 
such as measuring the GM Nation? debate against a deliberative ideal, Reynolds et al 
dismiss these ideas as abstract and argue that they would ‘obscure other important 
dimensions of the GM Nation? debate.   
The Food Standards Agency has carried out eight Consumer Attitude Surveys (CAS) 
since 2000 and GM is included in each, although a different level of attention is devoted 
to it across the years reflecting its prominence to the public and regulators.  Due to the 
fact that the questions posed were not uniform across the years the data is not easy to 
analyse and there is no method to gauge attitude change over time.  However, the CAS 
data shows that in 2000, 43% of respondents were concerned about GM foods and that 
this had reduced dramatically to 20% in 2008.  The data is robust and the sample size 
was around 2,500-3,000 respondents in each year.378  In 2003, the FSA produced a 
much more detailed report of the findings of their CAS survey and three focus groups 
entitled ‘Consumer Views of GM Food’.  The principal findings were that in the three 
years anxiety about GM foods had decreased (from 43% of respondents to 36% who 
agreed that they were concerned).  Consumers wanted more information and it was 
unclear what the benefits of GM foods were to UK consumers.379  The principal issue is 
the fact that the GM Nation? debate findings were very much at odds with both this data 
collected by the FSA and the BSA survey data from 2003.  To reiterate, the BSA survey 
2003 showed that 46.3% of respondents felt that GM foods sold in the shops were safe 
to eat.  It is noteworthy that the FSA have made a very concerted effort to gauge the 
public opinion on GM foods and a commitment to reflexive practice on public 
engagement is demonstrated by the establishment of the Advisory Committee on 
Consumer Engagement (ACCE). 
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5.8 The regulators’ understandings of public opinion 
The regulators interviewed for this thesis in relation to GM foods were senior officials 
in the regulation of GM foods from the Department of Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (Defra); the Food Standards Agency (FSA); the European Commission’s 
Directorate General for Health and Consumer Policy (DG SANCO); and the European 
Food Standards Authority (EFSA).  In addition to these were Professor Joyce Tait who 
is an academic and a member of the FSA steering group on GM; and Mr Phillip Cullum, 
the Deputy Chief Executive of Consumer Focus who chairs the FSA’s Advisory 
Committee on Consumer Engagement (ACCE).  The questions asked in the interviews 
are in Appendix 2. 
 
One of the overriding themes from the interview data was that the regulation was 
discussed in terms of being evidence and science-based.  A Defra official comments 
thus: 
‘We’re very much an evidence-based organisation and you know we will always say 
that the…you know, the authorisation of GM foods should be based on...on scientific 
evidence basically and I suppose, you know, and that’s really how we take the decisions 
in Brussels...’ 
 
It is contended that the regulators interviewed from EFSA and the FSA felt that the role 
of public opinion clouded the efficiency of the regulatory process.  At the beginning of 
one interview, the regulator stated that: 
‘When thinking of primary legislation then ethical opinion as well as public opinion are 
important, but when we’ve actually got the rules it is not important in terms of the 
process’. (Official from DG SANCO) 
 
This interviewee continued to discuss what takes place in practice by stating: 
‘In this case the law says to apply the science but what in practice happens is that you 
have public opinion making its opinion felt not by saying ‘we don’t like GM’ but ‘we 
don’t think the science is set up in the right way’ so public opinion then supports what is 
in effect scientific criticism of the process saying ‘you ought to have done a 40 day rat 
feeding study’ (…) so what we perceive as public opinion is not in an IPSO Mori sort of 
way so much as these scientific critiques which we have to take seriously because they 
are published in the general press and they are supported by the readership so it’s a 
complicated interplay between insiders and a broader aura of disapproval of general 
public opinion.’ 
 
The critical points to be taken from this comment are that the EFSA official does not 
feel the public opinion derives from survey data, from ‘an IPSO-Mori’ public, and he 
states very categorically that the scientific criticisms are from ‘insiders’.  This suggests 
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two things: that the criticisms are issued by public interest groups and that these interest 
groups use formal channels in a highly effective manner which has to be responded to 
because, as the interviewee states, the regulators have to take these critiques ‘seriously’.  
A further point lies in the fact the regulator attributes the reasons for taking the 
criticisms seriously to the fact that they are published in the general press and are 
supported by the readership.  The ideas of public opinion are further complicated by the 
introduction of the newspaper readership who might be viewed as the ‘general public’ 
and yet they have an indirect impact on the response of the regulators to the scientific 
criticisms levelled by the NGOs.  Related to this idea of the point in the regulatory 
process at which public opinion should have an influence are the comments made by a 
regulator from the FSA:    
‘when the voting process happens in Brussels there are a number of members who will 
vote against even though they acknowledge that they haven’t got any concerns about the 
safety assessment; everything they have asked has been addressed they will still vote for 
political reasons’. 
 
This reinforces the regulatory stance that the regulation should be based on science and 
it is not correct for opposition which is derived from opinion, that is, anti-GM feeling, 
to be felt in what is a scientific procedure.  It is clear that the ‘political reasons’ the 
interviewee refers to is public opinion.  The interviewees highlight the ways that the 
regulatory process, despite its appearance as a robust and tightly framed procedural 
system, can be manipulated by NGOs. 
The argument that the regulation should be led by the science returns again and again in 
the interviews, to the extent that once the authorisation process is established, there is 
no longer a role for the regulator.  In relation to this, an interesting comment was made 
by a regulator at the FSA that:  
‘whilst we are aware that there’s public concern about GM foods and the public saying 
‘we don’t want to eat GM foods’ and some retailers responding to that, that isn’t a 
factor in whether a GM crop is authorised by us.  As far as we are concerned its very 
much based on the science and it’s for the retailers to decide based on their market and 
their customers whether they want to stock GM foods and if they do then we can be 
confident that they are safe’. 
 
This relates to the issue of public trust which repeatedly arose in conversation with the 
interviewers.  An official from Defra commented that ‘regulation is only going to be 
successful if you’ve got public trust so you’ve got to have public input into the 
regulation’.  The same interviewee stated further that the role of regulators at Defra is to 
‘ensure safety and help ensure public trust, maintain innovation and guard the UK’s 
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interests – totally evidence based position, the policies we make and the decisions we 
make have got to be based on evidence and that includes people’s views.’ 
In the interviews the regulators were asked about the role of regulation in alleviating 
public concern over new technologies. The regulator from the European Commission 
states that: 
‘regulation gives you a reasonable reassurance and then it opens up peoples minds to 
look at the benefits, you have to craft the regulation with the worries in mind and what 
we’ve learned from GM is that we haven’t dealt with all the worries … we’d do better if 
we had correctly understood what the main problems were and then provided the 
answer to them.’  
One final theme is the issue that the labelling regulations have resulted in public 
confusion, as an official from Defra states: 
‘Talk about the confusion!....The rules that we’ve got….more than 0.9% GM then has to 
be labelled as such, that’s clear but um….then people start selling non-GM, GM-free, 
then people get confused, I know I do and I work on the stuff!’  
Thus this regulator contends that the public are confused by the labelling regulations.  
This does not suggest that public anxieties would be placated by a form of regulation 
which confuses them, yet it is argued that the very existence of the regulation does have 
the capacity to reassure.   
5.9 Analysis and Overview  
The BSA survey of 2003 found that 50% of survey respondents felt that genetic science 
is too complex for the public to play a role in the regulation.  If this view reflects the 
public view then it follows that there is faith in the regulatory system to protect the 
public from risk while giving them access to the benefits of novel technologies.  It is 
argued in chapter 4 that public trust in regulation is necessary for regulation to have any 
influence over public opinion.  Data collected shows that there are relatively high levels 
of confidence in the FSA with 48% of survey respondents rating the FSA as an 
organisation they can trust.380  Durrant and Legge argue that a combination of high 
levels of trust in Government and regulatory capacity can increase support for GM 
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foods.381  Higher levels of public trust are reported in the data, yet support for GM foods 
in 2005 is as low as it was in 1999, suggesting either that Durrant and Legge’s 
contention is incorrect or that labelling as the regulatory form is an unsuitable 
mechanism to increase support for GM foods.   
Undoubtedly, the levels of public opposition and the intensity of media coverage were 
of such magnitude in the late 1990s that they can be construed as a ‘scandal’ or a 
‘disaster’ in policy terms a propos Bernstein’s model.382  In keeping with the model, the 
issue of GM foods was placed firmly on the political agenda thanks ultimately to public 
pressure, which over-rode the standard policy agenda setting procedures and regulatory 
output ensued.383    There is no doubt that it would have been in the consumer’s interest 
had a systematic, cogent and comprehensive labelling system been implemented from 
the outset.  It has been seen that beyond the public protests, the public had an enormous 
influence as consumers.  Supermarkets responded by withdrawing all the GM products 
from their stores.  Millstone states that in the final eighteen months of the twentieth 
century: 
‘consumers did not just indicate that they had misgivings about the introduction of 
genetically modified foods, they discovered that their choices could influence the 
research and innovation strategies of an entire industrial sector’.384   
 It is apparent that in some cases, while the regulation has been unable to keep pace with 
the consumer, the market has had the capacity to respond speedily. The self-regulation 
taken by the supermarkets added to the pressure on the politicians and regulatory bodies 
to respond to public concerns over GM foods. The regulation that ensued served only to 
tidy up what was happening in practice.  The public protest brought about the 
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moratorium on GM foods and in turn this moratorium created a refuge for campaigner 
and regulator alike.   
The 2003 Regulations achieve a more codified and comprehensive labelling regime for 
GM foods than did the earlier labelling regulations.  However, the impact of the 
labelling regulations on the public is not clear.  Perhaps surprisingly, the Eurobarometer 
survey data shows that the level of support for GM foods in the UK was only 
marginally higher in 2005 than it was in 1999.  This disproves the argument that an 
increased familiarity with a novel technology leads to increased acceptance for it.  
Opposition levels to GM foods in 2005 are also comparable to those in 1999.  The high 
level of opposition in 2005 is again an unexpected finding and does suggest that the 
labelling regulations and the underlying ethos of enhanced consumer autonomy have 
resulted in confusion over GM foods. This idea that the public are confused about GM 
foods is supported by the regulators interviewed.  Part of the confusion may stem from 
the fact that there are so few GM products on sale.  A European Commission study 
found that in the UK in 2008, there were only two GM products on sale: soya oil, which 
is a cooking oil sold in large drums and is generally located in the Asian foods section 
of supermarkets, and an American product called Bac-Os (bacon-flavoured soya crisps).  
However, NGOs assert that there are GM ingredients in many foods from UK 
supermarkets and they attribute this to three factors: the adventitious presence, meat 
which comes from animals who have eaten GM fodder, and the GM which escapes the 
traceability regulations and enters the market illegally.  In relation to the adventitious 
presence of GM, Bate takes issue with the setting of a threshold amount and describes it 
as scientifically illogical on the grounds that if there are health risks then even a 
miniscule amount of the product may have the potential to harm.385   
It is additionally argued by some that rather than introducing customer autonomy, the 
labelling of GM foods stigmatises the technology.386  The labelling regime, by making 
visible the issue of segregation of GM from non-GM products has consequently 
deepened the divide and I contend has made the issue more visible to those people who 
may not have held a definite opinion beforehand.  In a bid by the EU to avoid trade 
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problems and consumer backlash, consumers are not actively informed of certain 
exemptions.  For instance, GM cattle feed is extraordinarily prevalent and meat reared 
on such feed is considered the ‘norm’.  However, it remains legal for food products 
derived from animals fed on GM feed to be labelled as ‘GM free’.  Additionally, 
consumers may not generally be aware that foods which have been produced using GM 
technologies may be labelled as ‘organic’.  Such pragmatic exercises cloud the labelling 
issue for consumers and lead to the development of fuzzy autonomy.  The consumer 
feels more empowered in terms of information with which to make a choice between 
GM or non-GM produce, but actually the position is far more complex than they realise.  
It is clear that the self-regulation by the supermarkets has an enormously significant 
effect.  While the food suppliers and producers may see a benefit in terms of a reduced 
price in using GM ingredients, there is not any demand for GM foods from the 
consumer.    
5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has been divided into two time-frames which help to identify the different 
relationships between public opinion and regulation in the ‘watershed years’ of 1999-
2003 and since the lifting of the moratorium.387  It is apparent that the public protests 
and the force of NGO lobbying in the 1999 and the early years of the 21st century 
created a very strong voice which was listened to by the regulators.  At this time there 
was an enhanced reference to public opinion in the regulatory process which culminated 
in the moratorium on GM foods.  The call for an in-depth public consultation came 
from the Government and the GM Nation? debate is a hugely symbolic indication of the 
Government’s wish to show that they wanted the public to feel included in the decision-
making over GM.  The principal motivation for the enhanced consultation arises as a 
result of the contested harm of GM foods. Jones argues that: ‘never before has there 
been a system of elaborate and expansive regulation based on hypothetical risks!’  Jones 
calls for the freeing up of the regulation to facilitate the development of smaller 
companies, and this is an important issue because the biotech lobby is dominated by the 
large multinationals.388  
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The first phase of the regulation, from 1997 to 2002, is characterised by a large volume 
of regulatory output which was produced in a very piecemeal, inchoate and almost 
tentative way.  I believe the regulatory purpose at this time was to increase public 
familiarisation with GM foods with the expectation that it would lead to social 
accommodation.  However, it is apparent that this has not been the case and public 
opposition was quelled only by the de facto EU moratorium. The lack of any challenge 
at the time by the European Commission to the six Member States who initiated the 
moratorium is testament to the EU’s recognition of the public mood.  Clearly, the role 
of the media has been hugely influential and the data identified an unprecedented focus 
on the issue of GM foods resulting in a huge level of press coverage.  It is interesting 
that the picture in 2005, when the Eurobarometer shows levels of opposition to GM 
foods to be similar to those in 1999, is very different from that in 1999 in terms of the 
media relationship to public attitudes.  In 1999 there was a clear connection between the 
intense media coverage and opposition to GM foods.  Yet in 2005 there is very low 
coverage given to GM foods and it is apparent from the low media coverage devoted to 
the BT10 and LL601 contamination cases that GM is no longer deemed a hot topic for 
the media.  However, as already mentioned, the NGOS still consider it an important 
issue but appear to be failing to publicise beyond their core supporters.  Labelling as a 
choice of regulatory approach has exacerbated the contested science debate by 
legitimising the issue, and the label in effect makes visible the contested science. 
I argue that a thermostatic control effect is apparent in relation to the public opposed to 
GM foods.  This plays out in the entrenchment of the opposition to GM foods where 
there is a definite bidirectional relationship between the regulators and the regulated. 
The deliberative circle (the entrenchment model) that I developed outlined this effect, 
whereby the regulatory response to public opposition towards GM foods legitimises the 
public opposition.  In this way therefore it is evident that regulation has influenced those 
opposed to GM foods but not as a means to assuage public concerns.  This is reinforced 
by the deepening product segregation and leads to calls for ever more stringent labelling 
regulations.  In terms of the future interplay, one possibility is that the regulation is 
proceeding along this deterministic path to produce ever more stringent labelling 
requirements. I believe that opposition to GM foods will remain an issue, partly as a 
result of the impact of the labelling per se which highlights the product as being inferior 
to GM free.  
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When the survey data findings are stratified, it is clear that the anti-GM group are still a 
strong minority and the result of increased information and regulation on this section of 
the public has been to entrench their position.  This group of people are the ones who 
are most vociferous in campaigning and it has been demonstrated in this chapter that 
this has been a successful campaign as the loudest voice has had a very marked 
influence over the regulation.  The dominant force in the understanding of public 
opinion have been the NGOs.  Tait stated in interview that:   
‘In Europe the governments do listen to public opinion, but they are not very critical 
listeners, …who shouts loudest tends to be taken as public opinion’. 
This supports the idea of interchangeability between and across the different 
understandings of public opinion by the regulators and within the regulatory process.   
The topic of GM foods makes for an enormously rich case-study of the relationship 
between public attitudes and regulation.  They are not only a special case because of the 
attitudes held by the public but also because they have received special regulatory 
handling.  It is evident that public attitudes towards GM foods have played an 
enormously influential part in the regulation of GM foods.  The regulation is not driven 
by expert opinion on the level of risk posed but by public perception of the risks of GM 
foods.  I contend that more than a one-way effect has been at work and that the 
regulation has additionally impacted upon public attitudes.  However, the labelling of 
GM foods has not acted as a reassurance to those people opposed to GM foods.  Whilst 
the two phases of the labelling regulation possess distinctive elements, there is a shared 
connective tissue running through the regulatory development suggestive of a strong 
teleological drive.  The impression I gained from interviewing the regulators of GM 
foods is that the regulators are supportive of the opening up of the EU and UK markets 
to GM food products.  However this would have to take place at EU level and it is 
argued that certain factors will stymie this, including the regulatory structures at 
national and EU levels and the powerful role of the NGOs.389   
Therefore while it appears that there has been an attempt to assuage the demands of 
both the public and the biotech industry, the regulators have not found a clear direction, 
and I would assert that this has been a deliberate and not reactive policy move.  The 
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labelling regulation is viewed by the regulators as provisional legislation implemented 
as a means to ‘manage’ fluctuating public moods insofar as it is anticipated that the 
regulation is a short-term fix.  It might be that the regulators are currently gearing up for 
the next round of protest in the face of the animal feed shortage which will come in the 
form of increased pressure from the farming community.  Whether a second wave of 
public protest would ensue is unclear but even if it does take place it is unlikely that it 
would be as heated as the protests of the late 1990s.  
In the 1970s and 1980s when GM foods emerged as a new regulatory object, the 
response was to establish a plethora of regulatory and advisory bodies.  Now the issue 
has been subsumed into the FSA, Defra and at a European level by EFSA.  In terms of 
whether the regulation displays sui generis features, it is without doubt that this area of 
regulation receives special regulatory handling relative to other novel foods.  In 
summary therefore while the regulatory oversight bodies are not distinctively genomics 
related, the umbrella of regulation to which GM foods are subjected is.  Despite the 
impression I gained from the interviews that many of the regulators were frustrated by 
the special regulatory handling of GM foods, it is clear that regulation has not brought 
about resolution on this issue for the public.  While the public may now be ambivalent 
or confused about GM foods, which is very different from the opposition of the past, 
there is no demand for the products.  For this situation to change, the benefits of GM 
products, such as their potential to enhance the nutritional value and the shelf life, 
would have to be made explicit.  The regulation of GM foods is underpinned by the 
regulatory science and the debate over contested harm.  In contrast the next chapter 
reviews the regulation of prenatal testing and PGD which is underpinned by a contested 
benefit argument.  The idea is that the regulation is driven by the need to enable or 
facilitate the development of the techniques in order to benefit people.  Critically in both 
case-studies there is a great deal of common ground in that they are situated within 
highly contested debates surrounding their risks and benefits.   
Durrant and Legge argue that the moratorium was a space in time which gave the 
Governments of the Member States the opportunity to increase public trust in their 
handling of GM foods.390  The Eurobarometer data shows that levels of public trust in 
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the Government’s ability to regulate on GM foods have risen since the late 1990s.  This 
suggests that the public have placed their trust in Government to protect them from any 
perceived or actual harm associated with GM foods.  However, while trust in 
Government may have increased, so it is argued have levels of uncertainty and 
confusion as to the risks posed by GM foods.  This is a corollary of the contested 
science at the heart of the debate over GM.  Division amongst expert opinion and 
scientific pluralism serve only to intensify public confusion.  I contend that the very 
process of labelling the GM products is in itself recognition of the fact that the 
Government are sitting on the fence and will not state whether they deem these products 
to be safe.  Importantly, the very presence of the authorisation process gives GM foods 
a level of legitimation in that the Government do not believe the products to be harmful.  
The label in effect makes visible the contested science.  
According to the regulators interviewed, the issue of GM foods is set to return to the 
public and regulatory agenda due to the shortage of non-GM animal feed. Indeed, a 
regulator from the FSA commented in an interview for this thesis that while GM ‘is not 
a ticking time bomb there are issues with the animal feed supply and there could be with 
food supply eventually as well as we are getting messages about this from the retailers’.  
She argues further that the retailers are calling on the FSA to provide more information 
and proactive communication about GM to the public because they believe GM is going 
to be an issue in terms of the supply chain.  Interestingly she discusses the problem for 
retailers in being the first to ‘stick their head above the parapet’ vis a vis GM products.  
What is interesting is to speculate over whether the current labelling provisions 
combined with the most important problem on the public agenda being the current 
economic situation will mean that this is a non-issue.  Indeed as has been argued here, it 
was the combination of many critical issues in 1999 which acted as the tinder box for 
the demonstrations and protests.  GM has now become more of a ‘boutique issue’ in 
current politics and does not dominate the mainstay of public concerns.   
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Chapter 6 
The Interaction between Public Opinion and the Regulation of 
Prenatal Testing and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis  
6.0 Introduction 
‘I think one of the things which is really interesting is the degree of interest in a 
procedure which is spectacularly rare’. (HFEA Member in interview, talking in relation 
to Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis)   
While this chapter relates to prenatal testing and diagnosis in addition to PGD, the 
above quote highlights the disproportionate allocation of regulatory resources to genetic 
technologies.  By contrasting the way that PGD and prenatal testing are both regulated 
and perceived by the public it makes very clear that PGD has received a much higher 
level of attention by the media and the regulators than prenatal testing and this has been 
reflected in the number of public consultations.  The focus of this chapter is to examine 
the interplay of regulation with public opinion in relation to prenatal and 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis.  In doing this the chapter will address whether the 
regulatory approach has been appropriate in terms of appeasing the concerns of the 
public about prenatal testing and PGD.  In the examination of the public opinion data it 
is important to assess whether the public are concerned over the use of genomics in this 
manner.  I am also interested in the function and structure of the regulatory institutions, 
as a separate force to the regulation, in helping to make the public feel reassured about 
the application of these technologies.  The principal IRA overseeing the regulation of 
PGD is also analysed in terms of the discretionary zone mentioned in chapter 3.  While 
it is clear that PGD is given special regulatory handling, this is not the case for prenatal 
testing.  In analysing the relationships between public opinion and regulation in this 
field, I will draw again on the five understandings of public opinion which were 
outlined in Chapter 2.   
It is argued in this chapter that the speed of technological advances results in public 
opinion as an input into the regulatory process being in many instances redundant.  To 
explain this further, it is not being argued that public opinion should not be included in 
regulatory decision-making, but rather that developments are taking place which the 
regulatory structures bend to meet, and that this is happening in an incremental way 
meaning that regulation is slowly evolving to the extent that the idea of public 
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consultation is not deemed relevant.  However, there is the additional argument that 
another form of public opinion, that of the prospective parents, is making its view heard 
as a consequence of the demand for and take-up of the techniques now offered to them.  
Indeed it could be argued that the response of the regulators to the applications by 
parents – sometimes made via the fertility centres or through patient groups – is 
responsive to a public, but that this view of the public is very narrow.  I will show that 
in contrast with the regulation of GM foods, the driver for regulating in this area has 
been to facilitate the application and development of the technology.  The underlying 
regulatory ethos is that these technologies are beneficial to the public.  However, public 
opinion does not show such a clear line of support and this mismatch between the 
regulatory approach and the public opinion data is analysed.  It is argued that in terms of 
the different understandings of public opinion, the public opinion which the regulators 
are responding to is a combination of parental pressure, which may be voiced through 
interest groups, and the influence of clinicians who hold a very powerful position in 
health technology.  Public concern does not arise from problems resulting from the form 
of the regulation which, while being permissive, is supported by a large volume of 
procedural safeguards.  Concerns result from the controversial nature of the current uses 
of PGD and prenatal testing and the potential future developments.   
In the introduction to the thesis, the provocative challenge set down by Sturgis et al was 
discussed; they claimed that their findings from the BSA survey were ‘a good deal more 
robust and representative of public preferences on these issues than can ever be 
produced by such exercises in public ‘consultation’’.391  This claim will be examined in 
the chapter where the BSA survey data is compared to the data on public opinion 
commissioned and collected by the principal regulatory agency in this area of 
regulation: the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). 
The chapter opens by defining the object of regulation by setting out the principal terms 
discussed and the differences between PGD and PGS. The range and availability of 
prenatal tests and applications of PGD are then examined which leads into a discussion 
of the clinical validity of procedures.  The subsequent section of the chapter then gives 
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an overview of the regulation and the public opinion data is analysed in relation to 
prenatal testing and PGD.  The case of prenatal sex selection is examined in terms of 
both the public opinion on this subject and the regulatory developments.  Following this 
the application of PGD in cases of inherited cancer susceptibility and to HLA tissue-
typing are examined in depth.  The HFEA carried out public consultations on these two 
applications of PGD and the resultant findings are analysed with a view to the shaping 
of this data as an input into the regulatory process.  The chapter includes an exploration 
of the numbers of elective abortions following a diagnosis of a serious mental or 
physical disability.  I collated this data in order to establish whether there has been an 
increase in rates of such abortions in line with the increase in diagnostic techniques.  
This data ties in with my contention that a very forceful voice in both the development 
of prenatal testing and the regulation of PGD has been the parental views.  The final 
section of the chapter deals with the regulators’ understandings of prenatal testing and 
PGD.  The chapter closes with some conclusions including the contention that public 
opinion in the cases of prenatal testing and PGD has been conflated with the views of 
the parents and the clinicians.   
6.1 The Regulation of Prenatal Testing & Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis 
6.1.1 Defining the Object of Regulation  
This section sets out the definitions of the principal terms under discussion, delimits the 
area of study and examines the range and scope of the techniques in practice in the UK.  
There are varied interlinked terms in prenatal testing and diagnosis and these include, 
inter alia: prenatal testing, prenatal screening, prenatal diagnosis (PND), 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), preimplantation genetic screening (PGS) and 
non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPD).  This area is problematic in that these terms are 
used to mean very specific things in some instances and yet in other contexts are used 
interchangeably.  The distinction between prenatal testing and prenatal screening is 
difficult to make.  The Human Genetics Commission defines prenatal screening as: 
‘a public health service that offers pregnant women a test to see if the baby is at 
increased risk of having a particular disorder such as Down’s syndrome.’392  
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Whereas the HGC definition for prenatal diagnosis is:  
‘an individual procedure that aims to provide a diagnosis of a particular condition that 
the baby might have’.393   
The distinction therefore hinges on whether the practice is offered widely or whether it 
is something tailored to meet an individual’s needs or demands.  There is of course 
some crossover and they are very much interlinked.   
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is a technique which was first undertaken in a 
clinical capacity in 1989. It takes place on embryos outside of the uterus in conjunction 
with in vitro fertilisation (IVF).  It involves the analysis of one or two biopsied cells 
which have been taken from a 3-day old embryo with the intention of deselecting those 
embryos affected by serious genetic conditions.  For the majority of cases, PGD is used 
when one or both parents are carriers of a serious genetic disorder which they do not 
wish to pass on to their off spring.  It is argued that PGD reduces the distress faced by a 
woman or a couple in such circumstances who would otherwise undergo prenatal 
testing and choose to have an abortion in cases where the foetus was affected by the 
genetic condition.  On the other hand, the discarding of embryos in PGD is 
controversial.  While the case of deselecting embryos, or ‘negative’ selection has been 
outlined here as being the most common method for PGD application, it is important to 
note that ‘positive’ selection is an option and that embryos can be selected for specific 
conditions or attributes. 
Returning to defining the key terms, there is a further distinction to be made between 
PGD and preimplantation genetic screening (PGS).  It is generally understood that PGS 
is used to help couples with fertility problems in conjunction with genetic screening.  
PGS is carried out on embryos of infertile couples who are undergoing IVF with the 
goal of ruling out those embryos which have numerical chromosomal abnormalities, in 
the hope that this will increase the chances of embryo implantation and survival.  PGS 
also termed as PGD- aneuploidy screening is defined by the European Society of 
Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) as ‘the detection of chromosomally 
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normal embryos from sub-fertile patients’.394  PGS is interesting in that the motivation 
for the technique arises from a concern relating to increased maternal age, a history of 
recurrent IVF failures and/or repeated miscarriages.  The couples involved are not 
seeking the treatment because they are aware of a genetic condition which they wish to 
screen against. Indeed the ESHRE states that they ‘are parents with a normal 
karyotype’395, therefore a standard chromosomal complement.  As the ESHRE 
comments there is some debate over what to call this technique in terms of whether it is 
screening, testing or diagnostic. An added blurring of any distinction between PGD and 
PGS is that there exists a correlation between maternal age and chromosomal 
abnormalities and further to this studies also show that more than half of recorded 
miscarriages are associated with chromosomal abnormalities.396  In other fields the 
distinction between PGD and PGS is made by referring to the former as ‘high risk PGD’ 
and the latter as ‘low risk PGD’.397 
6.1.2 The Range of Prenatal Testing and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis 
Techniques Available 
(i) Prenatal Testing 
Over a decade ago in 2000, Graham et al noted that less than one percent of British 
pregnant women received no form of prenatal testing.398  The UK Genetic Testing 
Network (UK GTN) hold a list of all the genetic tests licensed under the NHS. While it 
would be technically possible to carry out all of these prenatally it is not the case that 
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they are used on a routine basis.  In practice there are a number of specific genetic 
conditions for which tests are routinely conducted under general public screening and 
these include trisomy 21 for Down’s syndrome.  However, if there is evidence of a 
family history of a genetic condition then the pregnant woman may be offered a relevant 
genetic test of which there are over 500 available.399  At present, it is not yet technically 
possible to carry out testing for a range of genetic conditions simultaneously. Jackson 
argues, however, that this will be feasible in the future and will ‘undoubtedly promote 
universal screening for some of the more common genetic disorders’.400  Currently, the 
prenatal tests available range from the neuchal translucency test for Down’s syndrome 
(which is carried out in conjunction with an ultrasound scan and the testing of maternal 
serum before the 14th week of pregnancy), chorion villus sampling (CVS), and 
amniocentesis.  It should be noted that not all prenatal tests are genetic. 
(ii) PGD 
In contrast with prenatal testing, it cannot be stated strongly enough that both PGD and 
PGS are very rare procedures relative to the number of live births per annum.  As 
established above, PND covers a wide range of tests and diagnoses to which all 
pregnant UK women are offered to varying degrees.401  There are nine fertility centres 
in the UK which offer PGD and eight which offer PGS.  Over fifty genetic conditions 
are now licensed for PGD and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(HFEA) provides an inventory of these on their website. However, the rarer conditions 
for which licenses exist are not listed in order to maintain patient anonymity.402  The 
most recent figures available showing numbers of PGD and PGS cycles relate to 2005.  
In that year, 122 patients received PGD, which resulted in 17 live births.  There were 
166 patients who received PGS and this resulted in 42 live births.  From this data it is 
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clear that a very small number of people seek out and receive such treatment and that 
the number of babies born following PGD and PGS is extremely low.  The second 
observation of the data presented is that numbers of cases are increasing over time but 
this rise is not to a high level. 
Figure 20: Data from the HFEA register showing numbers of PGD/PGS 
procedures (1999-2005) 403 
Year PGD 
Patients 
PGD 
Cycles 
PGD 
Live 
Births 
PGS 
Patients 
PGS 
Cycles 
PGS 
live 
Births 
Total 
PGD/P
GS 
Patients 
Total 
PGD/PGS 
Cycles 
Total 
PGD/PGS 
Live 
Births 
1999 - - - - - - 8 8 3 
2000 - - - - - - 64 66 9 
2001 - - - - - - - 59 4 
2002 - - - - - - 120 128 22 
2003 - - - - - - 208 234 50 
2004 84 95 17 164 190 25 246 285 42 
2005 122 134 17 166 205 42 286 337 59 
 
There are two significant features of this technology: the very rapid increase in the 
sophistication of the techniques and the ever enlarging diagnostic spread.  In relation to 
the latter, the number of inherited diseases that could be tested in 2004 exceeded 40.404   
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6.1.3 Clinical utility and validity and parental decision-making 
(i) Prenatal Testing 
Screening for genetic conditions such as Down’s syndrome was once restricted to 
pregnant women over 35 years old, but is now offered to nearly all pregnant women in 
the UK regardless of age.  The test involves the nuchal translucency scan combined 
with a blood test, and if these show a higher risk in the pregnancy then the woman is 
offered amniocentesis.  The techniques for prenatal screening are becoming ever more 
sophisticated and one of the most significant changes is the ability now to assess the 
probability of the actual risk of a chromosomal disorder as opposed to a woman’s age-
related risk.  These technological advances have come about through the increased 
accuracy of blood testing and ultrasound technology which have enabled a more 
accurate identification of nuchal translucency or genetic markers.405   
Jackson states that ‘there are those who would argue that the accumulation of 
techniques to monitor foetal progress creates needless anxiety, wastes time and 
resources and does little to improve the proportion of healthy babies and reinforces the 
perception that every pregnancy must be subject to as much technological intervention 
as possible.’  Jackson highlights the debatable discrepancy of offering prenatal 
diagnostic techniques such as ultrasound as a routine test for all pregnant women, when 
98% of pregnant women receive ‘normal’ results.406 Interestingly there is no clear line 
given by the NHS on the purpose of the 18-20 week foetal scan. In Appendix 1 to the 
NHS Fetal Anomaly Screening Programme Standards, it states that: 
‘The understanding of the purpose of the scan is variable – from the woman’s 
perspective it is a chance to see the baby and confirm normality rather than a screening 
test to look for abnormalities.  From the clinical perspective it is considered to be a 
useful tool to identify problems and to allow the clinician to develop management 
pathways which are likely to optimise outcome  This dichotomy appears to have led to 
confusion over the purpose, limitations and benefits of the use of ultrasound 
screening.’407 
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This confusion over the purpose of the scan to detect, inter alia, genetic abnormalities, is 
borne out by Jorg’s comments that: 
‘Although clinical validity and clinical utility are going to be important criteria in the 
decision making process of whether or not to offer and apply a genetic test, the 
development of standards and hence guidelines with the scientific community and 
health care providers of how to assess clinical validity and clinical utility are still in its 
infancy’.408   
These comments need to be examined in terms of the regulatory structures discussed 
later in the chapter and in terms of whether the issues of clinical utility and validity are 
being taken seriously.   
While prenatal tests may inform a couple that a foetus has a higher risk of a certain 
condition, or may give a more definitive result that a foetus will be born with a 
condition, it cannot generally state the extent or the severity of the condition or predict 
how it will impact a child’s life or the level of treatability.  Scott argues that there is a 
disconnection between the risk of a condition and the significance of harm which would 
potentially arise from a condition. 409  In terms of public opinion on prenatal testing one 
has to consider the views of the millions of pregnant women who already receive such 
screening and assess the level of reassurance it may offer them.  There is a wide debate 
on the decision-making processes of couples when they are given information that their 
future baby may be at risk of a certain genetic condition.  Issues to consider include how 
the couples assess the information imparted to them by the clinicians and the different 
very qualitative ways in which parents will interpret the probability statistics that they 
are given.  An important facet of this debate is to address whether it is appropriate to 
test a woman for a condition, for example, Down’s Syndrome, if that woman has 
already stated that she will not terminate a pregnancy in any case.  On the one hand one 
could argue that her awareness that there is an increased risk of her having a baby who 
has Down’s Syndrome may give her some time to adjust to the knowledge of this.  
However, it is a risk calculation and it will give many women a level of anxiety during 
their pregnancy which may be unnecessary.  Research shows that in the general 
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population, genetic disorders affect under three percent of neonates.410  There are a 
number of procedural safeguards underpinning the application of prenatal testing and 
PGD, such as the system of informed consent, but while these issues are important they 
are not discussed here.  
(ii) Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis 
Wyatt has stressed that the ‘take home baby rate’ following PGD is relatively low and 
may not be balanced by the high levels of psychological stress endured by couples 
undertaking the procedure.411  Added to this is a very pertinent comment made by a 
geneticist and member of the HGC who described how over the last decade she has 
spoken to hundreds of couples about PGD, and stressed that ‘for many people having 
learned what is involved they come to the decision not to proceed’.412  This is an 
important point and counters claims by some of the interest groups that once the 
technology is made available there will be immediate public demand for it. 
Additionally, the costs of PGD are very high; for example the cost of a single cycle of 
PGD at Guy’s Hospital in 2010 was placed at £7,020 (this amount is exclusive of the 
charges for drugs).413   
6.1.4 The Regulatory Handling of Ethical Concerns  
The principal issues which receive attention by ethicists and commentators in the arena 
of prenatal testing and PGD are: the case of discarded embryos; the status of the embryo 
in relation to selective abortion; ‘saviour siblings’; and the ‘designer baby’ arguments.  
These can be interlinked with the argument promoted by many clinicians that less harm 
is inflicted on the woman if she has PGD in comparison to prenatal testing and 
subsequent abortion.  These ethical issues are concerns for members of the public and 
scenarios have been played out in media commentary.  Related to the discussion of 
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public opinion of prenatal testing and PGD is whether these issues have become 
‘normalised’ as a result of increased familiarisation with them.  Indeed it is difficult to 
separate the role of the regulation as a force for placating public concerns from the more 
gradual erosion of concern over the technologies arising from increased familiarisation 
with them.  This process involves the very nebulous concepts of public confidence and 
public trust in genetic technologies.  While the public have become very familiar with 
prenatal testing, PGD remains a technique which is used in such a small number of 
cases and is often portrayed by the media in highly emotive ways.  For the regulators 
the balance is between facilitating the technologies to ensure that the public benefit and 
countering people’s concerns over the ethical issues.  In this chapter the drivers for 
regulators to change to accommodate new applications of PGD will be examined.  
Consumerism and the drivers of regulatory accommodation of new applications of PGD 
and PND are complex issues, and it is clear that some patient groups are very vocal and 
actively campaigning for such. On the other hand, it could be argued that these groups 
are responding to the science – for as the science develops and increasing number of 
genetic markers are identified this opens up options for new applications of PGD.  
Additionally, what is the role played by the clinicians and the fertility centres offering 
PGD?  It is not clear that the adaptation of regulation to accommodate novel uses is 
parent-driven.  Finally, there is the question of why some genetic conditions receive 
more publicity and more funding for research than others. Often this is not always a 
result of the numbers of people affected or the severity of the disease. 
6.2 The Regulatory Approach to Prenatal Testing and Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis  
Knoppers and Isai describe the regulatory style adopted in the UK as a public ordering 
approach, characterised by a state-led framing of the use of biotechnologies which is 
permissive, incorporating a legislative approach with administrative oversight.414  In 
essence, the regulatory issues have evolved in response to ethical concerns.  The aim of 
the thesis is to examine public opinion in this arena in relation to the level of regulatory 
oversight and to attempt to determine whether the public find this appropriate.  This 
raises two critical issues. The first is whether the public have knowledge of the 
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regulatory processes at work. The regulation is very piecemeal and is drawn from a 
wide range of sources.  It is argued here that it is the presence of the regulatory 
institutions which is fundamentally significant in terms of assurance that prenatal testing 
and PGD are being appropriately regulated.  The second issue is to question whether the 
public are really concerned about these issues. One could alternatively posit that is it 
that the media, interest groups, influential politicians who through repeatedly telling us 
that the public are concerned have made this a reality.  This will be examined in the next 
section of the chapter through the survey data and the HFEA’s public consultation 
exercises. 
6.2.1 The Regulation of Preimplatation Genetic Diagnosis 
The regulatory framework for PGD is outlined in this section following which, the 
interaction between public opinion and regulation is broken down into 4 case-studies: 
(i) PGD as a novel regulatory object 
(ii) PGD and Sex Selection 
(iii) The Application of PGD for HLA Tissue Typing 
(iv) Lower Penetrance Inherited Cancer Conditions & PGD 
The regulation governing the application and usage of PGD and PGS is found in the 
mandatory requirements: the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as 
amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008), licence conditions, 
and HFEA Directions. These regulations work in conjunction with a number of HFEA 
Guidance notes.  Finally there are relevant professional guidelines. Thus there exists a 
combination of substantive requirements and procedural safeguards in respect of PGD.  
There is no specific mention of PGD in the 1990 Act because the legislators did not 
anticipate the emergence of PGD and thus the HFEA have carved out the regulatory 
position on PGD acting on a case-by-case basis.  The UK has adopted a public ordering, 
that is, a legislative top-down approach to the regulation of this area which rests on a 
pragmatic, permissive approach.415 The regulation of PGD is set out in the HFEA 8th 
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edition Code of Practice416.  The regulation of PGD is also directed by the ethical 
guidelines set out by UN and WHO.  PGD is subject to the licensing procedures 
regulated by the HFEA and there are also a number of voluntary agreements of which 
the most significant are the ESHRE PGD Consortium’s Best Practice Guidelines.417  
ESHRE justify the drafting of these guidelines on the grounds that there is a lack of 
common practice and regulation in this field relative to other domains of diagnostic 
testing.  The guidelines list recommendations relating inter alia to: counselling, 
informed consent, treatment methods, patient inclusion criteria and clinical protocols.   
Prior to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 which amends the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, licences for PGD were examined as already 
stated on a case-by-case basis. The 2008 Act attempted to tidy up this by codification of 
the licensing arrangements for PGD, with the exemption of the ‘saviour sibling’ cases 
which will still be decided on a case-by-case basis.418  This move has been criticised by 
Augst, the HFEA’s acting Head of Policy who argues that greater legislative clarity 
comes at too high a price if the HFEA lose the interpretive flexibility of the 
regulation.419  With regard to the interaction between the applicant couple and the 
regulation are the 2008 Act’s amendments to the decision-making criteria.  There are a 
number of grounds for consideration when the licensing committee are making a 
decision and prior to the 2008 Act one element of this was to take into account the 
family’s perception of the genetic condition.  While this is a hugely subjective issue to 
judge, it is significant in terms of the response of a regulator to individual families as 
opposed to a blanket regulatory approach.  The most important element of introduction 
of the 2008 Act is that now all human embryos outside the body are subject to 
regulation. 
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In terms of an application by parents for PGD the interpretation of the regulation by the 
regulators is commonly said to be in accordance with a pragmatic approach. There is a 
clinician’s letter attached to the application but while this may include facts about the 
case that may incur an emotional response by the regulators, such as it being this 
couple’s last chance, the nature of the letter is not sentimental.  Of course this pertains 
to a discussion of how the regulation is interpreted and not thus how regulation and 
public opinion interact, but in the course of the regulation in practice the relationship 
between the regulation, regulators and public opinion is still a critical factor, for 
regulation evolves, and in this area of technology, the techniques are evolving also. 
6.2.2 The Regulation of Prenatal Testing 
‘…doctors have enormous discretion in relation to what you can test prenatally.  There 
is not a list of conditions, no law which says you can or can’t do anything, so in a sense 
PND practice is to say you do anything you like!’ (HFEA Member in interview) 
While there is no specific legislation covering prenatal testing and PND, there is a 
wealth of regulations, codes and guidance notes.  Principally, the regulation draws from 
codes and guidance which oversee the procedural safeguards which include: 
(i) Safeguards relating to patients’ rights (informed consent, counselling, 
confidentiality) and; 
(ii) Safeguards relating to civil status, oversight and licensing mechanisms (which in 
turn provide the list of licensed tests available on the UK Genetic Test 
Network). 
Additionally, the Abortion Act 1967 (amended by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990), sets out the legal grounds for a selective abortion in the case of 
a genetic condition being diagnosed.  It should be stressed that at the heart of these 
layers of regulation and having a great influence over the outcome is the role of medical 
discretion.  
The procedural safeguards outlined above are drawn inter alia from the Department of 
Health, the NHS, the Care Quality Commission, the UK National Screening Society, 
and Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists’ (RCOG) guidelines.  The 
specific standards overseeing the prenatal testing procedures are many and varied but 
are overarched by the NHS Constitution and the National Minimum Standards 
Regulations 2002. These regulations are generic in their scope.  For more focussed 
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guidance one would turn to the UK National Screening Committee’s ‘Foetal Anomaly 
Screening Programme: Screening for Down’s Syndrome’ and the National Standards 
issued on the Foetal Anomaly Screening Programme.420   
In turning to the Abortion Act 1967 as amended by the HFE Act 1990, the most relevant 
section relates to the interpretation of ‘seriously handicapped’ under section 1(d).  The 
RCOG states in relation to this section that: 
‘…a strict definition is impractical because we do not have sufficiently advanced 
diagnostic techniques to detect malformations accurately all of the time and it is not 
always possible to predict the ‘seriousness' of the outcome (in terms of the long-term 
physical, intellectual or social disability on the child and the effects on the family). The 
RCOG believes that the interpretation of ‘serious abnormality' should be based upon 
individual discussion agreed between the parents and the mother's doctor’.421 
It is apparent that a feature of the regulation of both PGD and PND is the issue of 
discretion over regulatory interpretation.  It has been shown to be a useful tool in these 
cases as it allows the regulator (or in this instance the clinician) to come to a decision 
which is tailored to the needs of the individual.  The regulation has been drafted with a 
level of discretion given to interpretation, leaving this in the hands of the regulator or 
clinician.  What does this mean for the interaction between regulation and public 
opinion? 
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6.3 Public Opinion  
This section of the chapter contrasts the findings of different sources of public opinion 
data collected in relation to prenatal testing and PGD.  This data is reviewed in relation 
to the five understandings of public opinion and these are listed again here as an aide-
memoire: 
(i) Public opinion is an aggregation of individual opinions 
(ii) Public opinion is a reflection of the majority beliefs 
(iii) Public opinion is a channelling of the public voice by interest groups 
(iv) Public opinion is a fiction – it is a rhetorical construct 
(v) Public opinion is what the media and elite tell us public opinion is. 
The research carried out for the thesis shows that when regulators talk of public opinion, 
they are most often referring to the findings of public engagement exercises 
commissioned by their own institutions.  This begs the question of what the value is of 
the collection of survey data by for instance, academics, which was the case with the 
cache of genomics questions in the BSA survey.  It is argued that the public 
consultations are dominated by stakeholders who are invited to participate by the HFEA 
or HGC.  This stands in strong contrast to the self-selection method adopted by the GM 
nation? debate and yet neither has produced data which is representative of public 
opinion.  It is contended however that the different routes adopted have led to very 
similar committee profiles and the resulting public opinion data should be called 
stakeholder opinion.  The views of parents and in particular applicant couples for PGD 
are influential in the evolution of the regulation in this field.  Indeed it is argued here 
that it is the views of parents affected by serious genetic diseases, either alone or 
represented by interest groups, that are being responded to by regulators.  Again it is a 
case of listening to those who speak loudest and perhaps dominate public engagement 
exercises.  The influence of the clinicians should not however be underestimated in 
prenatal testing and PGD.  The chapter now turns to analyse the public opinion data by 
dividing the analysis into the following five areas: 
1. Public Opinion of PGD & PND 
2. Public Opinion of Sex Selection 
3. Public Opinion of PGD for Inherited Cancer Susceptibility 
4. Public Opinion of HLA Tissue-Typing Typing (‘Saviour Siblings’) 
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5. The Influence and Views of the Parent in PND and PGD 
The table below illustrates a very brief chronological overview of the data points and 
the principal regulatory developments. 
Figure 21: Regulatory developments, IRA public consultations and BSA survey 
data entry-points 
Year PGD Regulation BSA data point Consultation 
1998  5 questions on Prenatal 
diagnosis 
 
1999 PGD ‘interim policy’ 
issued by the HFEA & the 
Advisory Committee on 
Genetic Testing (ACGT) 
 
HFEA/Advisory Committee 
on Genetic Testing (ACGT) 
commission Public 
Consultation  
2000  In 2000 there are  4 
questions on PGD 
(n=2,267) plus the same 
5 PND questions as in 
1998 
PGD - HFEA 31/3/00  
2001 HFEA & HGC, ‘Outcome 
of the Public Consultation 
on PGD’, 18 June 2001 
(The Outcome Report) 
  
2003 2002-2003 HFEA Review 
of sex selection regulation 
and the HFEA 
commissioned a MORI 
poll on sex selection. 
Genetic test questions 
which may relate to 
PGD – one question re. 
sex selection and one 
relating to HLA Tissue 
Typing 
 
2004   HGC – Choosing the Future 
consultation 
2005-
2006 
HFEA Decision on PGD 
for lower penetrance 
cancer conditions 
 
HFEA Public Consultation 
on lower penetrance 
inherited cancer conditions 
(November 2005 – April 
2006)  ‘Choices & 
Boundaries’  
2008 The Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 2008 
 
HFEA Consultation in 2009 
following  the Revisions to 
HFE Act in preparation for 
the 8th Code of Conduct 
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6.3.1 Public Opinion of Prenatal Testing and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis 
The data contrasted in this section is the BSA survey, which has data on prenatal testing 
in 1998 and 2000 and PGD in 2003, and the results of the public consultations carried 
out by the HFEA and ACGT in 1999.  In 1998 and 2000, the BSA survey asked: 
 ‘Genetic tests can [also] be taken from unborn babies while still in the womb, to show 
if the child is likely to be born with a serious medical condition, but such tests carry 
some risks. 
Which of the statements on this card comes closest to your view: 
1. All pregnant women should be offered such tests. 
2. Only women where there is a special reason should be offered such tests. 
3. Such tests should not be allowed at all.’422   
The responses to this question are shown below.   
Figure 22: Should prenatal tests be offered to all women (BSA survey) 
 
This shows little variation in response over the two years, which is to be expected since 
this question was only asked in two years with just a two year gap.  The most noticeable 
feature of the results is that there is an approximate but very clear split between those 
respondents who agree that prenatal testing should be offered to everyone and those 
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n=2,267. 
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who believe that it should only be offered if there are ‘special reasons’.  There are very 
few survey respondents who felt that the testing should be prohibited.   
The graph below illustrates the responses in the BSA survey in 2003 to the question: 
‘Do you agree with genetic tests to help decide whether to have a child with…a serious 
mental condition, a serious physical condition, the same types of body tissues needed to 
treat a sibling who was seriously ill, a condition that means the child would die in their 
20s or 30s, that is one sex rather than another’.  It is noteworthy that the wording of this 
question is not explicit as to whether it refers to prenatal testing or PGD, but it seems to 
suggest that it relates to the use of PGD.  This is a critical failing of the BSA survey and 
undermines the data findings. 
Figure 23: Public opinion of prenatal genetic testing (BSA 2003) 
 
These results have the interesting feature of reviewing the attitudes to the different uses 
of prenatal testing and diagnosis. The graph highlights very clearly the contrasting 
views of the survey respondents to the different uses of prenatal diagnosis techniques.  
It is evident from this data that in the cases of diagnosing whether a baby has a serious 
mental or physical condition or is a tissue match for a sibling, the majority of survey 
respondents were in agreement that this was acceptable.  However, the response is very 
different in the cases of determining the sex of the foetus and in the case of a foetus 
which has a condition which would mean that the child would not live beyond young 
adulthood.  These two cases are discussed in more depth below with reference to the 
regulation governing the application of PGD in such circumstances. 
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6.3.2 The Regulation & Public Opinion of Prenatal Sex Selection 
(i)The Regulatory Issues 
The regulation in relation to sex selection makes a clear division between sex selection 
for medical grounds and selection for social grounds.  Approximately 200 genetic 
conditions have been identified which only affect males.  This is a very different 
rationale for sex selection than that related to the concept of ‘family balancing’ or social 
selection.  Data collected by the HFEA shows that as a general trend in the UK there is 
little public preference for one sex over another in terms of children.  However the same 
HFEA data additionally showed that in ethnic populations there was a 
‘disproportionately high percentage’ of people with a social preference for male 
offspring. 423   
In the case of medical justification for sex selection this is permitted under the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended by the HFE Act 2008) where a 
woman ‘risks having a child with a life-threatening disease’424.  The issue of sex 
selection using PGD for social reasons was not subject to any regulation until the 
HFEA’s 6th Code of Practice which was published in 2003.  Under the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, a treatment licence issued by the HFEA can 
authorise an activity only if it is deemed by the Authority to be ‘necessary or desirable 
for the purposes of providing treatment services’.425  In addition to the split between the 
medical and social purposes of sex selection, the regulation was unclear and inchoate 
until the 2003 Code due to the differences in the regulatory treatment of sperm sorting 
techniques and PGD.  Sex selection for social reasons was not explicitly prohibited until 
the very significant inclusion in the HFE Act 2008 which placed it clearly in the statute.  
This finally tidies up the HFEA and governmental position on this issue.  In 1998 the 
World Health Organisation proposed a number of ethical guidelines in relation to 
medical genetics which included the following: 
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‘prenatal diagnosis is carried out only to give parents and physicians information about 
the health of the foetus.  The use of prenatal diagnosis for paternity testing, except in 
cases of rape or incest, or for gender selection, apart from sex-linked disorders, is not 
acceptable’.426   
These guidelines are categorically prohibiting sex-selection beyond the therapeutic de-
selection of a foetus with a sex-linked chromosomal condition.    
(ii) Public Opinion of the Use of PGD for Sex Selection 
‘The thing about sex selection – it was decisive – the public was overwhelmingly and 
adamantly against it…and as such it would be perverse of the regulator to go against it’. 
(Member of the HFEA in interview) 
In terms of establishing levels of public opinion on the question of sex selection, we 
will first turn to the BSA data and following this examine the steps taken by the HFEA 
to determine public opinion.  Unfortunately the BSA survey data does not provide us 
with a great deal of detailed data and there are no questions which probe the 
respondents in terms of whether their views differ in relation to the selection of a 
specific sex for medical or social reasons.  Despite such limitations in scope, the BSA 
survey data has a large sample size and is robust in terms of its collection and while the 
results are crude they are the results of best endeavours and rank highly in terms of 
survey date per se.  There is one further problem however in that the BSA survey data 
relating to sex selection for the years 1998, 2000 and 2003 is unfortunately hindered by 
a confusingly worded survey question: 
‘Suppose it was discovered that a person’s genes could be changed.  Taking your 
answers from this card, do you think this should be allowed or not allowed to make a 
person…determine the sex of an unborn baby?’427  
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 World Health Organisation, Proposed International Guidelines on ethical issues in medical genetics 
and genetics services. Geneva: WHO, 1998. 
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Figure 24: Attitudes towards determining the sex of an unborn baby (BSA 1998) 
 
The data for 2000 is not shown here as there is very little change in response across the 
five years from 1998-2003.  The respondents who consider that the proposed 
intervention should not be allowed reduce slightly over the years from 69% in 1998 to 
58% in 2003 and while this is indicative of a softening to sex selection, it still shows the 
majority of respondents to be very much opposed to prenatal sex selection. 
Figure 25: Attitudes towards determining the sex of an unborn baby (BSA 2003) 
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In 2003 a more clearly worded question was also added for which the results are shown 
in the pie-chart.428  This final chart shows a clear and overwhelming opposition to sex 
selection of an unborn child.  The combination of the survey questions show that while 
the respondents are very happy for the sex of an unborn child to be identified but 
strongly against a technique which will select one sex over another.  The data 
limitations have been outlined above but in terms of a match between public opinion 
data and regulation, the limitation which is most obvious is that the survey questions did 
not discriminate between sex selection on medical as opposed to social grounds, yet this 
is how the regulation is determined. 
Figure 26: Attitudes towards prenatal testing for sex selection (BSA 2003) 
 
(iii) HFEA Public Consultations 
The HFEA conducted two consultations on sex selection in 1993 and 2003.  As already 
stated, regulation pertaining to the use of sex selection for social reasons did not exist 
until the 6th Code of Conduct in 2003.  It is interesting that sex selection was the focus 
for the first public consultation on PGD conducted by the HFEA.  This consultation 
involved a written consultation document, of which 2000 copies were disseminated 
                                                          
428
 British Social Attitude Survey 2003, question 796: ‘Do you agree or disagree with parents using such 
tests [genetic tests carried out on an unborn child] to help them decide whether or not to have a child 
that is one sex rather than another?’ 
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resulting in 165 responses.  In addition to this in 2003, the HFEA commissioned a 
MORI poll on the issue of sex selection with a sample size of 2,165.  These people were 
interviewed face-to-face across Britain in 198 different locations in the period from 9th 
to 14th January 2003.  Significantly, the findings of the poll show that 68% of the 
respondents think that regulation on this issue would be a good idea.  In terms of 
understandings of the term ‘sex selection’, only one in five respondents knew that this 
related to the choice of a baby’s sex with 47% not understanding what this meant.  A 
very large majority, 69%, of respondents, disagree that prospective parents should have 
the right to choose the sex of their child.  This consultation had an additional component 
of a focus group analysis.  The consultation findings were published in the HFEA’s 
report, ‘Sex Selection: Choice and Responsibility in Human Reproduction’.   
In both the HFEA consultations, the respondents are opposed to sex selection for social 
reasons: 67% opposed in 1993 and 2003.  In the 2003 MORI poll, 65% agree with the 
use of sex selection for medical reasons while 67% oppose it for family balancing 
purposes and 79% disagree with it being permitted for other non-medical reasons.  
Following the 1993 consultation, the HFEA state that: 
‘the view of the Authority on sex selection for social reasons is strongly supported by 
the public who responded to our consultation exercise’.429   
It is interesting to posit the MORI poll result that 69% of respondents disagree with sex 
selection against the BSA survey data of the same year which found that 79% disagreed 
with sex selection.   
While the BSA survey has been criticised for not making a distinction between social 
and medical grounds for sex selection, the MORI poll commissioned by the HFEA did 
address this and made a distinction in the questions between attitudes towards social and 
medical use of PGD for sex selection. The data shows that 65% agreed with the use of 
PGD for sex selection on medical grounds and only 18% agreed with PGD for sex 
selection on the grounds of ‘family balancing’, with 8% agreeing and 79% disagreeing 
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with the use of PGD for sex selection in the case of other non-medical reasons such as 
social and cultural reasons.430 
In terms of public opinion, it would seem unlikely that there would be a shift of feeling 
in favour of sex selection for social reasons; however it may be that the regulatory arena 
is being neglected as the technology outpaces it.  There have been rapid technological 
changes in the fields of PND and PGD and things have moved on radically from the sex 
selection techniques available in 1993 such as sperm sorting. The field of prenatal 
genetic testing is to be radically affected by the introduction of non-invasive prenatal 
tests (NIPD).  A NIPD test for sex selection is now available and can be purchased by 
pregnant women and simply involves testing the maternal blood. This test can be 
carried out on a woman from seven weeks into a pregnancy and it is said to be 95% 
accurate.  It is already in use at Great Ormond Street Hospital where it is argued that it 
is useful for medical grounds to detect male foetuses in cases where there is a family 
history of serious genetic disorder.  In such cases, there is a clinical advantage to 
gaining this knowledge as early as possible, as an earlier stage termination involves less 
clinical risk. The risk is however that from these uses of NIPD for sex selection, the test 
will become publicly available and pregnant women would be able to use the test in 
their own homes and may seek a selective abortion if the sex is not to their liking.  By 
omitting that they have conducted a NIPD, the pregnant woman may argue alternative 
grounds for an abortion.  Such technological advances are difficult for the regulators to 
keep apace of and arguably make the regulation redundant.  It can be proposed that 
public opinion in such circumstances is playing out in a different way in that there is 
consumption and demand for a test which arguably could be classed as an indicator of 
approval and acceptance by the public. This is in strong contrast to the polls and survey 
data which shows that the public disapprove of sex selection on non-medical grounds. 
 
 
 
                                                          
430
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6.3.3  The Regulation & Public Opinion of the Application of PGD for Inherited 
Cancer Susceptibility 
In 2005, the HFEA chose to review its licensing position in relation to the use of PGD 
for lower penetrance inherited cancers for breast and bowel. Prior to this the majority of 
the conditions licensed by the HFEA were fully penetrant which means that once a 
specific gene is found to be present, the condition will develop.  Interestingly the push 
for a public consultation on the licensing of lower penetrance conditions at this time,  in 
late 2005 was stated by the HFEA as being a response to ‘several PGD centres [which 
had] expressed an interest in applying to us to carry out PGD for breast cancer’.  Further 
to this, the HFEA had not received an application for the use of PGD in this way at the 
time of the consultation.431  The HFEA launched a public consultation, entitled ‘Choices 
and Boundaries’ in November 2005 which was concluded in January 2006.  There were 
two dimensions to the consultation: a written discussion document which was issued in 
November 2005 and left open for responses until January 2006 and a public meeting in 
December 2005.  The discussion document is an interesting approach and it sets out to 
outline the regulation of PGD, it defines penetrance, and includes a couple of true 
scenarios from women with familial experience of cancer. Following this the proposals 
to extend licensing of PGD to lower penetrance inherited cancer are delineated.  The 
respondents were invited to read this information and to answer six very lengthy 
questions.432  The conditions under discussion differed from those licensed beforehand 
in three respects: they were conditions of a lower penetrance (40-80%), they were later 
onset conditions (often affecting people in their 30s or 40s), and the conditions were in 
some cases treatable.  
The written consultation document received only 284 responses and notably 56% of 
these responses were from school pupils.433 109 people attended the public meeting and 
while there was a wider cross section of the public at this meeting, 24% were 
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 http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Choices_and_boundaries_Report_2006_summary.pdf (last accessed 
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academics, 12% IVF clinicians or scientists and 8% were patients or from patient-
groups.  It is fair to describe the meeting attendants as stakeholders rather than the 
public.  In contrast, the make-up of the written respondents was described in the HFEA 
report as ‘a significant majority were school pupils and interested non-affiliated 
members of the public’.434  However, it was on the back of the findings from this 
meeting and the written responses that the HFEA produced the decision.  The HFEA 
states repeatedly throughout the consultation document that it welcomes the views of 
the public and wants to hear the views of patients and carers.435  It is also stated in the 
document that the purpose of the discussion document is ‘to gather the views of the 
public to inform licensing decisions and help the Authority decide…..’, and ‘[T]hese 
views will help the Authority to decide if PGD should be used to detect lower 
penetrance cancer susceptibility….’436  The report produced by the HFEA on the 
consultation is a very qualitative document which has quotes from the respondents 
scattered throughout, yet this qualitative approach is to the detriment of any indication 
of how many people felt one way or another in relation to the questions asked.  All 
responses are formatted in the phrasing of: ‘Some people felt…..’ and ‘A number of 
people said that...’.  However, a breakdown of the findings can be found in a document 
produced by the HFEA’s Ethics and Law Committee who noted that ‘if people do not 
accept the current use of PGD, it was difficult for them to respond to specific questions 
about its wider use’.437  It is important to review to what extent the findings of the 
consultation fed into the HFEA decision to allow licenses for PGD for lower penetrance 
conditions including inherited cancers.438  It was found that the majority of respondents 
to the written document felt that PGD had already crossed the boundary whereas at the 
public meeting, nobody expressed this view.  As a final word on this consultation it is 
noteworthy that the HFEA states in the Choices and Boundaries Report that: 
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‘The lack of an overall consensus is probably unsurprising as it is almost impossible to 
achieve compromise or consensus on issues where the views of respondents and society 
in general are so polarised and this highlights the difficult environment in which the 
HFEA has to make decisions’.439 
The following question was asked in the BSA survey of 2003: 
‘Genetic tests can be carried out on an unborn child.  Do you agree or disagree with 
parents using such tests to help them decide whether or not to have a child that has a 
condition that means it would live in good health but would then die in its 20s or 30s?’ 
The chart below shows the responses, and one of the interesting features of the results is 
how great the deviation of response is from the responses to the other uses of PGD (see 
figure 27 in relation to a serious mental genetic condition ).  While the BSA survey 
respondents were in favour of the use of PGD to deselect a serious physical and mental 
genetic condition, when it comes to using PGD to deselect an embryo where the child 
would die in early adulthood opinion is very different, with far fewer numbers of people 
in favour of the technique for these purposes.  It is this case which shows the least 
response by the regulators to public opinion, if the Choices and Boundaries Report or 
the BSA survey are to be understood to be public opinion.  It is therefore argued that the 
regulators decided to respond to the very vocal parents and interest groups who attended 
the public meeting of the Choices and Boundary review. 
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Figure 27: Attitudes towards prenatal testing to determine whether a child will die 
in young adulthood 
  
6.3.4 The Regulation & Public Opinion of the Application of PGD for HLA 
Tissue Typing (‘Saviour Siblings’)440 
‘Trying to define what is scientifically allowable based on primary legislation doesn’t 
make any sense.  In the long term it’ll be unwieldy and people will constantly be 
pushing at the boundaries of that and parliament will have to go through this process 
again’ (Dr Minger, Director Kings Stem Cell Biology Laboratory, with reference to the 
draft Amendments to the HFE Act ).441 
One application of PGD is to use it as a means to select foetuses which have a tissue 
matched with an existing sibling thus providing the potential to use the cord blood and 
bone marrow to help an existing sibling suffering from a genetic condition such as 
Fanconi anaemia.  The term ‘saviour sibling’ was coined by the media for such cases.  It 
is argued here in terms of the relationship between public opinion and regulation that 
the driving force behind these cases has been the push for them by a very small number 
of parents.  The issue came to public attention through widespread media attention 
when the Hashmi family applied to the HFEA for a licence to carry out HLA tissue 
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typing using PGD.  Zain Hashmi suffered from the blood disorder beta thalassaemia 
major, and he needed stem cell transplantation in order to recover.  Unfortunately, 
Zain’s siblings were not compatible for a tissue match and Mrs Hashmi had one 
abortion following parental tests which showed that the foetus was not a match either.  
A subsequent pregnancy produced a healthy baby but s/he was not compatible.  It was 
following these events that the Hashmis looked into HLA tissue typing PGD, a new 
procedure which had not been authorised by the HFEA.  While PGD as part of the IVF 
procedure was not novel, tissue typing had not before been undertaken in conjunction 
with PGD.   
The HFEA issued an interim policy on preimplantation tissue typing in November 2001 
permitting a restrictive policy which allowed the procedure only in cases where PGD 
was already necessary in order to avoid disability in the future child.  Thus PGD was 
not permitted on the grounds of HLA tissue-typing alone.  This is known as ‘selection 
in two stages’ and is a critical hinge for the ethical debate in this area as it is generally a 
corollary of the argument that PGD solely for tissue-typing is unethical due to 
instrumentalisation of the embryo.442  The HFEA Licence Committee made the decision 
to issue a licence to CARE Nottingham for the treatment of Mr and Mrs Hashmi in 
February 2002 in accordance with the ‘selection in two stages’ policy.  The Hashmis 
case was given a high level of media and legal attention at the point when, following the 
second cycle of treatment, an interest group sought a judicial review against the 
HFEA’s decision to allow this procedure.  Comment on Reproductive Ethics (CORE) 
argued that the HFEA had acted ultra vires in making the decision regarding HLA tissue 
typing.  The Court of Appeal found in favour of the HFEA443.   
There was a further pushing of the HFEA’s stance in the form of a second application 
for HLA-tissue typing from the Whittaker family.  This case deviates from the Hashmis 
and tested the HFEA’s position on the two-stage test in that there was no need for PGD 
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except for the purpose of the tissue-typing.  Charlie Whittaker suffered from Diamond 
Blackfan anaemia for which there is currently no known genetic marker.  The HFEA 
retained their regulatory position and the Whittaker’s application was refused in July 
2002.  Subsequently, the Whittakers travelled to the USA for the treatment.   
Whether it was as a consequence of what Brownsword calls ‘determined purchasers’ 
putting great pressure upon the regulators, the HFEA policy did undertake a radical shift 
in July 2004 following a review of policy in this area.  This involved the HFEA relaxing 
its policy on HLA tissue typing to remove the two-stage process and to permit cases 
where PGD was not necessary except for the tissue typing.  In September 2004, the 
Fletcher family benefited from this new decision and their application for a licence 
relating to their son, who also suffered from Diamond Blackfan anaemia, was granted.  
Little has been noted in the literature of the fact that this decision by the HFEA goes 
against the International Bioethics Committee guidance which supports the two-stage 
process.444 
With reference to the attention cycle literature discussed in Chapter 4, the origins of this 
shift in regulation are critical.  In the words of Professor Emily Jackson, Member of the 
HFEA’s Ethics & Legal Committee, the change came about because ‘this is what the 
public want’.  Jackson contends that ‘the decision was made on the grounds that the law 
is not in the business of promoting moral virtue but is there to prevent harm and thus by 
permitting this technique, there is reduced harm as the child survives and there is 
reduced parental grief’.445  Emily Jackson bases her opinion upon the results of the 
HFEA’s public consultation exercise on PGD.  In the HFEA’s consultations it is clear 
that there is a need to reflect the views of two very distinct publics: one that will 
promote an individual’s right to personal autonomy (for example in this case, the 
parents pushing for HLA tissue typing) and the ‘public citizen’ who will generally 
present a less emotive opinion because the regulation has no direct effect on his/her life 
at that time.  
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The 2004 Review of the regulation relating to saviour siblings involved some limited 
public consultation which was contracted out to Opinion Leader Research who 
conducted a series of six workshops with members of the public.  Each of these six 
groups was made up of 6-8 individuals.  It was found that the participants were ‘broadly 
in favour’ of tissue typing and that there was ‘cautious approval’ for the process. The 
areas of concern centred on the seriousness of the genetic condition and there were 
greater reservations about the use of the procedure to produce a bone marrow donor. 
However the HFEA report states that these concerns ‘tended to diminish in the light of 
more information about the procedure provided by the invited experts’.446  The 
limitation of any analysis of the HFEA report is that it is very spare in its detail of the 
workshop data. The number of participants was very small and evidently benefits from 
presenting the HFEA findings in a light fashioned to suit their own outcomes.  While 
the latter comment is unsubstantiated, it is noteworthy that the report states that ‘the 
Authority concluded that research into public opinion formation had been extremely 
helpful’.447  From a series of workshops involving a maximum of 48 people, the term 
‘public opinion’ is used. 
It is interesting to review the role of the HFEA which is a regulatory authority often 
called a model for other jurisdictions, indeed it is described by Knoppers et al as 
‘probably the best model of effective oversight and licensing’.448 Yet significantly, the 
HFEA chose to adopt this regulatory line in divergence with the International Bioethics 
Committee guidance on saviour sibling cases.  The institutional dynamics of the HFEA 
as a channel for public opinion is also a very pertinent factor in these cases.  As Stimson 
contends in his discussion of dynamic representation it is essentially a question of how 
closely coupled the institutional policy is with public opinion.  Stimson states that: 
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‘A closely coupled system would have a relatively short institutional memory in the 
sense that policy will incorporate recent (as opposed to long prior) shifts in public 
opinion’.449 
The BSA Survey data from 2003 is shown in the pie-chart below.  The critical finding 
from this is that there is a very strong response in favour of saviour siblings.  
Figure 28: Attitudes towards prenatal genetic tests for tissue typing (BSA 2003) 
 
Steve Webb MP conducted an on-line survey from his constituents prior to the House of 
Commons free vote on savour siblings which was part of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology bill now enacted as the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008.  In 
this survey it was found that 56% of the respondents were in favour and 39% against the 
amendments to the HFE 1990 Act specifically relating saviour siblings.  These 
amendments included: extending the treatment to ‘serious’ as well as ‘life-threatening’ 
conditions, and extending the scope of the treatment from the use of stem cells from the 
umbilical cord blood only to allow the possibility of treatment using other types of 
tissue and cells from the sibling – although not permitting the transplantation of whole 
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organs.  As McLean highlights the HFE Act 2008 was significant in increasing the 
‘lawfulness of the creation of so-called ‘saviour siblings’ because prior to this there was 
no statute in place from which the HFEA could determine regulatory policy. 
Where are the public here?  In terms of locating public opinion in this area, it is evident 
that there was no public backlash to the Hashmi case. Equally, the results from the BSA 
survey in 2003 and (while less robust and representative) the results of Steve Webb’s 
survey,450 both show that while this is potentially a controversial issue, the general 
consensus is in favour.  Evidently however there are some very strong oppositional 
views which are stressed by the interests groups, including CORE the pro-life charity, 
LIFE and GeneWatch, but which have not had an impact on the direction of the 
regulation. 
6.4  Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Termination: The Parents’ Voice as 
Public Opinion? 
It is interesting to question the weight, if any, that should be given to a pregnant woman 
and prospective parent’s view surrounding a positive test result which pertains to a 
higher than average risk of a genetic condition.  Issues such as the clinical advice and 
support are critical at this stage in terms of the prospective parent’s knowledge of the 
degree of risk and the seriousness of such a condition for a child and future adult.  In 
relation to the concept of public opinion it is often the views of the affected prospective 
parents which are referred to as an alternative sample to that of the ‘general’ public 
which are randomly selected.  In responding to a survey question relating to this issue, 
where would one put oneself - in the position of the parents or as a member of the 
public for whom this has never been an issue?  In respect of how a survey respondent 
situates him or herself, the framing of the survey question is crucial. 
Under the current legislation a number of reasons are specified for which an abortion 
may be undertaken.451  The relevant section in the context of this study are those 
abortions which are carried out under section 1(d) of the Abortion Act 1967 which 
permits an abortion in cases where ‘there is a substantial risk that if the child were born 
it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously 
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handicapped’.  The statutory requirements need to be viewed in association with the 
social justifications given in a decision to terminate a pregnancy where such serious 
handicap is perceived.  In such cases the principal reasons cited are the disruption to the 
family that the birth of a child with serious handicap would cause and the lack of a 
decent quality of life for the unborn child.  The medical authorities will also refer to the 
cost-effectiveness of the prenatal testing and therapeutic abortion in relation to the costs 
of medically supporting children and adults with serious genetic conditions. 
I wish to focus here on the question of whether there is evidence of a correlation 
between the increased number of prenatal genetic tests available and the number of 
abortions on the grounds of genetic conditions.  There has been a strong push for 
prenatal testing and diagnosis to be rolled out and offered across the board to pregnant 
women.  Indeed the Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing (ACGT, now subsumed 
into the Human Genetics Commission) proposed in 2000 that screening tests for all 
serious genetic conditions should be offered to pregnant women.452   
6.4.1 Is there a correlation between increased prenatal genetic diagnosis and 
elective abortion rates for serious mental and/or physical genetic conditions? 
Abortion statistics are collected annually by the National Statistics Online (ONS) 
database.  For the purposes of this study I examined the data inputs for each year and 
have extracted the numbers of abortions carried out under section 1(d) of the Abortion 
Act 1967.  These statistics can be sub-divided further into either chromosomal 
abnormalities and/or for Down’s Syndrome.  I have collated the data and supplied 
percentages of the number of abortions carried out under section 1(d) as a percentage of 
the total, and the percentage of abortions relating to chromosomal and Down’s 
syndrome in relation to the total number of abortions under section 1(d) of the Abortion 
Act 1967.   
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Table 29: Legal abortions under section 1(d) of the Abortion Act 1967 
Year Total 
legal 
abortions 
Total legal 
abortions 
under section 
1(d) 
Number of 
abortions  
carried out 
under section 
1(d) as a % of 
total of all 
legal abortions 
Number of 
abortions 
carried out on 
the grounds of a 
chromosomal 
abnormality 
Chromosomal 
as a % of 
total number 
of abortions 
under section 
1(d) 
Number 
of 
abortions 
on 
grounds 
of Down's 
Syndrome 
Down's 
Syndrome 
as % of 
total 
ground 
number of 
abortions 
under 
section 
1(d) 
1995 163638 1828 1.12 468 25.6 283 15.5 
1996 177495 1929 1.08 561 29.1 303 15.7 
1997 179746 1853 1.03 580 31.3 316 17.1 
1998 177871 1903 1.07 578 30.4 339 17.8 
1999 173701 1902 1.09 613 32.2 333 17.5 
2000 175542 1927 1.09 637 33.1 353 18.3 
2001 176364 1822 1.03 615 33.8 358 19.6 
2002 175900 2008 1.14 732 36.5 389 19.4 
2003 181606 2077 1.14 731 35.3 401 19.3 
2004 185414 2018 1.08 749 37.1 430 21.3 
2005 186400 2053 1.1 776 37.8 429 20.9 
2006 193700 2172 1.12 797 36.7 448 20.6 
2007 205598 2074 1.01 778 37.5 437 21.1 
 
My aim is to ascertain whether the increased number of prenatal tests has led to 
increased abortions under section 1(d) the Abortion Act.  In 1999, the screening test for 
Down’s Syndrome was offered to 70% of pregnant women who were deemed to be at 
risk of the disease (risk was highly related to the over-35 mother group at this time).  By 
2001, this figure was 80%.453  It is argued here that there exists a general acceptance by 
both the public and clinicians of the informative role of screening, for example, to show 
that a foetus has a higher risk of being born with Down’s Syndrome, yet this isn’t the 
case for the operative part, for example, the decision to have a selective abortion on the 
grounds that the foetus has a severe genetic condition.  From 1995 to 2007, it is evident 
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that there has been a significant rise in the number of abortions on the grounds of the 
foetus having Down’s syndrome. Allied to this finding is that, of the abortions carried 
out under section 1(d) of the Abortion Act, the percentage for Down’s syndrome has 
risen from being 15.5 % of the total number to 21.1% over the years 1995-2007.  This 
correlates with the increase in prenatal genetic diagnosis taking place over this period. 
There is research into the gap between what people say in surveys and their actions.  A 
study was undertaken by Corral-Verdugo in the late 1990s in relation to people’s 
recycling habits which highlighted a gap between their competencies and their 
beliefs.454  Relating this study to these statistics on abortion and the responses given in, 
inter alia, the BSA survey, there is an argument to be made that there is a relationship 
between the increase in diagnoses of Down’s Syndrome that has led to an increase in 
abortions of foetuses with this condition. However, it is notable that the percentage of 
cases of abortions under section 1(d) of the Abortion Act has not increased over the 
period measured – in 1995 abortions in this section accounted for 1.12% of total 
abortions and in 2007, this figure was 1.01.  This would therefore suggest that, while 
diagnosis of serious genetic conditions in prenatal testing is increasing, with the 
exception of Down’s Syndrome there is no indication of an increase in selective 
abortions arising from this. 
6.5 The regulators’ views of public opinion 
The public opinion data has been explored and it is interesting to enrich these findings 
with the comments of the regulators as an insight into their views on public opinion.  A 
member of the HFEA commented on the problematic nature of public consultations by 
stating that: 
‘one of the interesting things about consultation is that you get so few responses…it’s 
not the best way of gaining a view of what the public think, you only get a tiny slice of 
the public’. 
A second Member of the HFEA stated that it was ‘hard to say’ whether the HFEA’s 
consultations were an effective measurement of public opinion and she commented 
further that in relation to the responses to consultations: ‘what have we gained by asking 
                                                          
454
 Corral-Verdugo, Victor, ‘Dual Realities of Conservation Behaviour: Self-Reports versus Observations 
of Re-use and Recycling Behaviour’,  Journal of Environmental Psychology, Volume 17 (Issue 2), June 
1997, pp.135-145. 
220 
 
a question which 30 people respond to?’  The regulators interviewed for this thesis 
included members of the HFEA, the HGC, a clinical geneticist who was a Member of 
the HFEA and the Director of the Genetic Interest Group (GiG).  GiG is an umbrella 
group for approximately 140 member organisations which range from large NGOs such 
as Cancer Research UK to smaller interest groups. In the first instance it is important to 
view the role Mr Kent, Director of GiG plays, as GiG is a hugely influential interest 
group in this field.  With reference to partiality and being a member of the HGC while 
also chairing GiG, Mr Kent’s observes that:  
‘…as a member of the HGC, I am not there as Director of GiG, I am there as an 
individual appointed in my own right and that is a useful fiction, of course it is a fiction 
because they could have appointed me as a representative from the top of the Clapham 
omnibus but I think it is probable that I was asked to join because of the perspective I 
could give being Director of GiG…..’ 
In the course of the interviews and from researching the make-up of the regulatory 
bodies, two issues emerge vis a vis regulators and partiality.  Firstly, we see this concept 
of a ‘useful fiction’ and the idea that individuals have been appointed as non-partisan 
yet will inevitably maintain their own personal agenda.  Secondly, regarding partiality 
on a regulatory body, it is noteworthy that there is a very high ratio of Members of the 
HFEA who are geneticists.  For instance, of the eighteen Members of the HFEA, half 
are involved in clinical genetics.  This last point is not in itself a criticism of the running 
of the regulatory body, for there is clearly a need to involve clinical members in order to 
gain a full understanding of the issues being discussed and it is evidently not wise to 
ignore sources of specialist knowledge.  It will, however, impact upon regulatory 
decision-making and may have implications for the recourse of the regulators to public 
opinion.  Will a regulator prefer to determine a case in view of the specialist knowledge 
over what is perhaps deemed the uniformed view of the public?  As Mr Kent succinctly 
comments in relation to the partiality of regulators: ‘there clearly is a feed through, you 
don’t leave your GiG hat at the door of the HGC meeting’. 
All of the interviewees were asked whether they believed that the level of 
responsiveness of regulators to public opinion has altered over time, and there was a 
consensus that public engagement had increased over the last decade which is evidently 
a related but different matter.  However, as a member of the HFEA highlighted, the 
presumption in favour of consultation may be partly attributed to compliance with the 
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Cabinet Office Code of Practice on consultation.455  Mr Kent believes that ‘there’s been 
a fairly steady and growing recognition of the importance of listening to the end-users’.  
Of course, the end-users in this case are a select group in relation to PGD, and while 
they are a much larger number in relation to prenatal testing, they would not 
unanimously be regarded as ‘the public’.  While this noticeable increase in public 
engagement has occurred, levels of responsiveness are less predictable.  Although a 
member of the HFEA stated that ‘one example where public opinion was absolutely 
decisive was sex selection’, this is not the case for all the public consultations in this 
field.  The same member additionally commented that it would not be appropriate to 
consult on every single genetic condition as ‘that wouldn’t make sense’.  However, a 
further Member of the HFEA pertinently commented that ‘there’s a need to gauge what 
the regulators are doing…which is broadly kept in line with what individuals think is 
ok’, which suggests that this regulator believes that the regulation is responsive to 
public opinion. 
The regulators interviewed were quite open about discarding uninformed responses, as 
one regulator observes: 
‘There are ways of consulting that are really meaningful but they take a great deal of 
effort, the public find some things more interesting at certain times….we have to 
consult but we do sometimes get some really terrible responses’ (HFEA Member). 
There was also agreement that knowledge of PGD among the general public had not 
increased over the last 5-10 years.  Contradictorily, however, one HFEA member 
discussed the influence of a television programme which portrayed very emotively a 
family looking into the application of HLA tissue typing.  This interviewee mentioned 
that a shift occurred upon airing and that there was a noticeable impact on both the 
representation of such issues by the press and the views of the general public, which 
became more favourable towards the issue.  This contradiction may suggest a difference 
of definition between being informed about and being more familiar with PGD.  
Interviewee 2, also a Member of the HFEA, opined that the press often misrepresent 
PGD by placing articles ‘that say a child with a squint will get it’. She went on to 
comment that ‘I mean if someone in Eastenders went and had PGD it would be a great!’ 
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In this thesis it is argued that in the capture of public opinion by regulators there is 
something akin to ‘imaginary public opinion’ taking place in that regulators and 
politicians alike will often discuss the public mood, the public opinion etc. but without 
acknowledging any data or evidence to back up this portrayal of the public opinion to 
which they allude.  While the interviewees were asked whether they pick up signals 
from people they meet, this was played down by them and they all wished to argue that 
they were more interested in robust public opinion data.  What is happening here?  With 
regard to understandings of public opinion used by regulators, one interviewee 
comments that ‘it is not possible to take every belief factor into account all the time so 
you have to do your best to distil out what is seen as broad consensus and you know if 
you asked me what that meant I couldn’t tell you…it becomes very complex.’  In the 
course of the interviews, the regulators switched between many different understandings 
of public opinion: in some cases discussing members of the public, parents who utilise 
PGD, the media (generally the press but some mention of television), survey data, and 
findings from HFEA and HGC consultations.     
I discussed with the interviewees the findings from the BSA data which show that there 
is a less positive response to the application of PGD relative to that for prenatal testing.  
This is of note because many consultants voice the view that PGD is far less invasive 
than prenatal treatments which may result in a selective abortion and as such should be 
preferred.  When these two points were raised in the interview, it is interesting that two 
of the interviewees asked what the source of the data was and questioned its value.  
Interviewee 2, a Member of the HFEA commented that she would ‘question the survey 
and whether it was an educated response….people who’ve been through prenatal testing 
to that level…..well, it’s just horrific’.   
A Member of the HFEA who was actively involved in the Choices and Boundaries 
Review argued that despite it having been set up with the intention of being a public 
debate, it failed.  The interviewee stated that the people who attended included members 
of CORE456, family groups who suffered from severe genetic diseases, school children 
and professionals.  In this regard, the interviewee commented ‘there were very few 
people who came off the streets because they thought it would be a jolly interesting 
debate’.  The debate itself, the interviewee argued, was dominated by the groups of 
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families who had severe genetic diseases who spoke about their experiences in a very 
moving and emotive manner and argued strongly that everything possible should be 
done to avoid certain genetic conditions.  As a consequence the interviewee concluded 
that the members of CORE who are known to vociferously attack genetic testing and 
PGD ‘hardly said a word’.  To this effect the interviewee felt that a genuine debate did 
not take place. 
In questions of balancing the wishes of the select group of patients/users of the 
technology with the views of the population as a whole, where should the regulator 
stand?  It is very difficult not to keep returning to the normative question about how 
responsive to public opinion the regulator should be.  At a wider level some criticism 
was levelled against the HFEA in a 2005 House of Commons Report which suggested 
that it was active beyond its discretionary powers and mandate.  The Commons Select 
Committee stated that: ‘the current regulatory model, which provides the HFEA with a 
large amount of policymaking flexibility, should be replaced with a system which 
devolves clinical decision-making and technical standards down to patients and 
professionals’.457  How this is best achieved is a knotty issue however, as it suggests the 
need for a fairly permissive regulatory framework. 
To summarise the interviewees, it is necessary to stress that the regulators spoken to all 
believed that public opinion data was a valuable input into the regulatory process, it was 
the degree to which its inclusion was taken that was up for question.  While the 
limitations of with the data were discussed, it is evident that the IRAs and the individual 
regulators are undertaking a ‘best endeavours approach’ and are keen to have up-to-
date, robust data.  Although it should be noted that a member of the HFEA was of the 
opinion that public consultation is something you can have too much of, and she holds 
that ‘there are areas where I don’t think the public has a very strong view’.458 
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6.6 Conclusions 
Public confidence and support can be derived from familiarity with the object being 
regulated but equally the regulation per se can shape public opinion and lead to public 
acceptance.  However as a caveat to this, it is generally in reference to strict or 
prohibitive regulation that much is made of the correlation between regulation and 
public acceptance, for example, in relation to the stringent regulation of embryo 
research in the UK. 
There are factors that make public opinion, or reference to public opinion by the 
regulators irrelevant. Some of these factors relate to public understanding or knowledge 
of the techniques in practice, such as levels of clinical utility and the fact that genetic 
consultants argue that the distress (both physical and emotional) of prenatal testing in 
conjunction with a selected termination far outweighs that of undergoing PGD.  If the 
public are unaware of such issues then it becomes a normative issue as to who should be 
driving the direction of the regulation. 
In terms of public opinion, it is argued here that the most clearly heard voices in the 
case of PGD are the clinicians.  Prenatal testing is interesting in contrast as it has 
attracted very low levels of public interest and as such has not been the subject of public 
consultation, whereas there have been several large scale public consultations on 
various applications of PGD which singles it out as being subject to special regulatory 
handling.  It is not clear whether the higher prominence of PGD results from its special 
handling or from the movements of the HFEA in capturing the regulatory space and 
proving their legitimacy.   
The decision to prohibit the use of PGD for sex selection on social grounds is a very 
clear response to public opinion as understood to be the aggregation of individual 
opinions.  The views highlighted in the survey support this regulatory stance.  However 
in the use of PGD for cases of lower penetrance diseases, the regulators have taken their 
own regulatory decision.  It may be that the regulators believe this to be in the best 
interests of the public by responding to the interest groups.  A further factor has been 
the increased sophistication of the lobbying by NGOs and their increased access to 
formal channels of decision-making, such as the role played by the Director of GiG as a 
member of the HGC.  It is often the case that those outside of the formal channels are 
deemed to be the public – so the increased access of interest groups to the formal 
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channels has in some way shifted the perception of them so that they are no longer 
representatives of the public.  
 
The influence of the clinicians is very pervasive in the regulation of PGD and prenatal 
testing.  With reference to PGD, as mentioned above, a high number of the members of 
both the HFEA and the HGC are clinical geneticists.  I attended a meeting which was 
described as a public consultation on the provisions for PGD in the 8th Code of Practice 
in 2009459 and was overwhelmed by the number of clinical geneticists.  The meeting 
was not what I was expecting in that apart from a very small number of representatives 
of interest groups, it was HFEA members and clinicians.  I later requested a list of all 
those who had attended this ‘public’ meeting and was told that this information was not 
available under the Data Protection Act!  This does not give the impression of 
transparency in relation to consultation exercises.   
It should be asked whether PGD merits all this attention when the numbers of cases are 
so rare. While it is the case that many of the applications of PGD are controversial, the 
rapid developments in the range of tests carried out prenatally should surely merit more 
attention?  I contend that the role of the HFEA has been paramount in the attention 
received by PGD and its subsequent special regulatory handling relative to prenatal 
testing.  What will be interesting to follow in the future will be the advancement of non-
invasive prenatal diagnosis, the ease with which these tests can be purchased on the 
internet, and the impact of NIPD on PGD and prenatal testing. 
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Chapter 7 
 Thesis Conclusions 
7.0 Introduction  
This thesis has focused on the interactions of regulation and public opinion by tracking 
the relationships between these two variables in relation to GM foods and prenatal 
testing and PGD.  In the course of this research some interesting insights have emerged 
about the ways that regulation impacts on public opinion, and equally how public 
opinion feeds into the regulatory process.  It is reiterated here that despite the 
significance of this field of study not only to academics but also to regulators and 
politicians, these interactions have been neglected in social science research.  The 
reasons why this field has not been researched widely may be a consequence of the 
challenging nature of the subject matter, which arises from the difficulty of mapping the 
correlations between regulation and public opinion.  The dynamics at play are often 
difficult to draw out when a multitude of factors are involved.   
The central premise driving this thesis is that there needs to be a questioning of the 
rhetoric surrounding the elevated role given to public opinion by the regulators in the 
regulation of genomics.  This questioning concerns what the input is, whether the 
rationale behind the rhetoric is justified, and whether it is all just rhetoric or whether in 
practice public opinion is playing an important role in shaping the regulation of 
genomics.  One of the principal reasons given for the enhanced role of public opinion in 
the regulation of genomics has been that this area is rife with ethical and controversial 
issues which give cause for public concern.  An additional question was therefore added 
to the study, asking what the capacity of the regulation is to alleviate public concern.    
It is in the response to these questions that the original contribution of this thesis to the 
field of socio-legal studies and political science is made.  The contribution of the thesis 
is three fold: it has a novel methodology, a challenging and novel subject of analysis, 
and presents original findings.   
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Methodological originality is derived from the novel application of mixed-methods in 
conjunction with the analysis of various sources of public opinion data.  The 
methodological approach will be evaluated later in this chapter.   
The second and principal means by which this thesis offers an original contribution 
relates to the subject matter of the research.  While the role of public opinion in the 
regulation of genomics has received a great deal of attention from academics, the 
specific interactions have not.  Additionally, the models of opinion-responsiveness have 
not been applied to this sector.  The thesis offers a unique and nuanced level of 
description and analysis to this field.  The role played by regulation and the IRAs on 
public opinion of genomics has not been covered by the existing literature.  In 
undertaking this thesis the analysis of the diverse data sources has given a richness and 
depth to the study. 
The third area of original contribution is the research findings. While a privileged role is 
given to public opinion in the regulation of genomics in the policy making rhetoric, it is 
argued that this is not carried through to practice for two reasons: firstly, the data is not 
representative, and secondly, the understanding of the public is more clearly that of 
stakeholders.  Seven areas are highlighted below which draw out the various dynamics 
and interactions between the two variables of regulation and public opinion.  These 
issues have been at the heart of the thesis and are: 
1. understandings of public opinion in the regulation of genomics  
2. the role of regulation in the alleviation of public concerns over genomics 
3. the representativeness of the public opinion data used in the regulatory process 
4. the use of public opinion as a means to boost IRA credibility and increase 
regulatory share  
5. the privileged role given to public opinion in the regulation of genomics  
6. the regulators’ views on public opinion 
7. special regulatory handling and the idiosyncrasies of the regulation of genomics 
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In this chapter, these seven areas are discussed in terms of the research findings, 
following which the methodology is evaluated to draw out its merits and limitations.  
This leads into a discussion of lessons learned from this research in terms of application 
to other areas of novel technology, and a final section on possibilities for further 
research prompted by this study. 
 
7.1 Understandings of Public Opinion in the Regulation of Genomics  
There is a very powerful normative pressure upon regulators to not only refer to public 
opinion but to respond to it in the course of regulatory decision-making.  Appropriate or 
effective levels of responsiveness to public opinion are not the focus of this thesis, but 
what is central is who, if anyone, the regulators are responding to, in terms of who is 
represented by the public opinion data.  Throughout the thesis it has been established 
that there is a substantial and fundamental difference between the measured impact of 
what is called ‘public opinion’ on the direction of the regulation and the ways that 
public opinion is used rhetorically by regulators in discussion. The underlying issue 
which has been analysed in this thesis is that while the regulators discuss public 
opinion, they cross cut and interchange between different meanings of public opinion.  
In some instances they are discussing the public opinion data which has resulted from a 
consultation process and in others they are referring to the views of stakeholders.  A 
particularly interesting finding that emerged from the interview data was that they all 
agreed that public opinion date is not representative of public opinion.  However, 
paradoxically, while these regulators deem public opinion data to be unrepresentative 
they agree that it retains a prominent role as an input into regulatory decision-making.   
In the thesis the various understandings and definitions of public opinion have been 
ring-fenced into five groups and this has assisted the analysis and been a useful heuristic 
device. However, in conclusion it appears that one either opts for Zaller’s belief that 
public opinion simply does not exist, or holds the view that public opinion evades 
capture.  The regulatory process demands that regulators and regulatory agencies 
continue to strive for robust data on public opinion, but it is critical that regulators 
acknowledge that there is no alethic truth that equates to public opinion.  What remains 
however, is for regulators and academics alike to find working definitions and 
understandings relating to the public opinion data used which denotes what such data 
represents.  Within the regulatory process, the many and varied representations of public 
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opinion will continue to co-exist as a result of NGO lobbying, elite and stakeholder 
views, survey data and consultation exercises, not ignoring the huge role played by the 
media.  The thesis has made clear that it is not a case of only analysing the relationship 
between public opinion and regulation: a third variable has been at play – that of public 
opinion data.   
In contrasting the two case-studies, it has been argued here that the perceived role of the 
regulation has played a part in the weighting given to public opinion.  While the 
regulatory rhetoric is that regulation is responsive to public opinion, it is argued here 
that due to the nature of the public opinion data used, it is more apparent that regulators 
are acting in response to the principal stakeholders.  For GM foods this means balancing 
the demands of the suppliers of GM produce, the retailers and the anti-GM NGOs. With 
reference to prenatal genetic diagnosis and prenatal testing, the response is to the 
clinicians, and the applicant couples.  In neither case, therefore, is it an aggregation of 
individuals or the majority view that is prominent in the decision-making process.   
Regulation has the capacity to facilitate, to enable, to prohibit and to protect people 
from risk, which is interesting in terms of the two case-studies.  The role of regulation 
in GM foods is very complex, and while it may be may first appear as a system 
designed to protect people from the perceived risks of GM foods, it may be more 
realistic to see the regulation in this arena as a mechanism to enable the companies 
producing GM foods to survive in the EU, while the label gives the consumer a choice 
through information.  The lack of scientific unanimity surrounding the safety of GM 
foods will remain a hindrance to regulatory resolution in this field.  As regards the 
second case-study, prenatal testing and PGD, the regulation sets out to enable 
individuals to be able to benefit from these technologies.  As has been argued in the 
preceding chapter however, the regulation of prenatal testing and PGD is driven by the 
clinicians, the applicant parents and NGOs.  Indeed many regulators, members of the 
HFEA and HGC are also clinicians.  It has been argued here that this blurring of the 
regulatory role, in conjunction with increased access to regulatory processes by NGOs, 
while not amounting to a high level of regulatory capture, should lead regulators to re-
evaluate their understandings of what constitutes the public.  The public have moved 
into the policy rooms and often public consultations and public meetings are 
stakeholder only affairs. As the public consultation processes outlined showed, whether 
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by self-selection of participants or invited participants, the resulting committee 
structures are very similar.  As a regulator from the FSA commented:  
‘actually reaching out to Joe Bloggs I don’t think it really sort of happens to be honest 
we’ve got individuals who take a vested interests in GM and they come to consultations 
but the general public aren’t involved in those sort of consultations’.   
The number of stakeholders has grown as a corollary of the enhanced recourse to public 
consultation and this has had two impacts: firstly, these stakeholders are often conflated 
with the public; and secondly, there is the illusion that there is a public beyond the 
debates, one which is often alluded to but which is not defined. 
7.2 The Role of Regulation in Alleviation of Public Concerns over Genomics 
There is no question that regulation has an impact on public opinion and this effect is 
linked to public trust in regulatory institutions and to the regulation per se.  Three 
interconnected factors are at play in the capacity of regulation to alleviate public 
concerns over genomics and these are: 
(i) The regulations 
(ii) The regulatory structure – the IRAs 
(iii) The nature of the inclusion of public opinion in the regulatory process 
 
These three factors are connected to the level of responsiveness of the regulators to 
public concern, but it is argued here that in the cases discussed in this thesis, the 
existence of these factors alone has an impact regardless of the level of responsiveness 
to the public opinion input.  Thus the public feel that there is a level of protection 
provided by the regulations regardless of their knowledge of the detail of the regulation. 
Likewise, there is a level of surety derived from knowing that there exists an IRA which 
is responsible for a regulatory object.  Finally, the assumption that public opinion is 
taken into account in the regulatory process provides assurance that democratic 
principles are being upheld.  Interestingly, whether the findings of a public consultation 
are responded to by the regulatory stance or whether the participants of the consultation 
were all stakeholders does not detract from the capacity to reassure the public.   
In the UK the regulation has balanced a permissive style which facilitates the 
availability of products derived from genomics with necessary and tightly governed 
oversight safeguards.  This policy has engendered a level of trust in some of the 
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products and imbued them with an authority which runs along the lines that ‘it must be 
safe because it’s in the shops’ or ‘it’s a procedure offered to me in the hospital’.  
However, the correlation between the regulation and the alleviation of public concern is 
not as straightforward as the case of GM foods illustrates.  In the analysis in Chapter 5, 
it was a useful heuristic to stratify the public and to identify and highlight the different 
effects of regulation on groups of the public.  In very general terms the most evident 
trend arising from the BSA survey data in relation to GM foods was the very dramatic 
rise in the numbers of respondents who said that they neither agreed nor disagreed with 
the statements on GM foods.  It was purported in Chapter 5 that this related finding was 
a response to the lack of scientific unanimity surrounding the issue of risks posed by 
GM foods and it is argued that the labelling regime has helped to engender uncertainty.   
The second principal finding relating to the BSA survey data was the smaller increase in 
size over time of those who were pro-GM foods.  With reference to the entrenchment 
model a narrative is outlined in Chapter 5 which relates to those people who are 
opposed to GM foods and whose opposition has become more entrenched as a result of 
the regulation.  The entrenchment model is supported by the BSA survey and 
Eurobarometer data showing that the more knowledge someone has on GM foods the 
more likely they are to be anti-GM.  The opponents to GM have reduced by a small 
amount according to the BSA survey data, although the Eurobarometer data shows that 
the opposition levels remain high.  Pertinently, groups opposed to GM are the most 
vociferous in campaigning and undoubtedly have the loudest voice, giving them a 
strong influence.  It has been shown that the regulation has been highly responsive to 
this group.  The argument that familiarisation with a product leads to increased support 
or reduced opposition ties in with the deficit model.  However, according to the survey 
data, the opposite effect has been shown to have occurred. 
Turning to the second case study, the role of the IRA in helping maintain public trust is 
critical, and the Government’s proposal to abolish the HFEA and transfer its duties 
together with those of the HTA to the Care Quality Commission (CQC) has met some 
strong opposition, not least in the press.  The New Statesman maintained that: 
‘Without a distinct, visible body to oversee reproductive ethics, scientists in the field 
stand to lose public trust’.460 
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This comment adds weight to the argument that regulatory institutions act in an 
overarching capacity, providing the authority to engender trust in the activities they 
oversee and to those, such as the scientists, who undertake the activities.  The following 
further comment by The Guardian in relation to the proposed abolition of the HFEA 
provides an interesting slant on both public opinion and how the HFEA behave.  It 
states: 
‘The abolition of the HFEA will leave a major policy vacuum in biotech ethics.  
Without intervention it’ll be filled by the Daily Mail’. 461 
While it is very clear that public concern over prenatal tests and the use of PGD are not 
on a par with the concerns surrounding GM foods, there is a level of controversy and 
ethical debate about the use of PGD particularly.  The challenge arises in the separation 
of the role of regulation as a force for placating public concerns from the more gradual 
erosion of concern over the technologies which has occurred in response to increased 
familiarisation with them.  The role of familiarisation contrasts strongly in this context 
with the way it has played out in GM foods. 
Interconnected with the influence of familiarisation on public understanding and public 
opinion in relation to novel technologies are the nature and the pitch of the regulation.  
The regulatory ethos of GM food regulation is centred on the debate over the contested 
harm whereas prenatal testing and PGD regulation is focussed on harnessing the 
contested benefits.  Despite the different focuses of the regulation, the oversight 
mechanisms are designed to achieve the same outcomes: to facilitate the products or 
techniques in conjunction with protecting the public from harm. The capacity of strict 
regulation to result in high levels of public trust is discussed earlier in the thesis with 
reference to the work of Lofstedt.  The impact of strict and prohibitive regulation was 
very clearly played out when the moratorium was placed upon GM foods.  The public 
opinion data shows that the public were placated by the moratorium on GM foods.  The 
moratorium engendered a level of trust in the IRAs and regulation per se as a means of 
protection from the risks posed by GM foods, perceived or otherwise.  The moratorium 
on GM is viewed here as a shrewd development by regulators in that it gave them time 
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to gain public trust while additionally allowing a rethink on the appropriate means to 
reintroduce GM foods in the future and as such respond to the commercial sector 
pushing for this to happen.  Following the moratorium the regulators chose to 
reintroduce GM products in conjunction with labelling regulation, thus responding both 
to the concerns of the public and to the producers and suppliers of GM products. 
A common thread linking the case-studies is uncertainty surrounding these novel 
techniques and products.  There exists conflict over the potential benefits and risks 
posed by GM foods and prenatal testing and PGD.  This uncertainty and lack of 
consensus is central to the regulatory style.  It can be argued that while both case-
studies are subject to special regulatory handling, the regulation of GM foods has been 
treated in a very different way to the handling of other novel foods and this has simply 
been because of the technology used to produce the products.  In the case of PGD, the 
special regulatory treatment pertains to the disproportionate amount of regulatory 
activity and resources that have been devoted to it relative to the number of people who 
benefit from it.  This last point is not normative in that while it is disproportionate it can 
be seen to be justified.  As regards prenatal testing, the regulatory field is very different 
in that there are no specific regulations but a system of generic procedural safeguards 
and licensing regulations. 
7.3 The Representativeness of the Public Opinion Data used in the Regulatory 
Process 
While varied sources of public opinion data have been analysed throughout the thesis, 
there has been a greater role devoted to survey data as it has been used as a comparator 
against which the public opinion data collected by the IRAs can be analysed.  As with 
all sources of data, survey data is limited in what it can represent and the limitations of 
this data have been outlined in earlier chapters.  While survey data will evidently never 
be representative of public opinion, it is argued here that the majority of the limitations 
of survey data arise from the failure to adequately establish the purpose behind the 
collection of the data at the outset of the research process.  As a consequence, survey 
data is often inchoate and inconsistent; the questions change their wording over time 
reducing the opportunity for longitudinal study and evaluation of whether public 
opinion is changing as a result of regulation.  Further limitations arise as a consequence 
of the ad hoc funding provision which may be subject to the political salience of a topic.   
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With reference to the various sources of public opinion data, I return to the claim made 
by Sturgis et al in relation to the genomics questions in the BSA survey that: 
‘While we make no claims to having fostered a public dialogue by administering the 
questions in this survey, we believe that our findings are a good deal more robust and 
representative of public preferences on these issues than can ever be produced by such 
exercises in public ‘consultation’’.462   
In accordance with the findings of the thesis, it has been shown that the participants in 
the public consultations are stakeholders with a vested interest in the object under 
discussion.  Survey data and especially the BSA survey which has a sample that is 
representative and large is undoubtedly more representative of the general public than 
the consultations.  This raises the question again as to why IRAs prefer to conduct 
public consultations rather than carry out surveys or look at data collected, for example, 
by Eurobarometer or the BSA survey.   
There was agreement amongst the regulators interviewed that they do not have the time 
to keep up with the latest public opinion data and they rely on the external relations 
teams of their respective IRAs to both keep abreast of this data and to summarise data 
findings. Importantly the data often is not in a form which is readily digestible by the 
regulatory process.  One of the most important elements gleaned from the interview data 
was the ‘representative paradox’.  When asked whether the public opinion data was 
representative, they would say it was not, and that it had limitations. However, when 
asked about the value of their own institution’s public opinion data collection exercises, 
these were not only deemed of extreme importance, they were held as being indicative 
of the public mood.   
In the interviews, I introduced the findings of the BSA survey to initiate a response 
from the interviewees.  The data introduced pertained to each of the case-studies as 
related to the regulator being interviewed.  Two of the interviewees were highly critical 
of the BSA survey data findings, before asking the source.  The pertinent point is that 
later in the interviews the interviewees introduced data that they felt happy with and 
presented it as being representative. 
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7.4 The use of public opinion as a means to boost IRA credibility and increase 
regulatory share 
Regulatory lacunae are a common feature in the regulation of areas of fast developing 
science and technology.  An interesting focus is to ask how the IRAs and the regulators 
have capitalised on these gaps in the regulation of genomics.  This activity is in addition 
to the other feature demonstrated by the IRAs, debated throughout this thesis, which is 
the role given to the public opinion input in the regulatory decision making process.  As 
a procedural input, public opinion has been given an enhanced role in this field, but it is 
the quantifiable level of the input which has been put to the test in the course of this 
thesis.  In terms of the ways it has been used as an input, differentiation is required 
between the rhetorical discussion of the need to respond to public opinion and the 
substantive role that it has played.  There is additionally the question of responsiveness 
of the regulator to public opinion.  It has been argued in this thesis that firstly, reference 
to public opinion increases credibility and gives legitimacy to decision-making and, 
secondly, it can be viewed as a means to remove the IRA from full responsibility for the 
decisions made, which is useful in areas of controversial science and technology. 
Public opinion has an enhanced role in the domain of genomics as a result of a number 
of factors which were outlined in earlier chapters. However in addition to the arguments 
made for the inclusion of public opinion in the regulatory process, there has been a 
noticeable carving out of the regulatory space by IRAs in the field of genomics.  While 
competing for regulatory space is not a novel activity, what makes it noteworthy is that 
the ethical controversies surrounding genomics have facilitated these expansionist 
tendencies.   
Rothstein argues that: 
‘[c]ontemporary preoccupations with risk are driven less by a changing distribution of 
real, or imagined, ills in society, than by a changing distribution of ills in 
governance’.463 
Rothstein talks in terms of regulators having to justify their aims as a result of the 
increased systems of scrutiny and transparency that they are subject to.  Rothstein 
argues that a response to this has been for regulators to reframe regulatory objects in 
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terms of risk.464  As has been discussed, the risks posed by GM foods are contested, and 
while the regulation is nominally risk based, these risks are not measurable, which 
creates problems for the regulators.  However, regulators are compelled to justify their 
aims and the enhanced role and reference given to public opinion as a rhetorical aid for 
regulators has been one recourse in the case of genomics.  The concept of risk 
colonisation which is developed by Rothstein also serves to broaden this discussion 
about the use of public opinion in regulation, in that it may help account for why rare 
procedures such as PGD receive disproportionate amounts of regulatory attention and 
political salience. 
The HFEA has been very actively seeking to carve out a regulatory space which denotes 
a level of authority and this is seen in the number of consultations being commissioned 
by the HFEA on different applications of PGD, whereas prenatal genetic testing, which 
falls outside of the HFEA’s remit has not received the same attention.  The regulators of 
GM foods interviewed from EFSA and the FSA were largely opposed to any further 
role being given to public opinion and felt that the authorisation process was adequate.  
The official from Defra showed a greater understanding that whatever the regulators 
may believe, the role of public opinion cannot be ignored as the events of the late 1990s 
demonstrated.  While it appears contradictory, I believe that the IRAs of GM foods 
routinely use public opinion to further the credibility of their regulatory stance. 
7.5 The privileged role given to public opinion in the regulation of genomics  
Figure 3 from Chapter 4 supports the argument of this thesis that the public opinion 
input in the regulation of genomics has been given a privileged or enhanced role.  
Figure 3 outlined the normative arguments given in the field of genomics for a greater 
reference to public opinion and also listed the substantive responses identified in this 
thesis to these normative arguments.  Rhetorically, public opinion has been given a 
privileged role in regulatory decision-making in genomics, relative to other spheres of 
regulation, yet in practice the research shows that public opinion data may not be 
representative of the public opinion and that the collection of public opinion data is not 
a prerequisite for responsive regulation.  A distinction was made in the thesis between 
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the rhetoric surrounding public opinion inclusion and the nature of the role played by 
public opinion in the evolution of the regulatory field. 
One conclusion from this thesis is that there has been a significant enhancement of the 
role given to public opinion in the regulation of genomics.  In analysing the reasons for 
this, it is important to differentiate between the rhetorical use of the term ‘public 
opinion’ and the cases where there is evidence that public opinion data has been a 
significant contributor to regulatory decision-making.  It is salient to note that due to the 
discretion offered to the IRA in the interpretation and use of the public opinion input, it 
is exceedingly difficult to quantify the actual input of the public opinion data.  
Additionally, there is no reference in committee notes and regulatory documentation to 
the cases where public opinion data had been reviewed and where it was deemed more 
appropriate by the regulators to follow a course which did not respond to it.  Regulators 
will often choose to act in the public interest, which may be a very different stance to 
responding to public opinion and has overtones of paternalism. 
The level of political salience and media attention devoted to an issue is often no 
indication of the relative harm or risk posed.  IRAs are extremely sophisticated in the 
use and manipulation of the media to enhance their own regulatory status through, for 
instance, press releases and media and external relations.  While this is true, regulators 
are not responsible for the return of GM food to the political agenda, and it is stressed 
here that it is not the wish of the author to malign the role of the regulator.  The 
regulators interviewed came across as genuinely interested in the pursuance of 
regulation which meets the needs of society. 
7.6 The regulators’ views of public opinion 
To summarise the interviewees, it is necessary to stress that although the regulators 
spoken to all believed that public opinion data was a valuable input into the regulatory 
process, the degree to which they took it into account by regulators was questionable.  
While limitations with the data were discussed, it is evident that the IRAs and the 
individual regulators are undertaking a ‘best endeavours approach’ and are keen to have 
up-to-date, robust data.  The exception to this was a Member of the HFEA who was of 
the opinion that public consultation is something you can have too much of, and she 
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held that ‘there are areas where I don’t think the public has a very strong view’.465  In 
the course of the interviews the regulators gave the impression that they felt that they 
generally know what the public mood is.  This was not made explicit and they would 
clearly disagree if asked this directly, but when asked whether they had ever been 
surprised by the results of a consultation, only one interviewee answered that she had 
been and that related to only one specific case.   
One interesting finding from the interviews was the way that the regulators moved from 
one understanding of public opinion to another, crossing and interchanging throughout 
the interview.  This fluidity and interchangeability of understandings of public opinion 
is however problematic in that when the regulators argue that they are responding to the 
public, it is not clear whether they mean the stakeholders, the most influential interest 
group, or the clinicians or scientists.  As already stated in earlier chapters, there was 
strong agreement across the regulators interviewed that there has been a significant 
increase in consultation and recourse to public opinion.  Implicit in this is the idea that 
the regulators are more responsive than previously, yet the findings of this thesis do not 
show this to be so straightforward.  
 
In Chapter 4, the idea was posited of regulatory decision-making being carried out in 
response to different sources of evidence which needed to be deliberated over.  An 
official from the FSA interviewed in the course of this research contended that the 
public opinion was viewed in this light as another piece of evidence to be taken into 
consideration; although she did not allude to its ranking against the other pieces of 
evidence involved in the process. Regulatory decision-making is not however, a case of 
deliberating between different sources of empirical data; as Majone highlights, values 
and opinions count for a great deal.  Majone identifies the problems entailed in 
unregulated discussion which he argues would result in ‘unending dispute’. 466 It is for 
this reason that one cannot criticise too harshly the efforts of the regulatory institutions 
as it is necessary for them to delimit the deliberation.   
 
                                                          
465
 Member of the HFEA, Interviewee 1. 
466
 Majone, Giandomenico, (1998) ‘Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process’, Yale 
University  
239 
 
7.7 Special regulatory handling and the idiosyncrasies of the regulation of 
genomics 
The case-studies have highlighted some interesting commonalities across the regulation 
of genomics which would suggest that the regulations can be grouped in relation to the 
process from which the products and techniques originate.  This is in contrast to the 
perspective of regulation by product which is more prevalent in the USA.  In relation to 
GM foods, the product is regulated within the same IRA that oversees the regulation of 
novel foods, the special regulatory handling arises from the huge umbrella of regulation 
it sits under.  The contrast between the regulatory handling of prenatal testing and PGD 
was very revealing in that PGD has received a great deal of attention from the media, 
the regulators and the politicians alike.  Prenatal testing however has been regulated in 
the same fashion as other medical techniques with little regard for any emergent ethical 
issues.   
7.8 Evaluation of the Methodological Approach 
The methodology adopted in this thesis needed to facilitate the research in two ways.  
Firstly, it needed to respond to the challenging ambition of the research, namely, to 
analyse the interaction and impact upon each other of regulation and public opinion.  
While regulation and the accompanying documents relating to consultations can be 
easily accessed for analysis, the identification of correlations is less easy.  The second 
challenge was that of assessing the various sources and forms of public opinion data 
taken to be an input into the regulatory process, and further to use them against each 
other to see whether they resulted in similar findings. Evidently a mixed methods 
approach was an appropriate choice in responding to these challenges as it meant that 
the quantitative data in the form of survey data could be analysed in addition to the 
consultation and regulatory documents.  The interview data added a very important 
layer of richness to the study and while it is by no means representative of regulators, 
the fact that very senior officials were interviewed lends the data a level of import as 
these are the regulators ‘calling the shots’. 
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(i) Situating in a Socio-legal Studies Context 
The interdisciplinary nature of the study combined with the situating of the research 
within the socio-legal literature has benefited the study in offering novel perspectives on 
the findings.  The focus of the study was very challenging for the reason that correlation 
can often incorrectly be conflated with causation.  The findings here are therefore 
nuanced and subtle while equally opening up a field of rich research.  Adopting a socio-
legal stance has aided the research by allowing the exploration of the gap between the 
black letter of the regulation and the role denoted to public opinion in the regulatory and 
policy documentation as well as an analysis of the reality of the interactions between 
these two variables.   
The choice of genomics as a case-study has been very appropriate for this study as it is 
an area where public opinion is deemed central to the regulatory approach.  Genomics 
additionally encompasses a variety of products, processes and techniques enabling a 
wider study to ensue.  The very novelty surrounding the regulatory treatment of the 
products derived from genomics has been illuminating in terms of the roles of the 
principal IRAs and the impact of the regulation on public mood.  The choice to conduct 
a comparative study using the two case-studies of GM foods and Prenatal testing and 
PGD as representatives of green and red biotechnology has led to a more substantial 
thesis being produced than would have been possible had an analysis of the interplay 
between public opinion and regulation been limited to one case.  The choice of a 
comparative case-study approach has meant that common features which link the cases 
are highlighted, giving a greater support to the argument that the regulation of genomics 
can be considered a discrete area than is suggested by the wide range of products 
encompassed under the term. 
(ii) The Survey Data 
An evaluation of the methodological approach used in this thesis must acknowledge the 
limitations of the data that arise from the nature of the survey data, as discussed earlier 
in the thesis.  If one could conduct a meta-review of survey data in a bounded time-
frame in relation to each of the case-studies then evidently a far superior study would 
ensue.   
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(iii) The Elite Interviews 
One problem which arose in relation to the qualitative research was that of finding 
regulators who were willing to be interviewed and agreed to a time which they stuck to.  
These issues arose as a consequence of my status as a PhD student and due to the fact 
that the regulators, as with the majority of prospective elite interviewees, are busy 
people.467 As an interesting aside, one regulator I approached who worked in the GM 
Team at Defra responded to my interview request by stating quite rudely that he had 
nothing to do with the public as the team were all scientists.  I later interviewed a more 
senior member of the same Defra GM team who was extraordinarily helpful and who 
couldn’t stress more how important public opinion was in making regulatory decisions! 
7.9 Are there lessons that can be learned from the regulation of genomics that 
will help Regulators in other novel technologies? 
Both the literature and the regulators interviewed often discuss the idea that the GM 
story will lead to lessons being learned by policy makers and regulators who will in the 
future respond with greater sensitivity to public anxiety.  It is argued that things have 
changed, the levels of consultation are higher, and the sophistication of the consultation 
and surveys conducted have improved over the last couple of decades.  The 
recommendations for regulators following this study are to continue with public 
consultations on the grounds that the stakeholders need to be consulted.  However, 
robust survey data also is needed as it is a more representative indicator of the opinions 
of the general public.  The combination of these different sources of data will give the 
regulators knowledge of a wider breadth of opinion.  A further recommendation is that 
this data is used with a greater awareness of its limitations in representing the public 
opinion. 
It would be inappropriate to apply the findings of this thesis as a whole to the field of 
the regulation of genomics, because while this field originates from a common ground 
which does imbue it with some similarities, the regulatory set-up is very product 
orientated.  The connections which unite the techniques and products resulting from 
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genomics are the enhanced role played by public opinion, public concerns and anxieties, 
and the regulatory lacunae resulting from the fast developing technology. 
While transparency of processes is a prerequisite for a smoothly run democratic state, it 
is not wholly a case of increasing transparency in order for the gap to be highlighted 
between public opinion data as a procedural input and public opinion as it is used in 
regulatory debate.  To achieve this, regulatory regimes need to become more deeply 
involved in the interpretation and discussion of the procedures.  Central to an 
improvement in the workings of the interaction between public opinion and regulation, 
is a recognition of the limitations of public opinion data per se and a less reverent view 
of this data as justification for a particular regulatory stance. 
Genomics has some very idiosyncratic features which lead to its special political 
handling.  The most pertinent of these are the associated ethical dilemmas and the speed 
of technological development which often mean the regulators are responding to 
situations rather than forward planning.  Regulatory lacunae arise as it is exceedingly 
difficult for regulators to anticipate products or techniques which will develop and need 
to be regulated.  This is at the heart of the issue when it comes to public concern 
however, and one recommendation of this thesis is that regulators should formalise 
relationships with scientists and attempt to anticipate areas of regulation which will 
require attention in order to be effective in the light of novel product developments.  In 
support of anticipatory governance, Guston argues that regulators should turn from 
precaution which ‘connotes acting to avoid predicted and uncertain hazards’ to 
anticipation which ‘denotes building the capacity to respond to unpredicted and 
unpredictable risks’.468  This may be a means to reassure the public through regulatory 
oversight. This concept of regulators developing forecasting skills is not unrealistic; 
science and industry develop products for decades in advance of them being put into the 
public domain.  Equally it is not argued here that the only concern of the public is 
safety, since there are evident ethical concerns and through some higher level of 
regulatory foresight the debates surrounding new techniques could be discussed at an 
earlier stage meaning that whether to permit or to prohibit such an activity could be 
decided in advance.   
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7.10 Further Research Openings 
This research approach could be broadened to study the interactions between regulation 
and public opinion in other novel technologies such as nanotechnology or synthetic 
biology where the regulatory set up is still very formative and the public awareness of 
the products arising from these technologies is very low.  This would give insights into 
how the regulators are using the ‘public opinion input’ in these areas of novel 
technology.  One could also analyse the levels of public concern regarding these new 
products and techniques as well as the regulators handling of and response to such 
anxieties.  Alternatively, the current focus could be deepened and analysed with 
additional and more recent sources of public opinion data as a meta review.  Finally the 
research could be taken in new directions, for example it would be fascinating to 
analyse the role of the social scientist in the midst of the interplay between regulation 
and public opinion.   
7.11 A Final Comment on Regulatory Resolution  
The idea that regulation has the capacity to bring about public ease or to placate public 
unrest and anxiety has to some level been borne out in this thesis.  While the case-
studies analysed are each idiosyncratic, it is the case of GM foods which commentators 
persistently return to because there is a lack of policy resolution and a level of 
frustration about this amongst the regulators.  This thesis has shown that regulation has 
helped to reduce levels of public concern but it has not resolved the issue in either the 
minds of the suppliers of GM products, the public or the regulators.  In summary 
therefore the science has imbued the regulatory projection: there will not be regulatory 
resolution until the contested harm of GM foods is resolved and the contested benefits 
of prenatal testing and PGD are established.  It may be that resolution is not achievable.   
This thesis has shown that the public opinion model which has become common place 
in the regulation of genomics does not work.  The idea that the public can be placated 
by the incorporation of public opinion into the regulatory process has limited success.  
One reason has been that the findings of some of the IRAs’ consultations have been 
based on stakeholder views.  A further reason is the confusion caused by the conflation 
between public opinion and the public interest.  As Feintuck argues public interest is an 
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‘empty vessel’ for the regulators to fill.469  The regulatory system does not provide an 
adequate framework for areas which are controversial or where harm and benefits are 
contested.  This thesis helps to explain the limitations of the public opinion model and 
in doing so offers understandings of the regulatory system and the role played by public 
opinion in the regulation of genomics.  It is for this reason that I suggest that the gauge 
which regulators refer to as ‘public opinion’ should for reasons of transparency be 
called ‘public opinion data’.  Public opinion data is defined as the results of formal 
attempts to measure opinion.  Such a move would reflect its value in the process but 
simultaneously indicate that such data has inherent limitations.  This would increase 
transparency in the regulatory system.  
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Appendix 1 
Information/Consent Form for Research Interviews 
 
Title of Research Project  
The Role of Public Opinion in the Regulation of Genomics in the UK 
Details of Project 
The research aims to establish whether there is any evidence of a two-way relationship between 
the regulation of and public attitudes to genomics.  As such both the responsiveness of the 
regulation to public attitudes and whether the regulation plays a role in changing public attitudes 
to the technologies will be analysed.  The case studies being researched are GM foods and 
prenatal testing including pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). 
You have been asked to take part in this research as you work for one of the regulatory bodies 
which I am studying and I am interested in your thoughts about the role of public opinion and 
regulation in the field in which you work.  It is anticipated that the interview will last 
approximately one hour. 
 
Contact Details 
For further information about the research or your interview data, please contact: 
Kate Getliffe, University of Exeter, Egenis, Byrne House, St Germans Road, Exeter EX4 
4PJ , Email: ksg203@exeter.ac.uk 
 
If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss with someone 
independent of it, please contact: 
Professor Oliver James, Politics Department, University of Exeter, 
Email: O.James@exeter.ac.uk 
Confidentiality 
Interview data and transcripts will be held in confidence. They will not be used other than for 
the purposes described above and third parties will not be allowed access to them (except in the 
case of legal subpoena). However, if you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your 
interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please give your 
email below). 
 
Anonymity 
Would you prefer your interview information to be held and used on an anonymous basis, with 
no mention of your name? (Note that I still need to refer to the Institution/Organisation you 
work for or represent).     
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PLEASE CIRCLE  YES  / NO 
 
IF YES Pseudonym to be used :................................................................ 
Institution/ Organisation:................................................................. 
  
IF NO   Name of interviewee:....................................................................... 
  Signature: ......................................................................................... 
  Email/phone:..................................................................................... 
  Institution/ Organisation:.................................................................. 
 
 
Consent  
I voluntarily agree to participate and to the use of my data for the purposes specified above. I 
can withdraw consent at any time by contacting the interviewer.  
TICK HERE:  

  
 
Interviewee signature……………………………. Date…………………………..... 
 
 
Interviewer signature……………………………... Date……………………………. 
 
 
247 
 
Appendix 2 
Interview Schedule 
Opening question 
1. I wondered if you would be able to tell me a bit about your work. - What does 
being a member of [relevant IRA] entail?  
 
Core Questions 
2. My research examines the role of public opinion in the regulatory process and I 
wonder how responsive you feel regulators are to public opinion?  What weight 
do you feel is given to the views of the public? 
3. Public opinion is a pretty vague concept - how do you think it is generally 
defined by regulators and policy makers? 
4. Expert opinion - What do you think is the role of expert opinion, e.g. from 
clinicians?  Should it at times outweigh the views of the public?   
5. This also relates to the role of the regulator and the question of the level of 
autonomy of the [principal IRA] to make decisions within its mandate and 
whether it should devolve clinical decision-making and technical standards 
down to patients and professionals /Scientists (in the case of GM foods)  
6. What do you think about the idea of alignment of PGD with prenatal diagnosis?  
Do you think they should be regulated on the same basis and do you feel it is 
currently in line?  [not a relevant question for GM foods] 
7. Do you feel that the public have a greater understanding of [insert case-study] 
now than say ten years ago?   
8. Why do you say this?  What grounds are there for this? 
9. Is it important that the individuals consulted as representatives of the public can 
produce an informed opinion? I note for example in the [example of one of a 
specific consultation and the levels of knowledge displayed]  - Is the opinion of 
an informed public more significant? 
10. In general terms, do you think that the findings of consultation exercises 
representative of public opinion? 
11. (if no, ………) Why then, do you think the results retain their significance in the 
regulatory process? 
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12. Do you think that regulation has the capacity to shape public opinion?  (if yes, 
how does it do this?) 
13. Can you tell me about the [relevant IRA] consultation processes? – Do you feel 
these consultation processes are an effective measurement of public opinion? –is 
the data produced representative of public opinion? 
14. Do you feel that survey data is useful?   
15. Have you been involved personally in any consultation exercises?  Could you 
tell me about the experience? 
16. What role do the media play in influencing your view of the public opinion on 
an issue?  Are you influenced by newspaper reports on public opinion? 
17. When you are out socially, e.g. At non-work parties etc., and you chat about 
your work – do peoples’ responses have any bearing on your understandings or 
ideas of what the public think?   
18. Beyond accountability and issues of democracy, do you feel that recognition of 
the public opinion and responsiveness to it improves regulatory output? 
19. Do you feel that public opinion is given a greater weighting in the determination 
of policy in the application of genetic technologies relative to other 
technologies?   
 
Wrapping up 
20. I was just wondering whether there is anyone who you could recommend who 
would be useful for me to interview, maybe someone who deals with public 
consultations? 
21. Is there anything that you would like to add?  Is there any question that you 
think I should have asked but didn’t? 
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